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The Big Mac Index, introduced by The Economist magazine more than two decades ago, 
claims  to  provide  the  “true  value”  of  a  large  number  of  currencies.    This  paper  assesses  the 
economic value of this index.  We show that (i) the index suffers from a substantial bias; (ii) once 
the bias is allowed for, the index tracks exchange rates reasonably well over the medium to longer 
term in accordance with relative purchasing power parity theory; (iii) the index is at least as good as 
the industry standard, the random walk model, in predicting future currency values for all but short-
term horizons; and (iv) future nominal exchange rates are more responsive than prices to currency 
mispricing.  While not perfect, at a cost of less than $US10 per year, the index seems to provide 
good value for money. 
 
                                                 
*We would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Grace Gao, Ze Min Hu, Callum Jones and Tom 
Simpson,  and  helpful  comments  from  Aimee  Kaye,  Geoffrey  Kingston  and  seminar  participants  at  UWA  and  the 
Economic  Measurement  Group  Workshop,  Centre  for  Applied  Economic  Research,  UNSW.    This  research  was 
supported in part by the ARC, ACIL Tasman, AngloGold Ashanti, WA Department of Industry and Resources and the 
Business School, The University of Western Australia.  The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of the 





1.  Introduction  
In 1972, just prior to the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the 
US dollar cost about 40 British pence.  By 1985, the dollar had appreciated to 90 pence, but by the 
end of December 2008 it had fallen back to 67 pence.  As such substantial changes in currency 
values over the longer term are commonplace in a world of floating exchange rates, understanding 
the  valuation  of  currencies  is  a  significant  intellectual  challenge  and  of  great  importance  for 
economic policy, the smooth functioning of  financial markets, and the financial management of 
many international companies.   
While exchange-rate economics is a controversial area, a substantial body of research now 
finds that over the longer term exchange rates are “anchored” by price levels.  This idea is embodied 
in purchasing power parity (PPP) theory, which states that the exchange rate is proportional to the 
ratio  of  price  levels  in  the  two  countries.  To  illustrate,  Figure  1.1  uses  annual  data  to  plot  the 
exchange rate (relative to the US dollar) of the United Kingdom and Japan and the ratio of their 
price level to that of the US.  British prices increased relative to those in the US over the past 30 
years, while those of Japan decreased.  According to PPP theory, the British pound should have 
depreciated  (an  increase  in  the  pound  cost  of  the  dollar),  and  the  Japanese  yen  should  have 
appreciated.    This  is  what  in  fact  happened.    Even  though  at  times  the  exchange  rate  deviates 
substantially from the price ratio, there is a distinct tendency for this ratio to play the role of the 
underlying trend, or anchor, for the exchange rate.  That is to say, while the exchange rate meanders 
around the price ratio, over time it has a tendency to revert to this trend value, so the ratio can be 
thought of as the “underlying value” of the currency.  Figure 1.1 thus provides some prima facie 
evidence in favour of PPP over the long term. 
A new and simple way of making PPP comparisons was introduced in 1986 by The Economist 
magazine.  This involves using the price of a Big Mac hamburger at home and abroad as the price 
ratio that reflects the underlying value of the currency.  This price ratio is known as the “Big Mac 
Index” (BMI), which forms the basis for “burgernomics”.  When compared to the actual exchange 
rate, the BMI purports to give an indication of the extent to which a currency is over- or under-
valued according to the law of one price.  “[Seeking] to make exchange-rate theory more digestible” 
(The  Economist,  9
th  April  1998),  the  Index  has  been  published  over  a  lengthy  period  for  an 
increasing number of currencies (now more than 40) and is claimed to be a successful new product 






The [Big Mac] Index was first served up in September 1986 as a relatively simple way 
to calculate the over- and under-valuation of currencies against the dollar.  It soon 
caught on.  Such was its popularity that it was updated the following January, and has 
now become the best-known regular feature in The Economist.
1 
 
In an instructive metaphor, The Economist (26
th August 1995) describes the approach underlying the 
BMI in the following terms: 
Suppose a man climbs five feet up a sea wall, then climbs down twelve feet.  Whether he 
drowns or not depends upon how high above sea-level he was when he started.  The 
same problem arises in deciding whether currencies are under- or over-valued.”  
The current exchange rate is analogous to the position of the man on the sea wall and the PPP rate is 
the  sea-level,  so  that  whether  the  currency  is  correctly  priced  by  the  market  is  determined  by 
reference to its PPP value.  The identification of the PPP value of a currency with the sea-level also 
accords with the idea that “water finds its own level”, so that over time the currency should tend to 
revert to its PPP value.  While an informal currency pricing model, the BMI is rooted in PPP theory 
and  provides  a  fascinating  example  of  the  productive  interplay  between  fundamental  economic 
research, journalism and financial markets.  
The  literature  on  PPP  in  general  is  large  and  growing,  and  several  good  surveys  are 
available, including Froot and Rogoff  (1995),  Lan  and Ong (2003),  MacDonald (2007), Rogoff 
(1996), Sarno and Taylor (2002), Taylor and Taylor (2004) and Taylor (2006).  Early contributors to 
academic research on the BMI include Annaert and Ceuster (1997), Click (1996), Cumby (1996), 
Ong (1997) and Pakko and Pollard (1996), while more recent papers include Chen et al. (2005), 
Clements and Lan (2010), Lan (2006) and Parsley and Wei (2007); a comprehensive review of the 
burgernomics literature is provided later in the paper.  As a way of illustrating professional interest 
in  PPP,  we  conducted  a  keyword  search  for  the  term  “purchasing  power  parity”  or  “PPP”  in 
Factiva.
2  As a basis for comparison, we also searched for four broad economic terms -- “inflation”, 
“unemployment”, “interest rate” and “exchange rate” -- and another relatively narrow term, “foreign 
direct investment” (or “FDI”), together with the “Big Mac Index”.  Figure 1.2 plots on the left-hand 
axis the number of articles published on each topic in each of the past three decades.  As this axis 
uses a logarithmic scale, the change in the height of the bars from one decade to the next indicates 
                                                 
1 From “Ten Years of the Big Mac Index”, published on The Economist web site (http://www.economist.com, consulted 
14  July  1999).    The  Economist  also  publishes  other  similar  PPP  gauges.    The  “Coca-Cola  map”  appeared  in  the 
magazine in 1997 and shows a strong positive correlation between per capita consumption of Coke in a country and that 
country’s quality of life.  In 2004, the “Tall Latte Index” was proposed, which is based on the price of a cup of Tall Latte 
coffee at Starbucks in more than 30 countries.  This index provides roughly similar, albeit not identical, results to the 
BMI.  Inspired by such single-good indices, other institutions have devised similar measures, such as the “iTunes Index” 
featured in Business Review Weekly, an Australian business magazine, in August 2006, and the “iPod Index” compiled 
by CommSec Australia in January 2007 (James, 2007a, b). 




the exponential rate of growth for each topic.  The right-hand vertical axis gives the average growth 
rate, on an annual basis, for each topic.  It can be seen that PPP has grown at an average annual rate 
of about 25 percent p.a., which ranks immediately below that of foreign direct investment, while the 
BMI has almost the same growth rate as FDI of 32 percent.  Thus while the number of articles on 
PPP and the BMI are still smaller than the four broader areas, this topic is clearly of substantial 
professional importance and growing rapidly. 
As the BMI is now a mature product, a broad evaluation of its workings and performance is 
appropriate.  We show that although it is not perfect, the Index offers considerable insight into the 
operation of currency markets.  In Section 2, we set the scene by discussing PPP theory in some 
detail.  Then follows in Section 3 an account of the workings of the BMI, where it is established that 
it is subject to serious bias.  Once the Index is adjusted for this bias, we show in Section 4 that 
exchange rates tend to revert to the mean, roughly speaking, after a period of about 4 years.  Section 
5 examines the predictive ability of the BMI and establishes that over (under) -valued currencies 
subsequently  depreciate  (appreciate).    How  this  effect  is  split  between  a  future  change  in  the 
nominal rate and inflation is discussed in Sections 6 and 7.  The possible role of the United States 
dollar in generating common shocks to all other currencies is explored in Section 8.  Section 9 
contains a survey of the literature on burgernomics and concluding comments are given in Section 
10. 
 
2.  Three Versions of PPP 
This  section  gives  an  account  of  PPP  theory  by  presenting  the  three  versions:  
Absolute,  relative  and  stochastic.    This  material  provides  the  theoretical  underpinnings  for  the 
remainder of the paper.  
Let  i P  denote the domestic price of good i in terms of domestic currency and 
*
i P  the price of 
the same good in the foreign country in terms of foreign currency.  With zero transaction costs and 
no barriers to international trade, arbitrage equalises the cost of the good expressed in terms of a 
common currency:  
(2.1) 
*
i i P SP =  
where  S  is  the  spot  exchange  rate  (the  domestic  currency  cost  of  a  unit  of  foreign  currency).  
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As prices in a given row are expressed in terms of the same currency, they are comparable “row-
wise”, not “column-wise”.   
Further, let  i w  and 
*
i w  denote the share of good i in the economy at home and abroad, with  
* n n
i 1 i 1 i i w w 1, = = = = ∑ ∑  where n is the number of goods.  Then, multiplying both sides of equation 
(2.1) by  i w  and summing over i 1, ,n, = …  we obtain   
n n
*
i i i i
i 1 i 1
w P S w P .
= =
= ∑ ∑  
As the left-hand side of this equation is a share-weighted average of the n prices at home, it is 
interpreted as a price index, which we write as 
n
i 1 i i P w P. = = ∑   But as the right-hand side of the above 
equation applies domestic weights to foreign prices, it is not a conventional price index.  To make 
some progress, we need the simplifying assumption that the foreign and domestic weights coincide, 
so that 
* * * * n n
i 1 i 1 i i i i w P w P P , = = = = ∑ ∑  an index of the price level abroad.  Thus we have   
(2.2) 
* P SP , =  
which is an economy-wide version of condition (2.1).  We can interpret P as the domestic currency 
cost of a basket of goods at home, while 
* P  is the cost of the same basket abroad.  Thus, 
* P S  
converts this foreign currency cost into domestic currency units and the ratio  ) P S /( P
*  is a measure 
of  the  relative  price  of  the  two  baskets.    Expressing  equation  (2.2)  as 
* S P/P , =  we  obtain  the 
absolute version of PPP, whereby the exchange rate is the ratio of domestic to foreign prices.  Using 
lowercase letters to denote logarithmic values of variables, we obtain  
(2.3) 
* s p p . = −  
Writing 
* r p p = −  for relative prices, the above can be expressed as s r. =    






which is the logarithmic relative price of the two baskets.  According to absolute PPP, the real 
exchange rate  




relative to those abroad, and the currency is said to be “overvalued in real terms”, and vice-versa.  If 
there is a tendency for the real rate to revert to it PPP value, a non-zero value of q signals some form 
of disequilibrium, calling for future readjustments of prices and/or the exchange rate.   
Before  proceeding,  it  is  worthwhile  to  emphasise  the  restrictive  conditions  under  which 
absolute parity holds.  The assumption of zero transport costs and other barriers to trade rules out a 
“wedge” between foreign and domestic prices.  It also serves to exclude from PPP considerations all 
non-traded goods, those goods that do not enter into international trade due to prohibitive transport 
costs.  As in a developed economy non-traded goods constitute something like 70 percent of GDP, 
their exclusion would seem to limit drastically the applicability of PPP theory, at least in its absolute 
form.  Below, we return to transport costs and in the next section, we return to the related issue of 
non-traded goods.  A further restrictive condition underlying PPP is the assumption that the market 
basket associated with the price index is identical in the two countries. 
We now present a geometric exposition of PPP theory.  The left graph of Panel A of Figure 2.1 
presents the absolute PPP relationship, which is a 45-degree line passing through the origin.  As this 
PPP line has a unit slope, any combination of s and r that lies on the line satisfies s r, =  so that the 
real exchange rate q r s 0. = − =   On this PPP line, an increase in the relative price from  1 r  to  2 r , for 
example, leads to an equi-proportional depreciation of the nominal exchange rate s, as is illustrated 
by the movement from point A to B, whereby  2 1 2 1 s s r r. − = −  The PPP ray acts as a boundary that 
divides up the exchange-rate/price space into two regions of mispricing.  As shown on the right-
hand  graph  of  Panel  A,  points  above  the  ray  indicate  an  undervaluation  of  the  home-country 
currency ( ) q 0 , <  where s is too high and/or r is too low.  In this region, the price of the domestic 
basket (P) is below that of the foreign basket 
* SP . Conversely, points below the PPP ray represent 
an overvalued domestic currency ( ) q 0 . >  Only at the boundary between these two regions is the 
currency correctly priced ( ) q 0 . =  
Let us now consider transport costs and any other barriers to the free flow of goods across 
borders that inhibit the equalisation of prices.  With transport costs and other barriers, rather than 
having  equation  (2.1),  we  now  have  a  generalisation 
*
i i i P S(1 T )P , = +  where  i T  measures  the 
proportionate  wedge  between  domestic  and  foreign  prices,  which  for  short  we  term  “transport 
costs”.  If these costs are approximately constant over time, then  
(2.5) 
*




where a circumflex (“^”) represents relative change ( ) ˆ x dx/x . =  Equation (2.5) represents a weaker 
version of the law of one price as it is formulated in terms of changes not levels.  We can then 
weight as before and aggregate over goods to obtain  
(2.6) 
* ˆ ˆ ˆ P S P , = +  
where 
n
i 1 i i ˆ ˆ P w P = = ∑  is  the  change  in  the  cost  of  the  basket  of  goods  at  home  and 
* ˆ P  is  the 
corresponding change for the foreign country.  As these measures are share-weighted averages of 
the (infinitesimal) changes in the n individual prices, they are interpreted as Divisia price indexes.  
Integrating  equation  (2.6)  we  obtain   
* P KSP , =  where  K  is  a  constant  of  integration,  or  in 
logarithmic form 
(2.7) 
* s p p k. = − −    
This is the relative version of PPP.  As  ˆ x dx/x d(logx), = =  equation (2.7) implies  
(2.8) 
* ˆ ˆ ˆ S P P , = −  
where  P ˆ  and 
* P ˆ  are  interpreted  as  inflation  at  home  and  abroad,  respectively.    In  words,  the 
proportionate change in the exchange rate is equal to the inflation differential.  Thus high-inflation 
countries experience depreciating currencies and vice-versa, which is the open-economy version of 
the quantity theory of money.  It is to be noted that equation (2.8) is just a rearrangement of equation 
(2.6).  Note also that relative PPP expressed in (2.7) includes absolute PPP as a special case where k 
=  0,  or  K 1 =  in 
* P KSP . =  To  summarise,  relative  parity  implies  that  the  exchange  rate  is 
proportional to the price ratio, with the  factor  of proportionality not necessarily  equal to unity.  
Under absolute parity, the proportionality factor is unity so that the exchange rate equals the price 
ratio.
3 
Geometrically, under relative PPP the relationship between s and the relative price 
* p p r − =  
is a straight line of the form s r k, = −  which is presented on the left graph of Panel B of Figure 2.1.  
Along this line, the real exchange rate is q r s k, = − =  which is constant.  This relative PPP line also 
has a unit slope, but an intercept  k 0. − ≠   Again, as we move up the line from A to B, an increase in 
the relative price still leads to an equiproportional depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, so that  
2 1 2 1 s s r r. − = −  As before, points above the relative PPP line correspond to an undervaluation of the 
domestic currency ( ) q k 0 − <  and those below the line correspond to an overvaluation ( ) q k 0 , − >  
                                                 
3 A further issue about the distinction between absolute and relative PPP should be noted.  Almost invariably statistical 
agencies publish information on the cost of a basket of goods in the form of a price index that has an arbitrary base, 





but in comparison with absolute PPP, the boundary between the two regions is now “vertically 
displaced”, as indicated by the graph given on the right-hand side of Panel B in Figure 2.1. 
Panel C for Figure 2.1 gives the case of stochastic PPP.
4  If we denote the stochastic deviation 
from relative parity by e with  0 ) e ( E =  and variance 
2, σ  the real exchange rate is then the random 
variable  e k q − =  with 
2 var(q) 0, = σ >  so that q is obviously not constant.  Initially, suppose for 
simplicity  that  e  is  a  discrete  random  variable  and  that  0 e1<  and  0 e2 >  are  its  only  possible 
values.  When the shock is  1 e 0, <  we obtain a new, lower 45-degree line,  1 s k e r, = − + +  which has 
an intercept of   1 k e ; − +  similarly,  0 e2 >  results in the upper line on the left graph of Panel C.  
Consider the situation in which s is the exchange rate and r1 is the relative price, so that we are 
located at the point W on the left graph of Panel C.  If there is now the same increase in the relative 
price as before, so that r rises from r1 to r2, then, in the presence of the shock e1, we move from W to 
the point X with the rate depreciating to s0.  But if the shock is e2, the same relative price r2 leads to 
an exchange rate of  s , as indicated by the point Y.  More generally, if relative prices change within 
the range  ] r , r [ 2 1  and if the shocks can now vary continuously within the range  1 2 [e , e ], then the 
exchange-rate/relative-price points lie somewhere in the shaded parallelogram WXYZ.  Thus, the 
relationship between the exchange rate and prices is s r k e, = − +  which is the stochastic version of 
PPP.  Due to the random shocks e, the exchange rate and prices are no longer proportionate.  It is to 
be noted that the height of the shaded parallelogram exceeds its base, which accords with the idea 
that exchange rates are much more volatile than prices in the short run (Frenkel and Mussa, 1980).  
However in the long run, as  0 ) e ( E =  and thus E(s) r k, = −  relative PPP holds and the expected 
value of the real exchange rate  k ) q ( E =  is constant.  Here, k is the long-run, or equilibrium, value 
of the real exchange rate.   
Therefore in the case of stochastic PPP, the real exchange rate q is not constant and fluctuates 
around k, so that exchange rates and prices are scattered around the 45-degree line.  This is in 
contrast to relative PPP, in which q is a constant value for any combination of s and r and all (s, r) 
pairs locate exactly on the 45-degree line.  In other words, stochastic PPP means that there exists a 
“neutral band” around the 45-degree line that contains values of the exchange rate and prices that 
identify the currency as being “correctly priced”.  Under relative PPP, these points are interpreted as 
deviations  from  parity.    Obviously,  the  width  of  the  band  is  the  key  to  this  approach:  if  it  is 
                                                 
4 For an earlier rendition of stochastic PPP, see Lan (2002).  For related work, see MacDonald and Stein (1999).  Note 
also that MacDonald (2007, p. 42) considers PPP within an environment in which there are transaction costs in moving 
goods from one country to another.  According to this broader version of PPP, there exists a “neutral band” within which 




sufficiently wide, then all possible configurations of exchange rates and prices would be contained 
in the band, and the approach would be vacuous.  On the other hand, if the band is sufficiently 
narrow, all observations would locate outside it, and the approach would always be rejected.  One 
way to strike a balance between the “too wide” and “too narrow” band problems is to proceed 
probabilistically.   
Consider  the  probability  distribution  of  the  real  exchange  rate  q  with  k ) q ( E =  and 
2 var(q) . =σ   We commence with the symmetric case in which the probability of the exchange rate 
being undervalued ( ) q k 0 − <  is  2 α  and the same  2 α  is the probability of the currency being 
overvalued ( ) q k 0 , − >  where 0 1. < α <   In other words, we can interpret  2 α  as the mass in each 
tail of the distribution, so that our task is to characterise the location of the tails.  According to 
Chebyshev’s inequality  
                  ( )
2
2 Pr q k c ,
c
σ
− > ≤   
where c is a positive constant.  We interpret c as defining the boundary, so that  
2 2 /c , α = σ  or  
2 c / . = σ α   Thus, the lower bound is  
2 k / − σ α   and the upper bound is  
2 k / . + σ α   The 
region of correct pricing is indicated in the area between the lines  ' DD  and  ' FF  on the right graph of 
Panel C, which is defined by   
(2.9)  − k z  q k z, ≤ ≤ +   
where  z
2 z / . = = σ α   The points above the line DD', which correspond to the case  − < k q z,  
indicate  that  the  currency  is  undervalued,  while  points  below  the  line  ' FF   ( ) q k z > +  identify 
overvaluation.  Statistically, if we have a number of observations on q,  100 α×  percent of these 
would lie outside the band and the remaining (1 ) 100 −α ×  percent inside it.  In the above situation, 
the deviations are symmetric around the mean, so that there are equal probabilities of currency 
undervaluation  and  overvaluation  and  z  z. =    In  the  more  general  case,  the  distribution  of  q is 
asymmetric  and  the  long-run  relative  PPP  line,  EE',  does  not  lie  mid-way  between  the  two 
boundaries  ' DD  and FF'.   
The above analysis does not hinge on q following any particular probability distribution -- it is 
distribution  free.    If  we  have  information  on  the  form  of  the  distribution,  then  this  additional 
information can be used to tighten the neutral band.  Consider for the purpose of illustration the case 
of the normal distribution whereby 





Pr 1.96 1.96 1 0.95,
−   − < < = −α =   σ  
 
so that the neutral band for q is [ ] k 1.96 , k 1.96 . − σ + σ   Contrast the width of this band with that 
implied  by  the  Chebyshev’s  inequality,  expression  (2.9).    With  0.05 α =  as  before,  we  have  
z
2 z / 20 4.47 , = = σ α = σ = σ  so that the neutral band is [ ] k 4.47 , k 4.47 . − σ + σ   Thus the width 
of the band under normality is 2 1.96 , × σ  while under Chebyshev’s inequality, it is 2 4.47 , × σ  so that 
the additional information that the distribution is normal results in a shrinkage of the band width by 
about 50  percent. 
It is worth noting that this approach to currency valuation resembles hypothesis testing.  To see 
this, imagine the existence of an unknown “true” state of the world in which the currency is either 
correctly or incorrectly priced, and we observe only whether or not the exchange-price configuration 
is  located  within  the  neutral  band.    There  are  four  possible  outcomes  of  the  application  of  the 
approach: 
(i)  When  the  currency  is  in  fact  correctly  priced  and  stochastic  PPP  identifies  this  situation 
accurately, i.e., the (s, r) point is located in the neutral band.  As the inference is correct, the 
procedure works satisfactorily.   
(ii)  When the currency is in fact correctly priced, but stochastic PPP yields the conclusion that it is 
undervalued or overvalued.  There is an  100 α ×  percent probability of this incorrect inference 
being drawn, which is analogous to a Type I error. 
(iii)  When the currency is in fact incorrectly priced, but stochastic PPP indicates that the currency 
is correctly priced.  This is similar to the case of a Type II error. 
(iv)  When the currency is in fact incorrectly priced, and stochastic PPP accurately indicates that the 
currency is incorrectly priced.  In this situation, the correct inference is drawn. 





Does (s, r) lie in the neutral band? 
True currency pricing 
Yes   No 
Correct   Reliable inference  Type I error 
Incorrect  Type II error  Reliable inference 
To conclude this section, consider an arbitrary combination of s and r, which is represented by 
the same point  C  in all three right-hand graphs of Figure 2.1.  As C lies above the PPP ray in 
Panels A and B, both absolute and relative PPP indicate that the currency is undervalued.  However, 
according to stochastic PPP (Panel C), the currency is correctly priced as the point C lies within the 
neutral band.  This situation is likely to be frequently encountered in practice with many apparent 
departures  from  parity  simply  associated  with  the  inherent  volatility  of  currency  markets.    For 
example, some departures may be insufficient to justify the costs of moving goods internationally 
and/or  taking  a  currency  position,  especially  if  they  are  expected  to  soon  reverse  themselves.  
Therefore, to value a currency, it is crucial that the proper distinction be made between the three 
versions of PPP. 
 
3.  The Workings of the Big Mac Index 
The previous section highlighted the restrictive conditions under which absolute parity holds, 
viz., (i) the absence of barriers to international trade, which also rules out nontraded goods; and (ii) 
identical  baskets  underlying  the  price  indexes  in  the  home  and  foreign  countries.    The  weaker 
condition of relative PPP largely avoids the first problem, which accounts for its more frequent use 
in practice, but the problem of identical baskets remains.  Surprisingly, the Big Mac Index (BMI) 
uses absolute parity in the context of a single-good basket, a Big Mac hamburger.  In this section, 
we illustrate the workings of the BMI and, as it purports to have much to say about the workings of 
the  real-world  currency  markets,  we  assess  how  the  Index  deals  with  the  above  two  restrictive 
conditions and how it performs in practice. 
Though  just  a  single  good,  a  McDonald’s  Big  Mac  hamburger  has  a  variety  of  tradable 
ingredients such as ground beef, cheese, lettuce, onions, bread, etc., and non-tradable ingredients 
such as labour, rent, and electricity, as well as other ingredients such as cooking oil, pickles and 
sesame seeds.  By estimating the Big Mac cost function using the prices of the various ingredients, 
Parsley and Wei (2007) recover the recipe in “broad” basket form.  They find that the shares of 





Ingredient  Cost share (%) 
Tradable   
Beef  9.0 
Cheese  9.4 
Bread  12.1             30.5 
Nontradable   
Labour  45.6 
Rent  4.6 
Electricity   5.1            55.3 
Other    14.2 
Total    100.0 
We can thus regard the price of a Big Mac as being the cost of a basket of inputs, just like P  of the 
previous section is the cost of a market basket of goods.  By comparing the price of a Big Mac in the 
US and other countries, The Economist magazine judges whether currencies are correctly priced 
based on the idea that a Big Mac should cost the same everywhere around the world when using a 
common currency.  As the basket associated with the prices can be considered almost identical in 
the home and foreign countries, the BMI cleverly avoids problem (ii) above associated with absolute 
PPP.  But as transport costs and other trade barriers are not allowed when comparing prices, this is 
an application of absolute PPP.   
As discussed in the previous section, the arbitrage foundation of absolute parity applies to 
traded goods only.  But non-traded goods prices can also be related across countries for at least two 
reasons.    First,  if  there  is  substitution  between  traded  and  nontraded  goods  in  production  and 
consumption, then in a broad class of general equilibrium models, the change in the price of non-
traded goods ( ) N ˆ P  is a weighted average of the changes in the prices of importables and exportables 
( ) X , M ˆ ˆ P P :  ( ) X 1 , = ω + −ω N M ˆ ˆ ˆ P P P   where 0 1 ≤ ω≤ .  Thus if nontraded goods are good substitutes 
for importables, the weight ω  is large, so that the relative price  N M P P is approximately constant, 
while  a  large  value  of 1−ω  implies  X N P P  is  approximately  constant  (see  Sjaastad,  1980,  for 
details).  Provided the weight ω is approximately the same at home and abroad, if PPP equalises the 
prices of traded goods across countries, then there is at least a tendency for the same to be true for 
their weighted average, the price of non-traded goods.  However, as this link is based on substitution 
in production and consumption, it could possibly take some time for these relative price changes to 
work themselves through the economy and for there to be full adjustment.   
A  second  mechanism  that  links  prices  of  nontraded  goods  across  countries  is  via 
expectations.  If producers of non-traded goods know of the above link between their prices and 




mean that in setting prices, these producers employ as a short-cut the rule that they change their 
prices as soon as the exchange rate varies.  An example is the plumber in Buenos Aires who puts up 
his prices as soon as the peso falls. This type of expectations mechanism may be quite rapid in its 
operation.  These two arguments provide a rationale for the inclusion of elements of the cost of non-
traded goods in PPP calculations, such as the Big Mac Index. 
Figure 3.1 reproduces the Big Mac article published in The Economist of 26
th July 2008.  As 
can be seen from column 4 of the table, the implied PPP of the dollar is just the ratio of the domestic 
Big Mac price in domestic currency (column 2) to that in the US in terms of dollars (first entry in 
column 2).  This ratio is the purchasing power of one US dollar in terms of Big Macs.  However, the 
actual  exchange  rate,  presented  in  column  5,  may  not  be  the  same  as  this  PPP  exchange  rate.  
Column 6 is the percentage difference between the PPP exchange rate and the actual exchange rate, 
a positive (negative) value of which indicates over (under) -valuation of a currency.  An overvalued 
currency indicates that domestic prices are higher than foreign prices [
* P/(SP ) 1 > ], and vice-versa.  
Take as an example Brazil, the fourth country from the top of the list in the table.  The first and forth 
entries in column 2 of the table show that it costs US$3.57 to buy a Big Mac in the US, and 7.50 
reals in Brazil.  Thus the implied PPP exchange rate is 7.50/3.57 = 2.10, as indicated by the third 
entry of column 4.  As the actual exchange rate is 1.58 (the cost of $US1 in terms of the real), the 
Brazilian real is overvalued by ( ) 2 10 1 58 1 58 33 − = + . . .  percent (the third entry in column 6 of the 
table).  Given the value of the real and US prices, Brazilian prices are too high, so that a movement 
towards parity would require some combination of a fall in Brazilian prices and a depreciation of the 
real.   
Tables  A1  and  A2  of  Appendix  A1  contain  the  implied  PPP  exchange  rates  and  nominal 
exchange  rates  of  all  countries  that  have  their  Big  Mac  data  published  at  least  once  in  The 
Economist since the inception of the Big Mac Index in 1986.  Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are the companion 
tables for the 24 countries that have all data available over the period of 1994-2008; these data will 
be used in all computations that follow.  In the previous paragraph, we showed that for Brazil in 
2008 the BMI is as much as 33 percent above the market exchange rate.  An element-by-element 
comparison of the third row of Table 3.1 with that of Table 3.2 reveals that there are similar large 
differences in most other  years for this country.  As will be discussed further below, the same 
problem of large deviations from parity occurs for most other countries.  As under absolute parity 
these differences should be zero, this is not particularly encouraging for the proposition that BMI 




One other feature of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is worthy of note.  The last columns of these tables 
give the coefficients of variations of the implied PPPs and exchange rates in each country, and 
Figure 3.2 is the associated scatter.  The points corresponding to Brazil, Poland and Russia are 
located far away from those for the other countries, due to the volatility of monetary conditions in 
these countries associated with currency redenominations.  The left panel of Figure 3.2 shows that in 
17 out of the remaining 21 countries, as the points lie above the 45-degree line, the implied PPPs are 
less  volatile  than  the  corresponding  exchange  rates.    This  difference  between  the  behaviour  of 
exchange rates and prices was noted long ago by Frenkel and Mussa (1980) who attributed it to the 
essential distinction between the nature of asset and goods markets.  The exchange rate is the price 
of foreign money and as such, behaves like the prices of other assets traded in deep, organised 
markets such as shares, bonds and some commodities.  The determination of asset prices tends to be 
dominated by expectations concerning the future course of events.  As expectations change due to 
the receipt of new information, which is unpredictable, the net result is that changes in asset prices 
themselves are largely unpredictable, giving rise to the substantial volatility of these prices.  By 
contrast, goods prices tend to be determined in flow markets in which expectations play a much less 
prominent role.  It is for this reason that goods prices tend to be more tranquil over time, reflecting 
changes in the familiar microeconomic factors of incomes, supply conditions, etc.  The Big Mac 
data reflect this difference between the volatility of asset and goods prices.  
Under PPP, 
* P SP , =  or 
* P SP 1. =   It is convenient to measure disparity logarithmically, so 
that for country c in year t, we define  ( )
*
ct ct ct t q log P S P , =  as in equation (2.4) where we referred to 
this measure as the real exchange rate.  This  ct q ,  when multiplied by 100, is approximately the 
percentage  difference  between 
*
ct t P /P  and  ct S ,  the  measure  of  disparity  (or  under-  or  over-
valuation) used by The Economist (given in column 6 of the table in Figure 3.1).  Under absolute 
PPP,  ct q 0. =   Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 give  ct q  for each of the 24 countries over the 15-year period 
and as can be seen, there are frequent departures from absolute PPP.  Additionally, in the majority of 
countries  ct q  fluctuates substantially around its mean over the 15-year period; the exceptions to this 
general rule are Britain, China, and Hong Kong.  One striking pattern is the one-sided nature of the 
disparities.  Among the 24 countries under investigation, eight countries -- Australia, China, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Poland, Russia, Singapore and Thailand -- always have undervalued currencies.  
The currencies of Britain, Demark and Switzerland are always overvalued, while the Czech koruna, 
the Hungarian forint and the Mexican peso are undervalued in all but one year.  Moreover, the 




a total of 24, the BMI declares the currencies to be continuously (or almost continuously) over- or 
under-valued for each of the 15 years.  These strings of persistent disparities over a fairly lengthy 
period in almost two-thirds of the cases raise serious questions about the credibility of the BMI as a 
pricing rule for currencies.  To assess the current value of a currency, it would seem desirable for a 
robust  pricing  rule  to  appropriately  incorporate  past  mispricing.    The  sustained  nature  of  the 
departures from PPP, departures that are distinctly one-sided, means that past mispricing is ignored 
by the BMI.  Below, we explore further this problem.   
To test the significance of the pattern of deviations from parity, we employ two tests, one 
based on a contingency table and the other a runs test.  Consider again the signs of successive 
pricing errors.  If these errors are independent, then the probability of the currency being over- or 
under-valued in year t 1 +   is unaffected by mispricing in year t.  To examine this hypothesis, in 
Table  3.4  we  tabulate  the  mispricing  for  all  currencies  in  all  years,  cross-classified  by  sign  in 
consecutive years t and t 1. +   As the observed 
2 χ  value is 211.9 (given in the last entry of the last 
column of the table), we reject the hypothesis of independence on a year-on-year basis.  Next, we 
repeat this test with the horizon extended from 1 year to 2, 3,…,14, and Table 3.5 reveals that 
independence is again rejected over most of these longer horizons regardless of whether or not 
overlapping observations are omitted. 
Now  consider  a  runs  test.    A  run  is  a  subsequence  of  consecutive  numbers  of  the  same  
sign,  immediately  preceded  and  followed  by  numbers  of  the  opposite  sign,  or  by  the  
beginning or end of the sequence.  If a currency is correctly priced, it is expected that the number  
of runs in the signs of the deviation is consistent with that of a random series.  For example, the first 
row of Table 3.6 shows that for Argentina the signs of its q are  + + + + − + − − − − − − −−+,  
which  comprise  five  runs.    If  there  are  T  observations  and  positive  and  negative  values  occur 
randomly, then the number of runs, R, is a random variable with mean  ( ) ( ) E R T 2T T T + − = +  and 
variance    ( ) ( )
2 varR 2T T 2T T T T T 1 , + − + − = − −  where  T+  and  T−  are  the  total  number  of 
observations with positive and negative signs, respectively, with T T T. + − + =   Asymptotically, the 
distribution of  R  is normal and the test statistic  ( ) Z R E R varR ~ N(0,1). = −       The results, 
given in Table 3.6, show that the null of randomness is rejected in a substantial number of countries.  
Although this result is subject to the qualification that this test has only an asymptotic justification, 
there seems to be considerable evidence against the hypothesis of randomness. 
Next,  we  test  whether  or  not  the  disparities  are  significantly  different  from  zero,  which 




bands for the mean exchange rates.  These bands include zero only for Argentina, Chile, Japan and 
South Korea, so we can reject the hypothesis that q 0 =  for the remaining 20 countries.  In Figure 
3.4 we present the mean real exchange rates with countries grouped into four regions.  This figure 
reveals that all currencies except those for the five high-income European regions/countries -- the 
Euro area, Britain, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland -- are undervalued on average.  It is notable 
that  among  the  Asians,  the  currencies  of  China,    Malaysia,  Hong  Kong  and  Thailand  are  all 
substantially  undervalued.
5   As  exchange  rates  are  expressed  relative  to  the  US  dollar,  some 
inferences about the value of the dollar can be drawn by averaging disparities over all non-dollar 
currencies, as is done in the third last row of Table 3.3.  Thus we see that in 2008 on average the 24 
currencies were undervalued by about 5 percent, which is equivalent to saying that the US dollar is 
overvalued by this amount.  The value of the dollar over time is thus given by the entries of the third 
last row of Table 3.3 with the signs changed.  Figure 3.5 plots these values of the dollar and as can 
be  seen,  it  was  most  overvalued  around  2001  and  has  been  falling  since  then.    The  obvious 
qualification to this measure is that all 24 countries are equally weighted in valuing the dollar; more 
complex weighting schemes could be easily explored, but these would be unlikely to change the 
broad conclusion of an overvalued, but falling dollar. 
Due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it is natural to divide the whole 15-year period into sub-
periods, before and after 1997, as in Table 3.7.  There are two notable features here.  (i) In the 
majority of countries, currencies become more undervalued (or less overvalued) following the Asian 
crisis.  (ii) The changes in the means over the two periods are mostly significant.  The results of 
testing the hypothesis that the real exchange rate is zero can be summarised as follows: 
  Period 






Significantly positive  29  21  21 
Significantly negative  54  79  67 
Insignificant  17  0  13 
Total  100  100  100 
Thus, we see that sustained mispricing is almost the rule for the BMI.  If the BMI is meant to play 
the role of the long-term, or equilibrium exchange rate, to which the actual rate is attracted, then an 
under- or overvaluation would signal subsequent equilibrating adjustments of the exchange rate 
and/or prices.  But lengthy periods of substantial, sustained and significant mispricing demonstrate 
                                                 
5 The productivity-bias  hypothesis of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) says that  the currencies of rich (poor) 
countries are over (under) -valued.  While it is true that in Figure 3.4 the five countries (regions) with q 0 >  all have 
high incomes, countries with q 0 <  include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore, all of which 
should probably also be classified as rich.  Thus the evidence in Figure 3.4 does not provide unambiguous support for 




that such a mechanism is not at work.  In a fundamental sense, the Big Mac Index fails, so that the 
Big Mac metric of currency mispricing cannot be taken at face value.  In large part, the reason for 
this  failure  is  that  the  BMI  relies  on  absolute  PPP,  which  ignores  barriers  to  the  international 
equalisation of prices.  Fortunately, a simple modification to the BMI restores its predictive power, 
as is shown in the section after the next. 
To summarise this section, we have established the following: 
•  The BMI uses the cost of a Big Mac hamburger as the metric for judging whether or not the 
currency is mispriced.  As this product is made according to approximately the same recipe in all 
countries, the BMI avoids one of the major problems usually associated with absolute PPP.  That 
problem  is  that  the  baskets  underlying  price  indexes  at  home  and  abroad  are  likely  to  be 
substantially different, so that the ratio of the indexes reflects a combination of compositional 
disparities, as well as currency fundamentals. 
•  A well-known empirical regularity is that exchange rates are more volatile than prices.  The Big 
Mac prices reflect this regularity. 
•  There are substantial, sustained and significant deviations of exchange rates from the BMI.  The 
under- and over-valuations of currencies based on the BMI published by The Economist cannot 
be accepted as a reliable measure of mispricing.  The BMI needs to be enhanced before it has 
substantial practical power. 
 
4.  The Bias-Adjusted BMI and the Speed of Adjustment 
The above discussion implies that the BMI is a biased indicator of absolute currency values.  
Thus rather than absolute PPP holding in the form of 
* S P/P , =  we have  ( )
* S B P/P , =  where B is 
the bias, or 
* s b p p = + −  in logarithmic terms.  This, of course, is just relative PPP of Section 2 with  
B 1 K =  or b k. = −   In this section, we analyse the extent to which the bias-adjusted BMI tracks 
exchange rates by formulating it in terms of changes over time, 
* s p p . ∆ = ∆ −∆  
To  proceed  we  have  to  specify  the  length  of  the  horizon  for  exchange-rate  and  price 
changes.
6    For  any  positive  variable  t X (t 1,...,T), =  define  (h) t t t h x logX logX − ∆ = −  as  the 
logarithmic  h-year  change  and  ( )
(h)
t (h) t x 1/h x ∆ = ∆  as  the  corresponding  annualised  change, 
h 1,..., T 1, = −    t h 1,...,T. = +  As  ( ) ( ) ( )
(h) h 1 h 1
s 0 s 0 t (1) t s t s t s 1 x 1/h x 1/h x x
− −
= = − − − − ∆ = ∆ = − ∑ ∑ ,  the 
annualised change over a horizon of h years is the average of the h one-year changes.  Writing  
                                                 





ct ct t r p p = −   for the Big Mac price in country c in terms of that in the US (as before), relative PPP 
implies that, for horizon h,  (h) ct (h) ct s r , ∆ = ∆  or dividing both sides by h, 
 (4.1) 
(h) (h)
ct ct s r . ∆ = ∆  
Equation  (4.1)  states  that  exchange-rate  changes  are  equal  to  the  relative-price  changes,  with 
changes expressed as annual averages.  To examine the content of this equation, we initially set h = 
1  and  plot  one-year  exchange  rates  changes  against  the  corresponding  price  changes  for  all 
countries.  The graph on the top left-hand corner of Figure 4.1 contains the results.  As can be seen, 
there is considerable dispersion around the solid 45-degree line, with a root-mean-squared error 
(RMSE) of 14 percent.
7  In the other panels of the figure, as the horizon  h  increases, the points 
become noticeably closer to the 45-degree line and the RMSE falls continuously to end up at 2 
percent for  h 14 =   years.  To clarify matters, Figure 4.2 provides a blow up of the graphs for h = 1, 
6 and 12.   
To  shed  more  light  on  the  decrease  in  volatility  as  the  horizon  increases,  consider  the 
following parsimonious data-generating process for the real exchange rate  
(4.2)  t t 1 t q q , − = α+β +ε  
where α and β are constants and the random disturbance term  t ε  is iid, independent of  t 1 q − , with a 
zero  mean  and  variance 
2
ε σ .    Figure  3.3  showed  that  there  is  considerable  persistence  in  the 
behaviour of  q  over time, which could be consistent with model (4.2) with a high value of  . β   The 
stationarity of the real rate implies 0 1, <β <  and the variance of q is  ( )
2 2 2 / 1 . ε σ = σ −β   On the other 
hand,  if    q    follows  a  random  walk,  we  have  1, β =  so  that 
t t 1 t q q − = α+ +ε = ( ) 0 0
t
s t 1 0 t s t t q = + ∑ − α+ + ε , where 
0 t q  is the initial value.  Hence, its variance at 
time t is  ( )
2 2
t 0 t t ε σ = − σ  if the initial value is treated as fixed. 
To examine the variance of the annualised change over horizon h, 
(h)
t q , ∆  consider first the 
stationary  case,  in  which  0 1. <β <    Equation  (4.2)  implies  t t h t 1 t h 1 t t h q q (q q ) − − − − − − =β − +ε −ε  
( ) h 0 , >  which can be written as 
(h) (h) (h)
t t 1 t q q , − ∆ =β∆ +∆ ε  so that 
 
(h) 2 (h) 2 (h)
t t t 1 t h 2
2 2
var q var q cov q , .
h h
ε − −
β       ∆ =β ∆ + σ − ∆ ε        
The covariance term in the above is 
                                                 
7 This RMSE is the square root of the ratio of  ( )
2
c t (1) ct (1) ct r s ∆ − ∆ ∑ ∑ to the number of observations, which measures 




[ ] [ ]
[ ]
2
t 1 t 2 t 1 t 1 t 1 (h)
t 1 t h
t 1 t h 1 t h
cov q q , cov q , if h 1
cov q ,
cov q q , 0 if h 1,
− − − − − ε
− −
− − − −
 − ε = ε = σ =    ∆ ε =    − ε = >  
 





















Therefore, we can see that 
(h)
t var q   ∆   decreases when the horizon h increases for the stationary 
case.  This is represented in Panel A of Figure 4.3 by the reciprocal quadratic curve of the form  
(h) 2
t var q 1/h ,   ∆ ∝    with  0 6 . . β =  
If  1 β = , equation (4.2) implies that 
t
s t h 1 t t h s q q h = − + − − = α+ ε ∑ .  When divided by h, we have 
(h) t 1
s t h 1 t s h q = − + ∆ = α+ ε ∑ , so that  




s t h 1
1




σ     ∆ = ε = ∑      
 
which  is  represented  in  Panel  A  of  Figure  4.3  by  the  reciprocal  curve  of  the  form  
(h)
t var q 1/h   ∆ ∝   .  We can see that here 
(h)
t var q   ∆    also declines, but at rate h, which is slower 
than in the stationary case.  This contrast is more apparent by considering total volatility, defined as 
(h)
2 (h)
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1 var q
h      1,
ε
ε
 σ β <    −β ∆ =   
 σ β = 
 
which is constant when  1 β <  and increases linearly when  1 β = , as indicated in Panel B of Figure 
4.3.   
Equation  (4.5)  is  a  key  result  that  shows  that  when  the  real  rate  is  stationary,  the  total 
volatility is constant as the length of the horizon expands, while it increases in the non-stationary 
case.  Although this is based on the simple AR(1) model, the implications carry over to more general 
cases.  For a given horizon  h, the RMSE of Figure 4.1 is the standard deviation of the annualised 
changes, or an estimate of 
(h)
t var q   ∆   .  Thus h RMSE ×  is the standard deviation of the total 
changes,  (h) t var q   ∆   , which under stationarity will also be constant with respect to h.  We use the 




volatility  first  increases  and  after  about  4  years  fluctuates  within  a  band  that  is  less  than  10 
percentage points wide.  It seems not unreasonable to interpret this evidence as saying real rates are 
stationary, that is, relative purchasing parity holds at longer horizons. 
The above analysis shows that as the PPP adjustment mechanism is not evident until after a 
longish period, the speed of adjustment of exchange rates to prices is not rapid, which presumably 
reflects transaction costs, informational costs, sticky prices due to contracts and menu costs, etc.  
But over the medium-term of more than three years, the tendency for exchange rates to reflect PPP 
is clear.  In the context of the discussion of Section 2, it seems that stochastic PPP with a relatively 
high value of the variance 
2 σ  is the way to think of the relationship between exchange rates and 
prices in the short term.
8   
 
                                                 
8  Conventional  tests  of  the  stationarity  of  real  exchange  rates  are  usually  based  on  the  equation 
t t 1 k k t k t q q q .
− − ∆ = α + ρ + Σ λ ∆ +ε  The  null  hypothesis  of  a  unit  root  is  0 ρ = ,  while  the  alternative  of  stationarity 
corresponds to  1 0 − < ρ < . To implement this approach with the Big Mac data, due to the limited sample size (T=15, 
before lags), a parsimonious specification that omits 
t k q
− ∆ on the right-hand side has to be employed. Following Lan 
(2006), we can gain efficiency by exploiting the multicurrency (N=24) nature of the data and take a panel/SUR approach 
to estimate the model  ct c c,t 1 ct q q , − ∆ = α + ρ +ε for c 1, ..., N currencies and t 2,...,T years, = = where the parameter 
ρ takes a common value to conserve degrees of freedom.  
To  allow  for  common  shocks,  the  disturbances 
ct ε  are  correlated  across  currencies  with  N N × covariance 
matrix  ( ) t t E , ′ = ε ε Σ Σ Σ Σ where  [ ] t ct ε . = ε  However, as the number of currencies exceeds the sample size ( ) N T > , there is 
an undersized sample problem and the conventional estimate of  Σ Σ Σ Σ  is singular. To deal with the problem, Lan (2006) 
patterns  Σ Σ Σ Σ  in two ways. (i) A type of block-independence whereby countries are classified into three blocks: Asia 
Pacific, Europe and other.  As it is assumed that exchange rate innovations between countries in different blocks are 
uncorrelated,  this  is  called  “block-sectional  independence”.  (ii)  A  process  which  summarises  the  cross-country 
dependence in one factor common to all countries.  The common factor approach uses as weights the shares in world 
trade and world GDP. Using Lan’s (2006) iterative methodology, which involves bias-adjustments, the results are: 
Covariance matrix specified as  
Common factor model 
 
Block-sectional  
independence  Trade  GDP 
Estimated ρ  -0.18  -0.11  -0.09 
Half-life (years),  log2 log(1+ ) − ρ    3.5  5.9  7.3 
Test statistic for 
0 H : 0 ρ =   -4.15  -4.84  -4.16 
Critical value   1%  -6.50  -4.84  -5.19 
                         5%  -4.17  -3.72  -4.22 
                       10%  -3.35  -3.33  -3.37 
Thus, the unit root hypothesis is rejected at about the 5 percent level for all three cases. The estimated half-lives indicate 
relatively slow adjustment, which is consistent with the other results of this section. We also test the assumption of a 
common  ρ  for  all  countries  using  a  quasi  F-test  (Lan,  2006).  The  test  statistic  is  2.35  under  block-sectional 
independence (5% critical value = 6.35), 0.24 under the trade-based common factor model (0.40) and 0.27 with the 





5.  Does the BMI Predict Future Currency Movements? 
In this section, we examine the predictive power of the Big Mac Index by asking the question, 
can a currency be expected to appreciate (depreciate) in the future if it is currently undervalued 
(overvalued)? And if it does mean revert in this manner, how long does it take?  For an early 
analysis along these lines, see Cumby (1996).  
As our objective is to examine the information contained in the current BMI regarding future 
currency values, we start by defining the horizon for future changes in the real rate as 
(5.1)  (h) t h t h t q q q , + + ∆ = −  
which is the future change in q from the year t to t h. +   This total change in q over h years is just 
the  sum  of  the  corresponding  h  annual  changes,  ( )
h 1 h 1
s 0 s 0 (h) t h (1) t h s t h s t h s 1 q q q q .
− −
= = + + − + − + − − ∆ = ∆ = − ∑ ∑  
Regarding current mispricing, the use of  t q  would not be satisfactory due to the bias identified 
above in Section 3.  Instead we use   
(5.2)                                                            t t d q q, = −  
with q the sample mean, which can be interpreted as the equilibrium exchange rate.  Thus, now the 
currency is over (under) -valued if  t d 0 ( 0). > <   Under PPP, deviations from parity die out, so that if 
t d 0 ( 0), > <  the  future  value  t h q +  decreases  (increases)  relative  to  the  current  value  t q .    To 
examine whether this is the case, we plot in Figure 5.1 the subsequent changes  (h) t h q + ∆  against  t d  
using the 24-country Big Mac data for horizons of h 1,...,14 =  years.  PPP predicts that the points 
should lie in the second and fourth quadrants of the graphs, and Figure 5.1 shows this is indeed 
mostly the case, with the pattern becoming more pronounced as the horizon increases.  To examine 
the  statistical  significance  of  this  pattern,  we  first  carry  out  a 
2 χ -test  of  the  independence  of  
(h) t h q + ∆  and  t d .
9  The test statistic is contained in the top box of each graph in Figure 5.1, and is 
significant for all horizons except 14 years (for which there are few observations), so we can reject 
independence.  Figure 5.2 plots the test statistic against the horizon h and it can be seen that a 
maximum is reached for a horizon of h 5 or 6, =  so that in this sense the current deviation best 
predicts subsequent changes over a five- or six-year horizon. 




(h) t h t t q d u , + ∆ = η +φ +    
                                                 
9 This test is based on a 2 2 ×  contingency table with rows for the sign of 
t d  and columns for the sign of 




where, for horizon h, 
h η  is the intercept, 
h φ  the slope and 
h
t u  a zero-mean disturbance term.  Panel 
A of Table 5.1 reproduces the estimates of this regression in the first line for each horizon, while 
column 6 reproduces the 
2 χ  values discussed in the previous paragraph; the information in column 7 
will be discussed subsequently.  To examine the effect of inclusion of an intercept, we report for 
each horizon the slope coefficient when the intercept is suppressed, and the results are qualitatively 
similar.  Panel B of Table 5.1 redoes the analysis with non-overlapping observations only, and in all 
four sets of results  
– overlapping and non-overlapping, with and without an intercept – the slope coefficient is 
significantly negative, indicating that the adjustment goes in the expected direction.   
To further interpret equation (5.3), we combine equations (5.1), (5.2) and (5.3) to obtain  
 (5.4)  ( ) ( )
h h h h
t+h t t q = q + 1 q +u . η −φ φ +  
Under PPP,  t+h q  converges to the equilibrium value q, so that 
(5.5)  0,       1
h h . η = φ = −  
A test of restriction (5.5) reveals whether or not there is full adjustment to mispricing over horizon 
h.  The F-statistics for (5.5) are presented in column 7 and 13 of Table 5.1 for the overlapping and 
non-overlapping cases.  For the purposes of testing, the results for the non-overlapping case are 
more reliable and as can be seen from Panel B, the F-statistic is minimised for a three-year horizon 
and is not significant.  The F-statistic is also not significant for a six-year horizon, but is significant 
for all other horizons.  These results point to the conclusion that roughly speaking, over a period of 
three to six years there is more or less full adjustment of the rate to mispricing.   
Panel  A  of  Figure  5.3  plots  the  estimated  intercepts  and  slopes, 
h     ,
h and η φ  against  the 
horizon  when  overlapping  observations  are  omitted.    Three  comments  can  be  made.    First,  the 
intercepts are negative for all horizons up to 10, but many of the 95-percent confidence intervals 
include zero.  Second, the slope generally decreases with h and the 95-percent confidence interval 
includes -1 for horizons 3 to 6 years as well as 9 years.  As the absolute value of 
h φ  is the fraction of 
the total adjustment that occurs over horizon h, it is reasonable for a larger share of the adjustment to 
be completed over a longer horizon.  Third, we should possibly pay more attention to the estimated 
slope, rather than the intercept.  If, for some reason, the equilibrium rate differs from the mean q, 







Next, consider as an illustrative example the AR(1) case, equation (4.2),  t t 1 t q q − = α+β +ε , so 
that  
(5.6)    
h 1 h
h h j










= +β + β ε ∑
−β
 
Equating the intercepts and slopes of the right-hand-sides of equations (5.4) and (5.6), we have 
( ) ( ) ( )
h h h 1 q 1 1 ,
− η −φ = α −β −β  ( )
h h 1 , φ + =β or 




η = β −   β  
 
h h 1. φ =β −  
We use q 0.2, = −  the grand average from the Big Mac data, and  0.6, β =  as before, in equation (5.7) 
to plot the intercept 
h η  and slope 
h φ  against h, and Panel B of Figure 5.3 gives the results.  As these 
plots do not match those of Panel A too well, it seems that the actual data generating process is 
somewhat more complex than the simple AR(1) model. 
Since the work of Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b), the random walk model has become the gold 
standard by which to judge the forecast performance of exchange-rate models.  Accordingly, we 
compare the forecasts from the Big Mac Index and the bias-adjusted BMI with those from a random 
walk.  Under the BMI, absolute parity holds and the forecast real exchange rate at any horizon h is 
zero,  t h q 0; + =  the bias-adjusted BMI, as represented by equations (5.3) and (5.5), implies  t h q q; + =  
and the random walk predicts no change,  t h t q q . + =   We compute the root-mean-squared error of the 
forecasts  over  all  currencies  and  years  for  horizons  h 1,...,14 = ,  and  Figure  5.4  shows  that  the 
random walk model outperforms the BMI for all horizons, which is the familiar Meese-Rogoff 
result.
10  However the figure also reveals that beyond a one-year horizon the bias-adjusted BMI 
                                                 
10 Note that in addition to the RMSEs of Figure 5.4, earlier we presented another set in Figure 4.1.  These are related as 
follows.  For simplicity, suppose there are T realisations of one exchange rate, which we forecast for all horizons by 
sample mean  q .  Denote the RMSE for horizon h by  
                              
h 2 T
t 1 1 t h RMSE (1/ T) (q q) , = + = − ∑  
which is a simplified expression for the RMSEs presented in Figure 5.4 associated with the bias-adjusted BMI.  The 
corresponding simplified expression for the RMSEs of Figure 4.1 is 
                                ( ) ( ) ( )
2 h T
t 1 2 t h t RMSE 1 h 1/ T q q . = + = − ∑    
If 
t q  does  not  deviate  too  much  from  q,   ( )
h h
2 1 RMSE 1 h RMSE . ≈    While  this  is  only  an  approximation,  this 
relationship is likely to be the main reason that the RMSEs of Figure 4.1 decrease substantially with the horizon h, while 
those of Figure 5.4 do not exhibit this pattern.  
In the AR(1) case, 
j
j 0 t t 1 t t j q q q
∞
= − − ∑ = α +β + ε = + β ε , and the simplified expression for the first version of the 
of the square of the RMSE is  
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beats the random walk.  For example, for a 4-year horizon, the RMSE is about 40 percent for the 
BMI, 30 percent for the random walk and something less than 20 percent for the bias-adjusted BMI.  
This is an encouraging result for the bias-adjusted BMI. 
This section can be summarised as follows: 
•  The direction of future changes in currency values is clearly not independent of 
current  deviations  from  parity:    Overvalued  currencies  subsequently  depreciate, 
while undervalued ones appreciate.  
•  The adjustment to deviations from parity tends to be more or less fully complete 
over a period of three to six years. 
•  The bias-adjusted Big Mac Index beats the random walk model for all but one-year 
horizons, demonstrating that it has considerable predictive power regarding future 
currency values. 
 
6.  The Split Between the Nominal Rate and Prices 
In this section, we examine the relationship between mispricing and the two components of 
the real exchange rate -- the nominal exchange rate and inflation -- over different horizons in the 
future. 
From  the  definition  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  ( ) t t t t q log P S P ,
∗ =  and  using  the  previous 
change notation of  ( ) (h) t h t h t x log X X + + ∆ =  we have the identity 
(6.1)          (h) t h (h) t h (h) t h q s r , + + + ∆ = −∆ +∆     
where, e. g.,  (h) t h r + ∆ = (h) t h (h) t h p p
∗
+ + ∆ −∆  is the cumulative inflation differential over  h  years in the 
future.  Equation (6.1) decomposes the future change in the real rate into the corresponding changes 
in  the  nominal  rate  and  the  inflation  differential.    A  positive  value  of  (h) t h q + ∆  means  that  the 
inflation differential exceeds the nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, which amounts to a real 
appreciation over an h-year horizon.   
To examine the mean-reverting behaviour of the two components over different horizons, 
consider predictive regressions analogous to equation (5.3):  
                                                                                                                                                                   
The corresponding second version is 
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   

















As  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
h h 2 h
2 1
2 2
RMSE AR(1) RMSE AR(1) E 2 1 2 h E | | , = − β     ⋅    
there  is  a  similar  relationship  between  the  two 







(h) t+h s s t st -∆ s d u , = η +φ +   
h h h
(h) t+h r r t rt ∆ r d u , = η +φ +  
where,  for  horizon  h, 
h h
s s , , η φ
h
r η  and
h
r φ  are  parameters,  t d  is  current  mispricing  defined  by 
equation (5.2), and 
h
st u  and 
h
rt u  are zero-mean error terms.
11  The parameters in equations (5.3) and 
(6.2) satisfy   
(6.3) 
h h h
s r , η +η = η       
h h h
s r , φ +φ = φ    
while  the  errors  satisfy 
h h h
st rt t u u u . + =    To  interpret  model  (6.2),  for  simplicity  we  set  the  two 
intercepts 
h h
s r 0 η = η =  and  the  error  terms  to  their  expected  value  of  zero,  so  that 
h
(h) t+h s t -∆ s d , = φ
h
(h) t+h r t ∆ r d . = φ    Adding  both  sides  of  these  two  equations  then  gives 
( )
h h
(h) t+h s r t ∆ q + d , = φ φ or  ( )
h h
t (h) t+h s r d ∆ q + . = φ φ  Substituting back this expression for d gives 
     
h
(h) t+h (h) t+h -∆ s ∆ q , = λ     ( )
h
(h) t+h (h) t+h ∆ r 1- ∆ q , = λ  
where  ( )
h h h h
s s r + . λ = φ φ φ   As ( )
h h
s r + φ φ  is the response of q to mispricing d, 
h λ is the share of this 
response that is brought about via the nominal rate, while ( )
h 1-λ  is the share for prices.  
The  least-squares  estimator  automatically  satisfies  the  aggregation  constraints  (6.3),  and 
Table 6.1 presents the results using the 24-country Big Mac data for horizons  1, ,14 = … h .  As most 
of  the  parameters  are  insignificant,  the  split  between  the  nominal  rate  and  inflation  cannot  be 
precisely estimated.  The 
2 χ -values in this table test the independence between (i)  (h) t+h -∆ s  and  t d , 
and (ii)  (h) t h r + ∆  and  t d .  As for most horizons the 
2 χ -values for the nominal rate are considerably 
higher than those for inflation, we can possibly conclude that future changes in the real rate are 
mainly bought about by nominal exchange rates, but recognise the uncertainty in the split.  Looking 
at Panel B of the table, which refers to the non-overlapping case, it can be seen that the 
2 χ -value for 
the nominal rate is maximised for a horizon of 4-7 years, which is not too different to the pattern for 
the real rate (Table 5.1).  
                                                 
11 Model (6.2) can also be viewed as being part of the reduced form of a system of simultaneous equations.  The 
structural equations comprise (5.3) and (using an obvious notation) 
6 2 ( . ) ′                
t+h t+h (h)
h h h
s s (h) st -∆ s q , = α +β ∆ + ε   
t h t+h (h)
h h h
r r (h) rt r q ,
+ ∆ = α +β ∆ + ε  
where the endogenous variables are 
t+h t+h (h) (h) -∆ s ,  q ∆  and 
t h (h)r
+ ∆ , while 
t d  is exogenous.  Substituting the right-hand 
side of equation (5.3) for 
t+h (h)q ∆  in  6 2 ( . ) ′  then yields the reduced form, model (6.2) with  
x x x x x xt xt x t ,      ,     u = + u      x = s,r. η = α + φ η φ = β φ ε β




There  are  four  countries  that  experienced  considerable  monetary  turmoil  associated  with 
currency redenominations or a sudden switch from a fixed to floating regime.  These are Argentina, 
Brazil, Poland and Russia.  When analysing nominal magnitudes like exchange rates and prices, it is 
possible that this type of disruption could substantially affect the results.  When model (6.2) is 
reestimated with these countries omitted, two major changes occur.  First, the tendency for changes 
in the real exchange rate to be brought about by variations in the nominal rate is substantially more 
pronounced.    Second,  the  estimates  are  now  much  more  precisely  estimated.    For  details,  see 
Appendix A3.  The possible explanation for these changes is that most, if not all, of the changes in 
the exchange rates and prices that accompany monetary turmoil is unexpected.  As these changes are 
only weakly related to past currency mispricing, including the experience of these four countries 
with the others skews the results and blurs the role of the nominal rate in doing most of the “heavy 
lifting” in the adjustment process.   
Next,  suppose  that  at  some  horizon  H  there  is  complete  adjustment  of  the  real  rate  to 
mispricing, so that  
(6.4)  (H) t H t q d . + ∆ = −  
According  to  this  equation,  if,  for  example,  the  currency  is  today  undervalued  by  10  percent 
( ) d 0 10 , t . = − then over the next H years it appreciates by the same amount,  t H t q q 0.10. + − =   The 
complete adjustment restriction (5.5) then takes the form  0,  1,
H H η = φ = −  so that (6.3) becomes 
6 3 ( . ) ′                                        
H H
s r 0, η +η =              
H H
s r 1. φ +φ = −  
The hypothesis of complete adjustment restricts the equations for the nominal rate and inflation 
according  to  6 3 ( . ) ′ .    We  use  the  seemingly  unrelated  estimator  (SURE)  to  estimate  the  two 
equations in (6.2) as a system with the cross-equation restriction  6 3 ( . ) ′  imposed, and interpret the 
full adjustment horizon H as being successively equal to 1, ,14 …  years.  Table 6.2 contains the 
results.  While many of the estimates are again imprecisely determined, for the non-overlapping 
case, most of the estimates of 
H
s φ  for 2-4 year horizons are less than one standard error away from -
1, which points to the nominal rate doing the bulk of the adjusting.  But as the standard errors are 
still high, we conclude that the precise measurement of the nominal/inflation split remains elusive. 
However, when the four high-inflation countries are omitted from the analysis, the results become 
more informative with the nominal rate more clearly playing the role of the dominant adjuster to 







7. The Geometry of Adjustment   
In this section, we consider further the adjustment process by developing a simple geometric 
framework that highlights the relative flexibility of the exchange rate and prices.  
Consider model (6.2) for the complete-adjustment horizon H.  Restriction  6 3 ( . ) ′  means that 
model (6.2) then becomes 
                 (H)
H
t+H s t -∆ s d , = φ              ( )
H
(H) t H s t r 1 d , + ∆ = − +φ  
where for simplicity we have suppressed the intercepts and set the disturbances at their expected 
values of zero.  The above equations can be written as  
 (7.1)      ( ) (H) t H t (H) t H t s d , r 1 d , + + ∆ = γ ∆ = − −γ   
where 
H
s γ = −φ .  If the currency is undervalued ( ) t d 0 , <  then prices at home are too low relative to 
those  abroad,  that  is,  t t t p s p q.
∗ < + +  Thus,  we  expect  t d 0 <  to  be  associated  with  (i)  a  future 
nominal  appreciation,  (H) t H s 0, + ∆ ≤  implying  that  0, γ ≥  and/or  (ii)  a  rise  in  relative  inflation, 
(H) t H r 0, + ∆ ≥  implying  ( ) 1 0. − −γ ≤    Accordingly,  0 1, ≤ γ ≤  which  means  that  the  nominal  rate 
changes by a fraction γ of the mispricing, while relative inflation changes by the remainder 1−γ .  
When the nominal rate does most of the adjusting, the parameter  0 5 . γ > , and we have the ranking 
of changes 
(H) t H (H) t H t r s d . + + ∆ < ∆ <  
In words, the change in the rate is bracketed by  the change in  relative inflation and the initial 
mispricing. 
Combining the two equations in (7.1) to eliminate  t d  yields 




∆ = − ∆   −γ  
 
As the parameter γ is a positive fraction, the ratio  ( ) 1 −γ −γ  on the right-hand side of the above 
falls in the range [ ] - ,0 . ∞   Equation (7.2) describes the simultaneous adjustment of the exchange rate 
and prices in the future to current mispricing, with  ( ) 1 −γ −γ  the elasticity of the rate with respect 
to the price ratio 
* P P  along the adjustment path.  It is to be noted that as equation (7.2) deals with 
the  equilibrating  adjustments  to  mispricing,  or  a  deviation  from  parity,  this  equation  does  not 
describe a PPP-type of relation whereby the rate and prices move proportionally.  It follows from the 




the  real  exchange  rate, 
* q p p s, = − −  that  a  deviation  of  either  sign  results  in  equilibrating 
adjustments in the nominal rate and inflation that are negatively correlated.  This is the reason why 
the elasticity in equation (7.2),  ( ) 1 −γ −γ , is negative.  This elasticity characterises the trade-off 
between a higher nominal rate and a lower price level, and vice-versa, required to return the real rate 
back to its equilibrium value q.  
The schedule FF in Figure 7.1 corresponds to equation (7.2).  This schedule passes through 
the origin and has slope  ( ) 1 0 −γ −γ <  that reflects the nature of the flexibility of the monetary side 
of the economy, that is, the relative flexibility of the rate as compared to prices.  Going back to 
equation (7.1), when the nominal rate bears all of adjustment to mispricing, and relative inflation 
remains unchanged,  1 γ =  and 1 0, −γ =  and the FF schedule is vertical.  In the opposite extreme 
where the rate is fixed,  0, γ =  1 1 −γ =  and FF coincides with the horizontal axis.  In a fundamental 
sense, the slope of FF reflects the relative cost of changes in the exchange rate, as compared to price 
changes.  Related considerations include whether or not the country pursues inflation targeting as 
the objective of monetary policy, and the extent to which the value of the currency is “managed” by 
the monetary authorities.   
One way to obtain some additional information regarding the split between the nominal rate 
and inflation is to employ the signal extraction technique (Lucas, 1973).  Write the real exchange 
rate as the sum of its two components as 
(7.3)  q r x = + , 
where 
* r p p = −  is the relative price and x s q r = − = −  is the negative nominal rate, the logarithmic 
foreign currency cost of a unit of domestic currency.
12  Assume that (i) r is normally distributed with 
mean  r  and  variance 
2
r σ ;  (ii)  x  is  normal  with  mean  x  and  variance 
2
x σ ;  and  (iii)  r  and  x  are 
orthogonal.  Our objective is to forecast x given q.  We start with a linear conditional forecast of r,  
(7.4)  f r q = θ+ κ ,   
where the subscript “f” denotes the forecast.  Minimisation of the mean squared error, defined as  
2
f E(r r) − , gives 










Substituting the first member of (7.5) into (7.4) yields  f r (1 )r (q x) = −κ + κ − .  Based on equation 
(7.3), we then have   
                                                 




(7.6)  f f f E(x |r ) q r (1 )(q r) x = − = −κ − + κ . 
The above equation shows that the conditional forecast of the nominal rate is a weighted average of 
(i) the deviation of the real rate from the long-run relative price and (ii) the historical mean of the 
nominal rate.  If 
2 2 2
x s r σ = σ σ ￿  (as seems to be the case empirically), the second member of (7.5) 
gives  0 κ ≈ , so that the real rate term in (7.6) is accorded most of the weight in forecasting the 
nominal rate. That is, expression (7.6) becomes  f f E(x |r ) q r ≈ − , which implies  f f E( x |r ) q ∆ ≈ ∆ . In 
words,  the  future  change  in  the  real  rate  is  almost  entirely  brought  about  by  the  nominal  rate 
adjusting.  In the context of the full-adjustment horizon H, we can then write equation (6.4) as 
(H) t H t s d + ∆ ≈ , which from equation (7.1), means  1 γ ≈  and the FF schedule in Figure 7.1 is near 
vertical in this case. 
To be able to say where the economy locates on FF, we need more information regarding the 
link  between  mispricing,  the  change  in  the  exchange  rate  and  inflation.    This  is  provided  by 
combining equation (6.4) and identity (6.1) for h H: =  
(7.7)  (H) t H t (H) t H s d r . + + ∆ = +∆  
To interpret this equation, first consider the overvaluation case, so that  t d 0. >   Equation (7.7) then 
gives the combinations of the future nominal depreciation and higher inflation at home required to 
eliminate  the  overvaluation.    These  combinations  are  represented  by  the  schedule  OO  (for 
overvaluation) in Figure 7.1.  This schedule has a slope of 45 degrees and an intercept on the vertical 
axis  of  t d 0. >    As  the  schedule  indicates,  the  initial  overvaluation  could  lead  to  (i)  an 
equiproportional nominal depreciation with inflation unchanged ( ) (H) t H t (H) t H s d ,   r 0 ; + + ∆ = ∆ =  (ii) no 
change  in  the  nominal  rate,  with  all  of  the  adjustment  falling  on  inflation 
( ) (H) t H (H) t H t s 0,   r d ; + + ∆ = ∆ = −  or (iii) any combination thereof.  The overall equilibrium is given by 
the  point  E  in  Figure  7.1,  the  intersection  of  the  OO  and  FF  schedules.    As  can  be  seen,  the 
overvaluation leads to a sharing of the adjustment between a depreciation and a slowing of inflation.  
It is to be noted that the point E is uniquely determined by (i) the initial overvaluation, which gives 
the location of OO; and (ii) the degree of relative flexibility of the exchange rate, as measured by the 
slope of FF.
13   
                                                 
13 The intercepts in the two equations in (6.2),     ,
h h
s r and η η  represent the changes in the rate and relative inflation that 
occur for reasons other than mispricing.  For simplicity of exposition, in the above we set the intercepts to zero.  When 
these terms are nonzero, equation (7.2) becomes 
H






∆ = − − ∆








The above discussion refers to the situation in which the currency is initially overvalued.  
The  undervaluation  case  is  represented  in  Figure  7.1  by  the  schedule  UU,  so  that  the  overall 
equilibrium is given by the point E′.  Here the undervaluation leads to a subsequent appreciation 
and higher inflation. 
 
8. Is There a Dollar Effect? 
In  the  above  discussion,  currency  mispricing  is  identified  with  the  excess  of  the  real 
exchange rate q over its mean q .  This reflects the preponderance of nonzero means in Figure 3.3, 
but Figure 3.5 also reveals that the corresponding mean for the US dollar is also far away from zero 
and, importantly, there are large swings in the currency below and above the mean.  As the 24 other 
currencies are all expressed in terms of the dollar, they could thus be subject to common shocks due 
to dollar fluctuations.  In this section, we investigate this possibility. 
Equation (5.2) defines mispricing as  t t d q q. = −   We extend this to allow for a shock that 
hits all currencies simultaneously at time t,  t x , by redefining mispricing as  t t t d d x . ′ = −   As it is 
desirable  for  mispricing  to  have  a  zero  expectation,  we  need  t x 0 t ∑ = ,  so  that  ( ) t E d 0. ′ =   
Replacing  t d  on the right-hand side of the predictive regression (5.3) with  t d′, we then obtain 
(8.1)       
h h
(h) t h , h ,t t t q D d u , + τ τ τ+ τ ∆ = Σ α +φ +  
where 
h h
, h x τ τ+ τ α = η −φ  is the coefficient of the time dummy variable  ,t Dτ , which takes the value of 
one  if  τ = t,  zero  otherwise.    Note  that  t x 0 t ∑ =  implies  ( )
h h
, h 1 N τ τ τ+ Σ α = η ,  where 
h N  is  the 
number of year coefficients for horizon h, so that the time effects “wash out” over the whole period.   
  Table  8.1  contains  the  estimates  of  equation  (8.1)  for  1, ,14. = … h  To  further  allow  for 
common  shocks  across  countries,  we  use  robust  standard  errors  involving  a  cluster  correction 
whereby the disturbances are equicorrelated (Kleok, 1981).  The coefficients of the time dummies 
are cross-currency averages of the change in q over the relevant horizons, after adjusting for the 
initial mispricing, as measured by the term 
h
t d φ ; averaging over all non-dollar currencies extracts 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Thus if  0
H
s < η , which amounts to an “autonomous” depreciation in the rate, the term  ( )
H
s 1 0, −η − γ >  and the FF 
schedule  in  Figure  7.1  now  has  a  positive  intercept  on  the  vertical  axis,  rather  than  passing  through  the  origin.  
Accordingly, a given initial overvaluation is now associated with a larger subsequent depreciation of the rate and a 
smaller decrease in relative inflation.  Vice versa when  0
H





the common dollar effect.
14  Many of these year coefficients are significant, and for a given horizon, 
they vary substantially, which points to the importance of the dollar effect.  It can be seen from the 
first row of the table (which refers to  1 h = ) that the year coefficients are initially positive, then 
negative and end up positive.  This pattern is the mirror image of the path of the US dollar given in 
Figure  3.5.    The  year  2008  plays  a  prominent  role  as  the  time  effects  involving  this 
year, ,2008, 1994, ,2007, τ τ = α … are always among the largest in Table 8.1; these coefficients are the 
last entries of columns 2-15 of Panel A.  Depending on the base year for the comparison, these 
estimates range from about 8 to 23 percent and are always highly significant.  These values reflect 
the sharp depreciation of the dollar, or the appreciation of other currencies, in 2008 (see Figure 3.5).  
The importance of the dollar effects is also underscored by the increase in all relevant values of 
2 R  
in going from Table 5.1 (where the year effects are excluded) to Table 8.1.  The estimates of 
h η  and 
the slope coefficients given in columns 16 and 17 of Table 8.1 are close to what they were before in 
Table  5.1.    Additionally,  in  the  non-overlapping  case,  the  F-statistics  for  the  hypothesis  of  full 
adjustment are not significant for three- and six-year horizons, as before.
15 
Next, we add time effects to the analysis of the split between the nominal rate and prices.  In 
broad outline, this extension reveals little change from the results of Section 6 where the time effects 
are omitted.    In particular, we continue to find that it is difficult to quantity the split in a precise 
manner.  The detailed results are contained in Tables A4-A6 of Appendix A2.  But, as before, when 
the  four  high-inflation  countries  are  omitted,  the  nominal  rate  bears  a  larger  burden  of  the 
adjustment than does inflation.  However, this finding is somewhat less pronounced than before 
when  the  time  effects  (and  the  high-inflation  countries)  were  omitted.    See  Tables  A9-A11  of 
Appendix A3 for details. 
                                                 
14 To illustrate, consider the first entry in column 2 of Panel A of Table 8.1, 10.3 
1 100
− × ( ), which is the estimate of 
, h τ τ+ α  for  1994,  1 τ = = h .  From  equation  (8.1)  for  this  transition,  we  have 
( )
1 1
c,1995 c,1994 1994,1995 c,1994 1994,1995 c,1994 q q d q q , − =α +φ =α +φ −  where we have set the disturbance at its expected value of 
zero. Using an obvious notation, we average this equation over currencies:  ( )
1
,1995 ,1994 1994,1995 ,1994 q q q q .
• • • − =α +φ −  From 
Table 3.3, the means over the 24 countries of q in 1994 and 1995 are 
,1994 ,1995 q 8.28, q 1.58,
• • = − = −  while the grand 
mean over all years and currencies is 
1 18 75 ( 100 )
− = − × q . all .   Using these values, together with the estimate from Table 
8.1 of 
1 φ  of -0.344 (first entry of column 17), we have 
    ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1994,1995 ,1995 ,1994 ,1994 q q q q 1.58 8.28 0.344 8.28 18.75 10.30   all 100 ,
−
• • • α = − −φ − = − + + − + = ×  
which matches our estimated coefficient of 10.3 percent.  Note that if  1 φ = −
h , as it is under the hypothesis of full 
adjustment, then the expression for the year coefficient simplifies to 
, h , h q q,
τ τ+ • τ+ α = −  which is just the deviation of the 
cross-currency average q in the relevant year from the grand mean.  As the estimated slope coefficients in Panel B of 
Table 8.1 for horizons of 3-7 years are close to -1, this simplified interpretation applies for these cases.   
 




To summarise, the persistent swings of the dollar play a role in the adjustment to mispricing 
of non-dollar currencies.  But even when these effects are allowed for, in broad outline the results of 
Sections 5 and 6 continue to hold:  Within a period of three to six years, currency mispricing is more 
or less eliminated. 
 
9. The Burgernomics Literature 
This section reviews the literature on the Big Mac Index.  Cumby (1996) is widely known as 
the  first  burgernomics  paper  and  was  originally  a  1995  Georgetown  University  working  paper.  
Almost at the same time however, the paper by Ong (1995) was presented at the ANU/UWA PhD 
Conference in Economics and Business in Perth, held in November 1995, and later published as Ong 
(1997).  As far as we are aware, there are in total 22 academic papers and one book on the Big Mac 
Index/burgernomics.  Table 9.1 lists these publications in chronicle order.  These papers can be 
broadly grouped into two categories, (i) the basic foundations and (ii) “adventurous” applications.   
Regarding basic foundations, Cumby (1996) finds out that the half-life of deviations from the 
Big  Mac  parity  is  about  one  year,  and  these  deviations  provide  significant  information  for 
forecasting exchange rates and Big Mac prices.  Lutz (2001) applies Cumby’s methodology to 12 
price series published by the bank UBS as well as aggregate CPI data.  Click (1996), Fujiki and 
Kitamura  (2003)  and  Caetano  et  al.  (2004)  find  country  incomes  to  be  important  in  explaining 
deviations from Big Mac PPP.  Yang (2004) uses the BMI to evaluate the Chinese yuan and finds 
that currencies of low-income countries are overvalued due to the insufficient weight accorded to 
nontradables.  Ong (1997) finds that Big Macs are surprisingly accurate in tracking exchange rates 
over the long run.  She also proposes the “No-Frills Index” by excluding nontradable components 
from the Big Mac Index, and establishes that this performs better than the BMI.  Using Big Mac 
prices,  Ong  (1998a)  analyses  the  Asian  currency  crisis,  while  Ong  (1998b),  Ong  and  Mitchell 
(2000), and Ashenfelter and Jurajda (2001) compare wages in different countries.  Ong (2003) is the 
only book on burgernomics, and this comprises a series of papers by her and coauthors.  Pakko and 
Pollard (1996, 2003) conclude that Big Macs are a useful but flawed PPP measure as deviations 
from absolute PPP are persistent while those from relative PPP are transitory.  Chen et al. (2007) 
compare the behaviour of Big Mac prices with CPIs and find that the BMI supports the validity of 
PPP better than the CPI does.  Parsley and Wei (2007), discussed previously in Section 3, relate the 
price of a Big Mac to the costs of its ingredients and find that the speed of convergence of the 
overall Big Mac real exchange rate is bracketed by that for its tradable and nontradable inputs.   
Annaert and Ceuster (1997) pursue a different line of research in one of the first adventurous 




Mac Index whereby undervalued currencies are bought and undervalued ones sold, and their results 
show  that  Big  Macs  can  serve  as  a  useful  international  asset  allocator.    Given  their  volatility, 
exchange  rates  are  notoriously  difficult  to  forecast.    As  the  previous  US  Fed  Chairman,  Alan 
Greenspan (2004), puts it, “despite extensive efforts on the part of analysts, to my knowledge, no 
model  projecting  directional  movements  in  exchange  rates  is  significantly  superior  to  tossing  a 
coin.”  There is now an emerging stream of burgernomics that investigates whether the BMI can be 
used to forecast exchange rates.  Lan (2006) uses Big Mac prices to forecast the whole distribution 
of future exchange rates, employing a novel iterative approach to adjust for econometric problems 
associated with the estimation of dynamic panel models where the number of observations is not 
large.  The provision of the whole distribution emphasises forecast uncertainty that enables users to 
make financial decisions in an informed manner with the appropriate degree of caution.  Clements 
and Lan (2010) extend Lan (2006) and use Monte Carlo simulations to provide real-time exchange-
rate forecasts for any horizon into the future. 
 
10. Concluding Comments 
The Economist magazine advocates as a currency pricing rule the formula 
* S= P P , where 
S is the exchange rate (the domestic currency cost of one US dollar), P is the price of a Big Mac 
hamburger  in  the  country  in  question  and  P
∗  is  the  price  in  the  US.    Thus  an  increase  in  the 
domestic price, relative to the US price, leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency.  The rule is 
a precise, numerical relationship between the exchange rate and the relative price that can be used to 
identify mispricing of the currency in a quick and convenient way.  This is a novel and controversial 
application of the purchasing power parity theory of exchange rates that is known as the Big Mac 
Index and is published annually by The Economist for a large number of currencies.  
The cost of a full-page advertisement in The Economist must be something like $US50,000.  
For the magazine to continue to publish an annual article on the Big Mac Index for more than two 
decades means that it is worth this opportunity cost, at least in the mind of the editor.  This paper 
assessed the broader value of the BMI by analysing its properties and ability to track exchange rates.  
The major findings of the paper are: 
•  The index is a biased predictor of currency values. 
•  Once the bias is allowed for, the index tracks exchange rates reasonably well over the 
medium to longer term in accordance with relative purchasing power parity theory. 
•  The index is at least as good as the industry standard, the random walk model, in 




•  Future  nominal  exchange  rates  are  more  responsive  than  prices  to  currency 
mispricing.   
Thus, while it is not perfect, as the cost of the magazine is less than $US10, the index seems to 
provide good value for money.  In showing that relative prices act as an “attractor” or “anchor” for 
exchange rates over the longer term, our results also have implications for exchange-rate economics:  
As  currencies  of  high  (low)-inflation  countries  depreciate  (appreciate),  over  longer  horizons 







A1. The Big Mac Data  
The Economist magazine has been publishing the Big Mac index (henceforth, BMI) on an 
annual basis since 1986. The data presented in Tables A1, A2 and A3 are compiled from a number 
of  issues  of  the  magazine  from  1986  to  2008.    They  consist  of,  respectively,  the  implied  PPP 
exchange rates, nominal exchange rates and real exchange rates of all countries that have appeared 
at  least  once  in  The  Economist.    Note  that  the  data  for  2002-08  is  also  based  on  information 
contained in the on-line BMI articles found on the Economist website.  Some of this information is 
not contained in the hard copy versions of the articles.  
In years when countries were not included in either the printed or online versions of the 
articles the corresponding cells of Tables A1, A2 and A3 have been left blank.  Note also that to 
ensure internal consistency, the implied PPP (IPPP) exchange rates were calculated from the Big 
Mac (BM) prices.  The only exceptions to this rule are for 2004 and 2005, when a slightly different 
layout was used for the BMI articles.  As nominal exchange rates and prices were not quoted in 
these years, we used the IPPP values and prices to reverse engineer the nominal exchange rates.  The 
majority of exchange rates in the BMI articles are expressed in terms of the domestic currency price 
of one US dollar.  However, from 1993 onwards, the British pound, the Euro and the Irish pound 
were quoted in reciprocal form, which we inverted. 
We have made adjustments for five discrepancies found in the published data: 
(1)  Brazil 1986.  The prices of a BM is listed by The Economist as Cz$2.5 in Brazil and 
$1.6  in  the  US.    The  IPPP  is  2.5/1.6  =  1.5625.    However,  the  article  lists  the  IPPP  as  7.80, 
suggesting that the Brazilian price should be 7.8   1.6 = 12.48. ×
  As the article proceeds to use 7.8 as 
the IPPP for the overvaluation calculation, it seems that the error lies in the price, so we use 12.48 
for this price. 
(2)   Chile 1999.  The last digit of the Chilean BM price is omitted from the article: The 
price  is  recorded  as  1,25,  whereas  in  all  other  years  the  price  is  around  1250  pesos.    Using 
* P =IPPP P   × with  IPPP=  518  and P $2.43,
∗ = we  have518 2.43 1258.74. × =    Thus,  the  omitted  last 
digit is 9 (rounded up from 8.74), so we use 1,259 for this price.
 
(3)  France 1999. The prices are listed as 8.5 francs and 2.43 dollars, while the IPPP is 
7.20.  These  values  are  not  internally  consistent.    It  seems  that  the  price  in  France  should  be 
7.20 2.43 17.496 × =  francs. As this price is much more inline with previous values, we use 7.2 as 




(4)   Denmark 1998.  The IPPP rate is listed as 9.28, while using the listed prices, we 
computed it at 9.297. To keep things internally consistent, we use the latter rate. 
(5)  France 1986.  As with Denmark 1998, there is a small deviation between the listed 
IPPP and our internally consistent calculated value, 10.30 vs 10.25. Again, we use the internally 
consistent calculated value.
16  
In the text of the paper, we use the Big Mac data for 24 countries/areas over the period of 
1994 to 2008, so that the total number of observations is 24 15 360. × =  Tables 3.1-3.3 show the 
respective implied PPP exchange rates, nominal exchange rates and real exchange rates.  In two 
instances, Big Mac prices and nominal exchange rates are missing: New Zealand 1994 and the 
Czech Republic 1999.  In these cases, nominal exchange rates are taken from the  International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database (http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/).  The 
Big Mac prices are computed on the basis of the one-year percentage change in the Consumer Price 
Index (henceforth, CPI), again taken from IFS.  For example, the IPPP for New Zealand in 1994 is 
computed as ( )
* P 1 P ,   +π   where P is the 1995 price of a BM in New Zealand, π is the 1994 CPI 
rate of inflation in New Zealand and P* is the $US 1994 price of a BM in the US. 
As the euro was not introduced until 1999, official data are unavailable for this currency 
from 1994 to 1998.  However, the Big Mac data for the six member countries included in our data -- 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and Spain -- exist for the pre-euro period.  For the years 
1994-98 we estimated the euro exchange rate as follows. Let  ct S  be the nominal exchange rate (the 
domestic-currency  cost  of  $US1)  for  European  country  c  ( ) c 1, ,6 = … in  year  t 
( ) t 1994, ,1998 , = … the values of which are listed in The Economist, and  ct E  be the corresponding 
exchange  rate  for  the  European  Currency  Unit  (the  currency  basket  that  was  the  effective 
predecessor  to  the  Euro),  which  is  available  on  Inforeuro 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/inforeuro/index.cfm?Language=en).    Then,  ct ct S E  is  the  cost  of  the 
dollar in terms of ECUs.  Using the April ECU rates, the resulting values of  ct ct S E are very nearly 
the same for each country. The small differences are likely to be the result of rounding errors or 
changes in the currency values that occurred between the end-of-month (April) exchange rates on 
Inforeuro and the days within the month of April to which the data contained in The Economist 





th of April for 1994-98, respectively).  These differences 
are eliminated by averaging, so the euro exchange rate is defined as  ( )
6
t ct ct c=1 E = 1 6 S E . ∑   As Pct 
                                                 
16 Items 4 and 5 above are the only instances where internally calculated IPPPs differ from the Economist’s – internal 




is the price of a BM in country c in terms of domestic currency,  ct ct P E  is the price in ECUs (euros). 
For  the  period  1994-98,  we  define  “the”  price  of  a  BM  in  Europe  as  the  average  over  the  six 
countries, so the corresponding IPPP is the ratio of ( )
6
ct ct c 1 1 6 P E
= ∑ to the US price. 
 
A2. Additional Results with Time Effects 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of the text give the results for the predictive regressions when the real rate 
is  decomposed  into  the  nominal  rate  and  relative  inflation  components.    Tables  A4-A6  of  this 
Appendix give the corresponding results when time effects are added. As mentioned in the text, the 
inclusion of the time effects has little impact on the results. When all 24 countries are considered, it 
remains difficult to split precisely the overall adjustment of the real exchange rate between the 
nominal rate and prices. 
 
A3. High Inflation and Monetary Turmoil  
In 1994, 1995 and 1998, the Brazilian real, Polish zloty and Russian rouble, respectively, 
were redenominated.  This can be seen from the prices and exchange rates for these countries in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2, as well as in the volatility measures of Figure 3.2.  Additionally, following the 
floating of its currency in 2002, there was considerable monetary turmoil in Argentina.  What is the 
impact of these episodes on the performance of the Big Mac Index?  As large increases in prices 
tend to be offset by corresponding depreciations of the currency that restore the real rate, at least as 
an approximation, the impact of high inflation and redenominations is likely to be less pronounced 
when the real rate is analysed.  In what follows, we thus redo some of the analysis that involves the 
nominal exchange rate. 
 We start with predictive regressions of Section 6 of the paper,  
(A3.1)  
h h h
(h) t+h s s t st -∆ s d u , = η +φ +   
h h h
(h) t+h r r t rt ∆ r d u , = η +φ +  
where,  for  horizon  h, 
h h
s s , , η φ
h
r η  and
h
r φ  are  parameters,  t d  is  current  mispricing  defined  by 
equation (5.2), and 
h
st u  and 
h
rt u  are zero-mean error terms.  Table A7 presents the estimates of model 
(A3.1) with the four high-inflation countries omitted.  In comparison with the results when these 
four countries were included (Table 6.1), there is now a tendency for 
h
s φ  to be higher and 
h
r φ  
lower, making  ( )
h h h
s s r + φ φ φ  closer to unity, so that the nominal rate does more of the adjusting.  
Moreover, the estimates are more precisely determined and intercepts (the autonomous changes in 




As discussed in Section 6 of the text, when there is complete adjustment at horizon H, the 
intercepts  and  slopes  of  model  (A3.1)  satisfy 
H H
s r 0, η +η =  
H H
s r 1. φ +φ = −    The  two  equations  in 
(A3.1)  with  this  cross-equation  restriction  imposed  can  be  estimated  by  SURE  and  Table  A8 
contains the results when the four countries are omitted.  Comparing these results to those of Table 
6.2, again we see a substantially clearer picture with the nominal rate doing the vast bulk of the 
adjustment, the values of the intercepts falling and the parameters being better determined.  
Tables A4-A6 above give the results, for all 24 countries, pertaining to the split between the 
nominal rate and prices when time effects are added.  Tables A9-A11 contain the corresponding 
results when the four high-inflation countries are omitted.  Now, there is a slight tendency for there 
to be a more equal sharing of the adjustment between the nominal rate and inflation, but still the 
exchange rate does the majority of the work. 
The above discussion of the results when the high-inflation countries are excluded involves 
the  additional  dimension  of  time  effects  both  included  and  excluded.    To  assist  with  an 
understanding of the presentation of these results, Table A12 provides an analytical overview of the 
structure of the various pairwise comparisons.  Thus, for example, the first entries of columns 2 and 
3 of this table refer to Tables 6.1 and A7.  A comparison of these two tables reveals the impact of 
the high inflation countries on the results pertaining to the effect of mispricing on the nominal 
exchange rate, when time effects are excluded.  Similarly, from the first two elements of column 3, 
A7 and A9, the impact on the nominal rate results of the inclusion of time effects, when the high-
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FIGURE 3.1 
EXAMPLE OF BIG MAC ARTICLE 






























Source: Derived from The Economist 26
th July 2008 and http://www.economist.com/. 
(1)            (2)        (3)      (4)     (5)     (6)  
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TABLE 3.1  
IMPLIED PPP EXCHANGE RATES FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994 TO 2008 
Country                     Year                          CV 
   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Mean  SD 
(×100) 
Argentina  1.57  1.29  1.27  1.03  0.98  1.03  1.00  0.98  1.00  1.51  1.50  1.55  2.26  2.42  3.08  1.50  0.63  41.8 
Australia  1.07  1.06  1.06  1.03  1.04  1.09  1.03  1.18  1.21  1.11  1.12  1.06  1.05  1.01  0.97  1.07  0.06  5.79 
Brazil  652  1.04  1.25  1.23  1.21  1.21  1.18  1.42  1.45  1.68  1.86  1.93  2.07  2.02  2.10  44.9  168  374 
Britain  0.79  0.75  0.76  0.75  0.72  0.78  0.76  0.78  0.80  0.73  0.65  0.61  0.63  0.58  0.64  0.72  0.07  10.1 
Canada  1.24  1.19  1.21  1.19  1.09  1.23  1.14  1.31  1.34  1.18  1.10  1.07  1.14  1.14  1.15  1.18  0.08  6.53 
Chile  412  410  403  496  488  518  502  496  562  517  483  490  503  459  434  478  45.8  9.57 
China  3.91  3.88  4.07  4.01  3.87  4.07  3.94  3.90  4.22  3.65  3.59  3.43  3.39  3.23  3.50  3.78  0.29  7.76 
Czech Republic  21.7  21.6  21.6  21.9  21.1  21.9  21.7  22.0  22.6  20.9  19.5  18.4  19.0  15.5  18.5  20.5  1.94  9.46 
Denmark  11.2  11.5  10.9  10.6  9.30  10.2  9.86  9.74  9.94  10.2  9.57  9.07  8.95  8.14  7.84  9.81  1.05  10.7 
Euro Area  1.09  1.08  1.07  1.03  0.96  1.04  1.02  1.01  1.07  1.00  0.94  0.95  0.95  0.90  0.94  1.00  0.06  6.00 
Hong Kong  4.00  4.10  4.20  4.09  3.98  4.20  4.06  4.21  4.50  4.24  4.14  3.92  3.87  3.52  3.73  4.05  0.23  5.76 
Hungary  73.5  82.3  90.7  112  101  123  135  157  184  181  183  173  181  176  188  143  42.1  29.5 
Japan  170  169  122  122  109  121  117  116  105  96.7  90.3  81.7  80.6  82.1  78.4  111  28.7  25.9 
Malaysia  1.64  1.62  1.59  1.60  1.68  1.86  1.80  1.78  2.02  1.86  1.74  1.72  1.77  1.61  1.54  1.72  0.13  7.56 
Mexico  3.52  4.70  6.31  6.16  6.99  8.19  8.33  8.62  8.80  8.49  8.28  9.15  9.36  8.50  8.96  7.62  1.73  22.7 
New Zealand  1.25  1.27  1.25  1.34  1.35  1.40  1.34  1.42  1.59  1.46  1.50  1.45  1.44  1.35  1.37  1.39  0.09  6.74 
Poland  13478  1.47  1.61  1.78  2.07  2.26  2.19  2.32  2.37  2.33  2.17  2.12  2.10  2.02  1.96  900  3480  386 
Russia  1261  3491  4025  4545  4688  13.8  15.7  13.8  15.7  15.1  14.5  13.7  15.5  15.2  16.5  1211  1902  157 
Singapore  1.30  1.27  1.29  1.24  1.17  1.32  1.28  1.30  1.33  1.22  1.14  1.18  1.16  1.16  1.11  1.23  0.07  5.86 
South Korea  1000  991  975  950  1016  1235  1195  1181  1245  1218  1103  817  807  850  896  1032  155  15.0 
Sweden  11.1  11.2  11.0  10.7  9.38  9.88  9.56  9.45  10.4  11.1  10.3  10.1  10.6  9.68  10.6  10.3  0.64  6.17 
Switzerland  2.48  2.54  2.50  2.44  2.31  2.43  2.35  2.48  2.53  2.33  2.17  2.06  2.03  1.85  1.82  2.29  0.24  10.7 
Taiwan  27.0  28.0  27.5  28.1  26.6  28.8  27.9  27.6  28.1  25.8  25.9  24.5  24.2  22.0  21.0  26.2  2.34  8.91 
Thailand  20.9  20.7  20.3  19.3  20.3  21.4  21.9  21.7  22.1  21.8  20.3  19.6  19.4  18.2  17.4  20.3  1.39  6.82 
Notes:  1.  The implied PPP exchange rate for country cin year  t  is defined as 
*
ct t P P , where  ct P  is the price of a Big Mac hamburger in country  c  during  t  and 
*
t P  
is the corresponding price in the US. 
  2.  SD stands for standard deviation, and CV is the coefficient of variation. 
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TABLE 3.2 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994 TO 2008 
Country                     Year                          CV 
   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Mean  SD 
(×100) 
Argentina  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  3.13  2.88  2.94  2.89  3.06  3.09  3.02  1.93  1.04  53.6 
Australia  1.42  1.35  1.27  1.29  1.51  1.59  1.68  1.98  1.86  1.61  1.43  1.30  1.33  1.17  1.03  1.46  0.26  17.6 
Brazil  949  0.90  0.99  1.06  1.14  1.73  1.79  2.19  2.34  3.07  3.17  2.47  2.30  1.91  1.58  65.0  245  376 
Britain  0.69  0.62  0.66  0.61  0.60  0.62  0.63  0.70  0.69  0.63  0.56  0.55  0.53  0.50  0.50  0.61  0.07  10.9 
Canada  1.39  1.39  1.36  1.39  1.42  1.51  1.47  1.56  1.57  1.45  1.37  1.25  1.12  1.05  1.00  1.35  0.18  12.9 
Chile  414  395  408  417  455  484  514  601  655  716  643  593  530  527  494  523  99.9  19.1 
China  8.70  8.54  8.35  8.33  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.26  8.26  8.03  7.60  6.83  8.17  0.44  5.40 
Czech Republic  29.7  26.2  27.6  29.2  34.4  35.6  39.1  39.0  34.0  28.9  26.5  24.5  22.1  21.1  14.5  28.8  6.85  23.8 
Denmark  6.69  5.43  5.85  6.52  7.02  6.91  8.04  8.46  8.38  6.78  6.22  6.06  5.82  5.46  4.70  6.56  1.10  16.8 
Euro Area  0.88  0.74  0.79  0.87  0.93  0.93  1.08  1.14  1.12  0.91  0.83  0.81  0.78  0.74  0.63  0.88  0.15  16.5 
Hong Kong  7.73  7.73  7.74  7.75  7.75  7.75  7.79  7.80  7.80  7.80  7.80  7.79  7.75  7.82  7.80  7.77  0.03  0.39 
Hungary  103  121.  150  178  213  237  279  303  272  224  211  204  206  180  144  202  57.6  28.6 
Japan  104  84.2  107  126  135  120  106  124  130  120  112  107  112  122  107  114  12.8  11.2 
Malaysia  2.69  2.49  2.49  2.50  3.72  3.80  3.80  3.80  3.80  3.80  3.79  3.81  3.63  3.43  3.20  3.38  0.55  16.4 
Mexico  3.36  6.37  7.37  7.90  8.54  9.54  9.41  9.29  9.28  10.5  11.5  10.9  11.3  10.8  10.2  9.09  2.16  23.8 
New Zealand  1.74  1.51  1.47  1.45  1.82  1.87  2.01  2.47  2.24  1.78  1.64  1.40  1.62  1.28  1.32  1.71  0.34  19.8 
Poland  22433  2.34  2.64  3.10  3.46  3.98  4.30  4.03  4.04  3.89  3.86  3.31  3.10  2.75  2.03  1499  5791  386 
Russia  1775  4985  4918  5739  5999  24.7  28.5  28.9  31.2  31.1  29.0  28.3  27.1  25.6  23.2  1580  2445  155 
Singapore  1.57  1.40  1.41  1.44  1.62  1.73  1.70  1.81  1.82  1.78  1.72  1.66  1.59  1.52  1.35  1.61  0.16  9.71 
South Korea  810  769  779  894  1474  1218  1108  1325  1304  1220  1176  1004  952  923  1018  1065  216  20.3 
Sweden  7.97  7.34  6.71  7.72  8.00  8.32  8.84  10.2  10.3  8.34  7.58  7.41  7.28  6.79  5.96  7.92  1.20  15.2 
Switzerland  1.44  1.13  1.23  1.47  1.52  1.48  1.70  1.73  1.66  1.37  1.28  1.25  1.21  1.21  1.02  1.38  0.21  15.5 
Taiwan  26.4  25.7  27.2  27.6  33.0  33.2  30.6  32.9  34.8  34.8  33.5  31.1  32.1  32.8  30.4  31.1  3.02  9.73 
Thailand  25.3  24.6  25.3  26.1  40.0  37.6  38.0  45.5  43.3  42.7  40.6  40.5  38.4  34.5  33.4  35.7  7.19  20.1 
Notes:  1.  The nominal exchange rate is the domestic currency cost of one US dollar. An increase thus implies a depreciation of the domestic currency and vice versa. 
  2.  SD stands for standard deviation, and CV is the coefficient of variation. 
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FIGURE 3.2 
THE VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES, 1994-2008  
(Coefficients of variation; percentages) 
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TABLE 3.3 
      REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994 - 2008 
Country                    Year                   
   
   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Mean  SE  t-value 
Argentina  44.80  25.70  24.00  3.25  -2.37  2.84  -0.40  -1.59  -113.7  -64.38  -67.27  -62.37  -30.39  -24.47  2.01  -17.62  11.05  -1.60 
Australia  -28.75  -24.56  -18.14  -22.21  -37.76  -37.71  -48.74  -51.66  -43.42  -37.46  -24.49  -20.21  -23.79  -14.53  -6.38  -29.32  3.35  -8.74 
Brazil  -37.51  14.76  23.32  14.65  6.04  -35.42  -42.07  -43.51  -48.15  -60.35  -53.41  -24.71  -10.80  5.77  28.49  -17.53  7.90  -2.22 
Britain  13.89  18.86  13.57  19.81  17.66  23.02  17.90  11.36  14.74  14.86  15.02  11.62  16.26  15.96  24.91  16.63  0.99  16.76 
Canada  -11.14  -15.20  -11.53  -15.53  -26.46  -20.47  -25.82  -17.39  -16.04  -20.54  -21.88  -15.14  1.37  8.03  13.60  -12.94  3.04  -4.25 
Chile  -0.44  3.60  -1.35  17.32  7.06  6.79  -2.36  -19.19  -15.27  -32.64  -28.54  -19.02  -5.18  -13.83  -12.91  -7.73  3.62  -2.14 
China  -79.90  -78.91  -71.92  -73.15  -76.13  -70.92  -74.16  -75.35  -67.48  -81.83  -83.36  -87.94  -86.32  -85.70  -66.82  -77.32  1.75  -44.29 
Czech Republic  -31.20  -19.53  -24.47  -28.76  -48.91  -48.56  -59.06  -57.04  -40.83  -32.53  -30.86  -28.55  -14.86  -30.76  24.45  -31.43  5.21  -6.03 
Denmark  51.49  75.30  62.33  48.98  28.09  38.80  20.41  14.13  17.07  41.23  43.04  40.33  43.05  39.91  51.21  41.03  4.26  9.63 
Euro Area  21.39  37.17  30.17  16.77  3.50  11.33  -5.28  -11.61  -4.67  9.53  12.31  15.65  19.39  19.92  40.61  14.41  3.87  3.72 
Hong Kong  -65.88  -63.54  -61.25  -63.89  -66.53  -61.32  -65.07  -61.60  -55.05  -60.87  -63.29  -68.66  -69.42  -79.85  -73.89  -65.34  1.54  -42.55 
Hungary  -33.77  -38.51  -50.33  -46.34  -74.45  -65.55  -72.55  -65.69  -38.90  -21.42  -14.05  -16.29  -13.13  -2.27  26.28  -35.13  7.40  -4.74 
Japan  49.14  69.39  13.15  -3.65  -21.05  0.82  9.99  -6.89  -21.15  -21.61  -21.88  -26.83  -32.84  -39.59  -30.87  -5.59  7.94  -0.70 
Malaysia  -49.54  -42.94  -44.65  -44.68  -79.51  -71.44  -74.68  -75.87  -62.99  -71.45  -77.95  -79.63  -71.59  -75.45  -73.10  -66.36  3.54  -18.74 
Mexico  4.70  -30.44  -15.47  -24.93  -20.00  -15.27  -12.23  -7.46  -5.37  -21.57  -33.23  -17.06  -18.89  -23.90  -12.92  -16.94  2.52  -6.73 
New Zealand  -32.88  -17.19  -16.21  -7.67  -30.05  -29.01  -39.46  -55.54  -34.50  -19.98  -9.02  3.53  -12.09  5.25  3.90  -19.39  4.53  -4.28 
Poland  -50.95  -46.79  -49.44  -55.66  -51.36  -56.44  -67.41  -55.10  -53.36  -51.48  -57.61  -44.55  -39.10  -30.68  -3.47  -47.56  3.83  -12.41 
Russia  -34.20  -35.61  -20.03  -23.32  -24.67  -58.31  -59.39  -74.07  -68.91  -72.06  -69.31  -72.64  -55.97  -51.81  -33.92  -50.28  5.10  -9.85 
Singapore  -19.21  -9.62  -8.71  -14.98  -32.38  -27.29  -28.78  -33.16  -31.72  -37.96  -41.24  -34.37  -31.42  -27.17  -19.90  -26.53  2.56  -10.36 
South Korea  21.07  25.40  22.40  6.12  -37.25  1.35  7.58  -11.50  -4.63  -0.19  -6.41  -20.61  -16.59  -8.19  -12.73  -2.28  4.43  -0.51 
Sweden  33.01  42.32  49.58  33.05  15.86  17.15  7.85  -8.43  1.37  28.32  30.65  30.95  38.00  35.43  58.00  27.54  4.63  5.95 
Switzerland  54.29  81.12  70.93  50.59  41.62  49.50  32.40  36.03  42.14  52.88  52.45  50.10  51.85  42.32  57.94  51.08  3.23  15.84 
Taiwan  2.09  8.63  1.25  1.79  -21.70  -14.19  -9.28  -17.71  -21.34  -29.81  -25.82  -23.88  -28.28  -39.97  -36.95  -17.01  3.88  -4.39 
Thailand  -19.25  -17.31  -21.83  -30.20  -67.76  -56.37  -55.05  -74.25  -67.31  -67.36  -69.31  -72.64  -68.51  -64.05  -65.40  -54.44  5.41  -10.07 
Mean  -8.28  -1.58  -4.36  -10.11  -24.94  -21.53  -26.90  -31.80  -30.81  -27.44  -26.89  -24.29  -19.14  -18.32  -4.91  -18.75  2.75  -5.95 
SE  7.83  8.73  7.64  6.79  7.04  7.28  7.03  6.64  7.01  7.53  7.73  7.66  7.40  7.49  8.22  6.75  1.97   
t-value  -1.06  -0.18  -0.57  -1.49  -3.54  -2.96  -3.83  -4.79  -4.39  -3.65  -3.48  -3.17  -2.58  -2.44  -0.60  -2.78    -9.54 
Notes:   1.   The real exchange rate for country cin year  t  is defined as  ( )
*
c,t c,t c,t t q =log P S P , where  c,t P  is the price of a Big Mac hamburger in country c during t, 
*
t P  is the 
corresponding price in the US and  c,t S  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the domestic currency cost of $US1. A positive value of  c,t q  implies that the 
domestic currency is overvalued in real terms and vice versa. 
2.   All entries, except those in the last row and column, are to be divided by 100.  
3.   SE is standard error of the mean, which is a multiple  1/ k   of the corresponding standard deviation, where  k=15 is the number of observations for the row 
means and  k=24 for the columns means.  The t-values provide a test of the hypothesis that the means are zero.   
4.   The second to last entry in the second to last column, 2.75, is the standard error of the grand average, calculated as the standard deviation of all 24×15=360 
observations divided by  360 .  The corresponding t-value is presented in the right-bottom entry of the table.  
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FIGURE 3.3 
BIG MAC REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
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FIGURE 3.3 (continued)  
BIG MAC REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
(Means indicated by dashed-dotted lines; two standard-error bands shaded; all × 100) 
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FIGURE 3.3 (continued) 
BIG MAC REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
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TABLE 3.4 
CONTINGENCY TABLE TEST OF  
SERIAL INDEPENDENCE OF MISPRICING, 
ONE YEAR HORIZON 
Mispricing   Mispricing in year t+1 
in year t  Undervalued  Overvalued 
Total 
I. Observed 
Undervalued  221  14  235 
Overvalued  15  86  101 
Total  236  100  336 
II. Expected under independence 
Undervalued  165  70  235 
Overvalued  71  30  101 
Total  236  100  336 
III. Squared deviations 
Undervalued  19.0  44.7  63.7 
Overvalued  44.1  104.1  148.2 
Total  63.1  148.8  211.9 
Note:  The (i, j)
th element of Panel III is  
2
ij ij ij (O E ) /E − ,  





TESTS OF SERIAL INDEPENDENCE  
OVER VARIOUS HORIZONS 
Observed 
2 χ  value, with overlapping observations  Horizon 
(Years)  Included  Excluded 
1  211.9  211.9 
2  162.1  81.3 
3  120.0  41.6 
4  93.0  24.1 
5  74.7  23.5 
6  52.1  18.0 
7  37.7  2.5 
8  33.7  6.7 
9  35.5  8.8 
10  26.3  8.8 
11  18.5  5.7 
12  13.1  5.7 
13  4.8  2.1 
14  1.4  1.4 
Notes:  Under the null of independence, the test statistic 
follows a 
2 χ  distribution with 1 degree of freedom. The 
critical value of  ( )
2
.05 χ 1  is 3.8 and  ( )
2
.01 χ 1  is 6.6.  
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 TABLE 3.6 
RUNS TESTS FOR ABSOLUTE PARITY 
Number of runs 
Country  Sequence of signs 





Argentina  ++++-+--------+  5  8.20  1.79  -1.79 
Australia  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Brazil  -++++--------++  4  8.20  1.79  -2.35 
Britain  +++++++++++++++  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Canada  ------------+++  2  5.80  1.14  -3.33 
Chile  -+-+++---------  5  6.87  1.43  -1.31 
China  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Czech Republic  --------------+  2  2.87  0.34  -2.55 
Denmark  +++++++++++++++  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Euro Area  ++++++---++++++  3  5.80  1.14  -2.45 
Hong Kong  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Hungary  --------------+  2  2.87  0.34  -2.55 
Japan  +++--++--------  4  7.67  1.64  -2.23 
Malaysia  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Mexico  +--------------  2  2.87  0.34  -2.55 
New Zealand  -----------+-++  4  5.80  1.14  -1.58 
Poland  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Russia  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Singapore  ---------------  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
South Korea  ++++-++--------  4  8.20  1.79  -2.35 
Sweden  +++++++-+++++++  3  2.87  0.34  0.39 
Switzerland  +++++++++++++++  1  1.00  0.00  +∞ 
Taiwan  ++++-----------  2  6.87  1.43  -3.41 
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FIGURE 3.5 
THE VALUE OF THE US DOLLAR, 1994-2008 
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TABLE 3.7 
MEAN REAL EXCHANGE RATES 
(Logarithmic ratios  100 × ; standard errors  100 ×  in parentheses)  
Country        Period       
   1994-1997  1998-2008  1994-2008 
t-value for equality 
of means 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Argentina  24.44  (8.49)  -32.92  (11.72)  -17.62  (11.05)  3.96 
Australia  -23.41  (2.22)  -31.47  (4.38)  -29.32  (3.35)  1.64 
Brazil  3.80  (13.92)  -25.28  (8.69)  -17.53  (7.90)  1.77 
Britain  16.53  (1.63)  16.66  (1.26)  16.63  (0.99)  -0.07 
Canada  -13.35  (1.17)  -12.79  (4.18)  -12.94  (3.04)  -0.13 
Chile  4.78  (4.32)  -12.28  (3.90)  -7.73  (3.62)  2.93 
China   -75.97  (2.01)  -77.82  (2.30)  -77.33  (1.75)  0.61 
Czech Republic  -25.99  (2.56)  -33.41  (7.05)  -31.43  (5.21)  0.99 
Denmark  59.53  (6.00)  34.30  (3.71)  41.03  (4.26)  3.58 
Euro Area  26.38  (4.55)  10.06  (4.39)  14.41  (3.87)  2.58 
Hong Kong  -63.64  (0.95)  -65.96  (2.06)  -65.34  (1.54)  1.02 
Hungary  -42.24  (3.74)  -32.55  (10.03)  -35.13  (7.40)  -0.91 
Japan  32.01  (16.63)  -19.26  (4.49)  -5.59  (7.94)  2.98 
Malaysia  -45.45  (1.42)  -73.97  (1.43)  -66.37  (3.54)  14.15 
Mexico  -16.53  (7.72)  -17.08  (2.36)  -16.94  (2.52)  0.07 
New Zealand  -18.49  (5.25)  -19.72  (6.01)  -19.39  (4.53)  0.16 
Poland  -50.71  (1.86)  -46.41  (5.21)  -47.56  (3.83)  -0.78 
Russia  -28.29  (3.89)  -58.28  (4.91)  -50.28  (5.10)  4.79 
Singapore   -13.13  (2.45)  -31.40  (1.72)  -26.53  (2.56)  6.09 
South Korea  18.75  (4.31)  -9.92  (3.68)  -2.28  (4.43)  5.06 
Sweden  39.49  (4.01)  23.19  (5.66)  27.54  (4.63)  2.35 
Switzerland  64.23  (7.16)  46.30  (2.39)  51.08  (3.23)  2.38 
Taiwan  3.44  (1.74)  -24.45  (2.76)  -17.01  (3.88)  8.54 
Thailand  -22.15  (2.84)  -66.18  (1.79)  -54.44  (5.41)  13.12 
Mean  -6.08  (1.89)  -23.36  (2.99)  -18.75  (3.48)  4.48  
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                                                                             FIGURE 4.1 
SCATTER PLOTS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES,  
24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
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FIGURE 4.1 (continued) 
SCATTER PLOTS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES,  
24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 

























































































Note:  To facilitate presentation, the cases in which the annualised logarithmic changes ( 100 × ) exceeded 
100%  have been omitted.  These cases are included in the computation of the RMSEs.  
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FIGURE 4.2  
BLOW-UP OF SCATTER PLOTS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES,  
24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 






































































          
  (continued on next page)  
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FIGURE 4.2 (continued) 
BLOW-UP OF SCATTER PLOTS OF EXCHANGE RATES AND PRICES,  
FOR 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 






































Note:  To facilitate presentation, the cases in which the annualised logarithmic changes ( ) 100 ×  exceeded 20% have been 
omitted. These cases are included in the computation of the RMSEs. 
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(h)
t var q   ∆   
FIGURE 4.3 
VARIANCES OF EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES 
 
 
A. Annualised changes  B. Total changes  
 





























(h RMSE 100) × ×  










(h) t var q   ∆   
Horizon h  
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FIGURE 5.1 
SCATTER PLOTS OF FUTURE REAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST  
CURRENT DEVIATIONS FROM PARITY, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
(Logarithmic changes 100 × )  















y= -0.06 - 0.30x















y= -1.68 - 0.59x
















y= -3.37 - 0.89x















y= -4.69 - 1.11x
















y= -4.45 - 1.23x















y= -4.26 - 1.40x
     (1.09)  (0.06)
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FIGURE 5.1 (continued) 
SCATTER PLOTS OF FUTURE REAL EXCHANGE RATES AGAINST  
CURRENT DEVIATIONS FROM PARITY, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 















y= -2.87 - 1.52x















y= 0.015 - 1.61x
















q  c,t+9 - qc,t
y= 1.93 - 1.48x 















y= 3.84 - 1.42x
















y= 10.31 - 1.41x















y= 20.36 - 1.62x
     (4.73)  (0.22)
 
                  
Note: To facilitate presentation, the cases in which the annualised logarithmic changes ( 100 × ) exceeded 80% have been 
omitted. These cases are included in the regression and the chi square value. 
  
 




PREDICTIVE VALUE OF DEVIATIONS FROM PARITY: 













































PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS, REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h h
c,t+h c,t c,t c,t q -q = + d +u η φ           (Standard errors in parentheses)  
  A. With overlapping observations    B. Without overlapping observations 
Horizon  Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ²  F    Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ²  F 
h 
h η 100 ×   φ
h   observations          h η 100 ×          
h φ   observations       
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)    (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
1  -0.06 (0.73)  -0.30 (0.04)  336  0.14  15.74  143.39*    -0.06 (0.73)  -0.30 (0.04)  336  0.14  15.74  143.39* 
     -0.30 (0.04)  336             -0.30 (0.04)  336       
2  -1.68 (0.90)  -0.59 (0.05)  312  0.31  14.51  35.67*    -0.36 (1.38)  -0.59 (0.08)  168  0.27  6.65  15.54* 
     -0.59 (0.05)  312             -0.58 (0.08)  168       
3  -3.37 (1.00)  -0.89 (0.05)  288  0.48  35.37  8.29*    -2.22 (1.49)  -0.87 (0.09)  96  0.52  19.84  2.17 
     -0.88 (0.06)  288             -0.88 (0.09)  96       
4  -4.69 (1.04)  -1.11 (0.06)  264  0.60  73.97  11.86*    -6.46 (2.00)  -1.10 (0.10)  72  0.65  24.50  5.42* 
     -1.10 (0.06)  264             -1.06 (0.10)  72       
5  -4.46 (1.08)  -1.23 (0.06)  240  0.66  109.33  16.63*    -5.94 (1.93)  -0.88 (0.11)  48  0.56  19.37  4.83* 
     -1.23 (0.06)  24             -0.96 (0.12)  48       
6  -4.26 (1.09)  -1.40 (0.06)  216  0.74  115.60  33.48*    -4.23 (1.98)  -1.04 (0.10)  48  0.69  30.86  2.40 
     -1.41 (0.06)  216             -1.05 (0.11)  48       
7  -2.87 (1.12)  -1.52 (0.06)  192  0.77  94.87  43.46*    -0.14 (3.17)  -1.42 (0.16)  48  0.64  19.86  3.65* 
     -1.54 (0.06)  192             -1.42 (0.15)  48       
8  0.02 (1.17)  -1.62 (0.06)  168  0.80  84.77  50.14*    -6.71 (4.46)  -1.51 (0.21)  24  0.70  10.29  7.80* 
     -1.61 (0.06)  168             -1.67 (0.19)  24       
9  1.94 (1.37)  -1.48 (0.07)  144  0.74  57.65  22.20*    -5.94 (3.12)  -1.26 (0.15)  24  0.77  6.40  6.75* 
     -1.44 (0.07)  144             -1.34 (0.13)  24       
10  3.84 (1.63)  -1.43 (0.08)  120  0.72  35.60  13.54*    -4.16 (3.06)  -1.38 (0.14)  24  0.81  2.67  8.17* 
     -1.34 (0.08)  120             -1.48 (0.13)  24       
11  8.02 (2.08)  -1.47 (0.10)  96  0.70  18.50  11.67*    0.22 (2.22)  -1.55 (0.10)  24  0.91  2.67  18.01* 
     -1.23 (0.09)  96             -1.54 (0.09)  24       
12  10.31 (2.56)  -1.41 (0.11)  72  0.68  10.52  8.96*    4.05 (1.89)  -1.42 (0.09)  24  0.92  2.90  11.55* 
     -1.12 (0.01)  72             -1.33 (0.08)  24       
13  13.07 (3.40)  -1.43 (0.14)  48  0.68  5.94  7.77*    5.94 (2.89)  -1.53 (0.14)  24  0.85  2.90  7.58* 
     -1.10 (0.13)  48             -1.39 (0.13)  24       
14  20.37 (4.73)  -1.62 (0.22)  24  0.71  2.74  9.61*    20.37 (4.73)  -1.62 (0.22)  24  0.71  2.74  9.61* 
      -1.16 (0.26)  24             -1.16 (0.26)  24       
      Notes:  1. The 
2 χ statistics of columns 6 and 12 test the hypothesis of the independence of   q q
c,t+h c,t -  and  c,t d . Under the null, 
2 χ  has 1 degree of freedom. 
                  2. The F statistics of columns 7 and 13 test the joint hypothesis of 
h
=0 η  and 
h=-1 φ .  Under the null, F has degrees of freedom equal to 2 and N-2, where N is the number of observations.  
                  3. An asterisk (*) indicates significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
  66 
FIGURE 5.3 
TIME PATHS OF ESTIMATED AND IMPLIED PARAMETERS 
Intercept η
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Note: In Panel A the thick lines are estimated parameters, while the thinner lines are the 95 percent confidence limits. 
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FIGURE 5.4 
THE QUALITY OF THREE SETS OF EXCHANGE-RATE FORECASTS  
(Root-Mean-Squared Errors) 
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MORE PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
(i) Negative change in nominal exchange rate    (ii) Inflation differential 
h h h
c,t+h c,t s s ct s,ct - ) -(s s =η + d +u φ    
h h h h
c,t+h c,t r r ct r,ct =η + d +u r -r φ  
Horizon   Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ²    Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ² 
h  h
s η ×100 
h
s φ   observations        h
r η ×100 
h
r φ   observations     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  5.85  (3.87)  -0.15 (0.22)  336    0.00  8.46*    -5.91  (3.80)  -0.16 (0.21)  336    0.00  7.91* 
      -0.16 (0.22)  336            -0.14 (0.21)  336     
2  6.75  (4.54)  -0.21 (0.25)  312  0.00  12.15*    -8.43  (4.40)  -0.39 (0.25)  312  0.01  7.04* 
      -0.23 (0.25)  312            -0.36 (0.25)  312     
3  7.68  (5.25)  -0.26 (0.29)  288  0.00  32.91*    -11.05  (5.17)  -0.62 (0.28)  288  0.01  1.49 
      -0.29 (0.29)  288            -0.59 (0.28)  288     
4  9.26  (6.07)  -0.39 (0.32)  264  0.01  57.87*    -13.96  (5.96)  -0.73 (0.32)  264  0.02  0.000 
      -0.41 (0.33)  264            -0.70 (0.32)  264     
5  12.07  (6.79)  -0.46 (0.36)  240  0.01  68.70*    -16.52  (6.77)  -0.77 (0.36)  240  0.02  1.57 
      -0.46 (0.36)  240            -0.77 (0.36)  240     
6  13.01  (7.53)  -0.68 (0.39)  216  0.01  66.62*    -17.35  (7.57)  -0.72 (0.40)  216  0.02  1.27 
      -0.65 (0.39)  216            -0.76 (0.40)  216     
7  14.95  (8.50)  -0.93 (0.46)  192  0.02  55.81*    -17.81  (8.59)  -0.59 (0.46)  192  0.01  3.15 
      -0.82 (0.46)  192            -0.72 (0.46)  192     
8  19.15  (9.90)  -1.00 (0.54)  168  0.02  43.28*    -19.14 (10.03)  -0.61 (0.55)  168  0.01  0.00 
      -0.73 (0.52)  168            -0.88 (0.53)  168     
9  25.30  (11.86)  -0.95 (0.63)  144  0.02  32.31*    -23.37 (12.09)  -0.53 (0.65)  144  0.01  0.02 
      -0.45 (0.60)  144            -0.99 (0.61)  144     
10  32.90  (14.69)  -0.98 (0.74)  120  0.02  13.73*    -29.05 (14.96)  -0.45 (0.75)  120  0.00  0.96 
      -0.24 (0.67)  120            -1.10 (0.68)  120     
11  47.17  (19.49)  -1.65 (0.90)  96  0.03  3.49    -39.15 (19.72)  0.18 (0.95)  96  0.00  2.92 
      -0.26 (0.76)  96            -0.97 (0.76)  96     
12  62.87  (24.25)  -2.21 (1.08)  72  0.06  4.14*    -52.56 (24.44)  0.80 (1.09)  72  0.01  0.90 
       -0.46 (0.88)  72            -0.66 (0.87)  72     
13  86.55  (31.94)  -2.98 (1.35)  48  0.10  0.97    -73.48 (31.98)  1.55 (1.36)  48  0.03  0.17 
      -0.83 (1.17)  48            -0.27 (1.15)  48     
14  135.62  (53.16)  -4.94 (2.49)  24  0.15  2.06    -115.26 (51.96)  3.32 (2.43)  24  0.08  0.08 
      -1.83 (2.41)  24                0.68 (2.29)  24       
                                                                        (continued on next page)  
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TABLE 6.1 (continued) 
MORE PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008   
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
(i) Negative change in nominal exchange rate    (ii) Inflation differential 
h h h
c,t+h c,t s s ct s,ct - ) -(s s =η + d +u φ    
h h h h
c,t+h c,t r r ct r,ct =η + d +u r -r φ  
Horizon   Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ²    Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ² 
h  h
s η 100 ×  
h
s φ   observations        h
r η 100 ×  
h
r φ   observations     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
B. Without overlapping observations 
1  5.85  (3.87)  -0.15 (0.22)  336  0.00  8.46*    -5.91  (3.79)  -0.16 (0.21)  336  0.00  7.91* 
      -0.16 (0.22)  336            -0.14 (0.21)  336     
2  11.55  (7.66)  -0.30 (0.42)  168  0.00  4.92*    -11.91  (7.46)  -0.28 (0.41)  168  0.00  9.00* 
      -0.35 (0.42)  168            -0.23 (0.41)  168     
3  17.24  (13.14)  -0.71 (0.76)  96  0.01  15.02*    -19.45 (12.96)  -0.16 (0.75)  96  0.00  0.74 
      -0.68 (0.76)  96            -0.20 (0.75)  96     
4  21.06  (17.56)  -0.54 (0.85)  72  0.01  15.47*    -27.52 (17.29)  -0.56 (0.84)  72  0.01  0.16 
      -0.66 (0.84)  72            -0.40 (0.84)  72     
5  36.34  (24.78)  -1.79 (1.46)  48  0.03  15.97*    -42.28 (24.85)  0.92 (1.47)  48  0.01  0.01 
      -1.31 (1.44)  48            0.35 (1.46)  48     
6  35.33  (23.92)  -1.43 (1.25)  48  0.03  18.55*    -39.56 (24.38)  0.40 (1.28)  48  0.00  0.17 
      -1.32 (1.27)  48            0.27 (1.30)  48     
7  39.73  (23.72)  -1.72 (1.17)  48  0.05  30.08*    -39.87 (24.25)  0.30 (1.20)  48  0.00  8.07* 
      -1.85 (1.19)  48            0.43 (1.22)  48     
8  92.91 (52. 50)  -4.31 (2.45)  24  0.12  6.40*    -99.61 (53.62)  2.80 (2.51)  24  0.05  0.00 
      -2.18 (2.24)  24            0.52 (2.30)  24     
9  99.31  (51.33)  -4.31 (2.40)  24  0.13  5.45*    -105.24 (52.74)  3.05 (2.47)  24  0.07  0.06 
      -2.03 (2.22)  24            0.64 (2.29)  24     
10  104.54  (51.01)  -4.36 (2.37)  24  0.13  3.56    -108.70 (52.58)  2.98 (2.46)  24  0.06  0.00 
      -1.97 (2.22)  24            0.49 (2.29)  24     
11  112.15  (51.65)  -4.49 (2.42)  24  0.14  2.74    -111.93 (52.49)  2.94 (2.46)  24  0.06  0.08 
      -1.92 (2.27)  24            0.38 (2.30)  24     
12  115.14  (51.97)  -4.57 (2.43)  24  0.14  2.74    -111.09 (52.18)  3.14 (2.44)  24  0.07  0.30 
      -1.93 (2.29)  24            0.60 (2.29)  24     
13  123.58  (52.21)  -4.79 (2.44)  24  0.15  2.06    -117.64 (51.79)  3.27 (2.42)  24  0.08  0.08 
      -1.96 (2.33)  24            0.57 (2.30)  24     
14  135.62  (53.16)  -4.94 (2.49)  24  0.15  2.06    -115.26 (51.96)  3.32 (2.43)  24  0.08  0.08 
      -1.83 (2.41)  24            0.68 (2.29)  24     
                 Notes: 1. The χ² statistics in columns 6 and 11 test the hypotheses of the independence between  c,t+h c,t - ) -(s s  and  ct d , and  c,t+h c,t r -r  and  ct d , respectively. Under the  
null, χ² has 1 degree of freedom. 





SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS UNDER FULL ADJUSTMENT, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
H H H
c,t H c,t s s ct s,ct (s s ) d u + − − = η +φ +   and  
H H H
c,t H c,t r r ct r,ct r r d u + − = η +φ + , with 
H H
s r η +η 0 =  and 
H H
s r + 1 φ φ = −  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
                       
  With overlapping observations    Without overlapping observations 
Horizon   Intercept  Slope  No. of     Intercept  Slope  No. of  
H 
H
s η 100 ×  
H
s φ   observations   
H
s η 100 ×  
H
s φ   observations 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7) 
1  5.90  (3.79)  -0.72 (0.21)  336      5.90  (3.79)  -0.72 (0.21)  336  
      -0.74 (0.21)  336        -0.74 (0.21)  336  
2  8.38  (4.42)  -0.60 (0.25)  312    11.97  (7.42)  -0.78 (0.40)  168  
      -0.61 (0.25)  312        -0.83 (0.41)  168  
3  10.79  (5.15)  -0.37 (0.28)  288    20.66  (12.80)  -0.91 (0.74)  96  
      -0.39 (0.28)  288        -0.84 (0.75)  96  
4  14.09  (5.94)  -0.27 (0.32)  264    30.79  (17.02)  -0.39 (0.82)  72  
      -0.32 (0.32)  264        -0.60 (0.83)  72  
5  14.80  (6.73)  -0.32 (0.36)  240    36.95  (24.26)  -1.81 (1.43)  48  
      -0.37 (0.36)  240        -1.26 (1.41)  48  
6  14.36  (7.49)  -0.56 (0.39)  216    26.54  (23.04)  -1.51 (1.21)  48  
      -0.61 (0.39)  216        -1.46 (1.21)  48  
7  15.14  (8.46)  -0.90 (0.46)  192    39.65  (23.15)  -1.97 (1.14)  48  
      -0.86 (0.46)  192        -2.10 (1.17)  48  
8  19.16  (9.83)  -1.11 (0.53)  168    84.01  (49.70)  -4.99 (2.33)  24  
      -0.84 (0.52)  168        -3.64 (2.13)  24  
9  26.48  (11.75)  -1.25 (0.63)  144    74.44  (46.53)  -5.41 (2.18)  24  
      -0.66 (0.59)  144        -4.41 (1.96)  24  
10  35.57  (14.52)  -1.28 (0.73)  120    85.92  (45.67)  -6.07 (2.14)  24  
      -0.38 (0.67)  120        -4.68 (1.98)  24  
11  49.86  (19.27)  -1.81 (0.93)  96    112.76  (48.49)  -6.05 (2.27)  24  
      -0.18 (0.76)  96        -3.43 (2.19)  24  
12  63.46  (23.92)  -2.23 (1.07)  72    119.41  (49.67)  -5.01 (2.32)  24  
      -0.34 (0.87)  72        -1.30 (2.24)  24  
13  81.25  (31.24)  -2.81 (1.33)  48    111.47  (49.46)  -3.72 (2.31)  24  
      -0.64 (1.13)  48        -0.27 (2.19)  24  
14  94.84  (49.41)  -3.69 (2.31)  24    94.84  (49.41)  -3.69 (2.31)  24  
      -1.09 (2.03)  24          -1.09 (2.03)  24   
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FIGURE 7.1 
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PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS FOR REAL EXCHANGE RATES WITH TIME DUMMIES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h
, h ,t c,t+h c,t c,t c,t D q -q = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ                  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 





2  F 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  10.30  3.12  -0.80  -11.86  1.28  -6.33  -7.69  -3.50  -0.78  -2.44  -0.19  3.25  0.69  13.56  -0.10  -0.34  336  0.33  111.96* 
  (3.05)  (2.78)  (1.72)  (2.73)  (2.34)  (1.77)  (1.79)  (5.26)  (2.36)  (1.84)  (1.87)  (1.50)  (2.07)  (3.10)  (0.45)  (0.06)       
2  10.41  2.12  -11.66  -6.06  -5.80  -11.99  -8.96  -3.73  -3.56  -2.23  2.71  2.54  13.99    -1.71  -0.62  312  0.47  28.23* 
  (2.94)  (2.56)  (3.16)  (2.42)  (2.76)  (2.31)  (4.68)  (3.79)  (2.94)  (2.52)  (2.21)  (2.75)  (3.92)    (0.73)  (0.07)       
3  7.34  -8.32  -4.57  -9.28  -12.27  -11.71  -7.68  -6.52  -4.03  0.70  1.45  14.53      -3.36  -0.88  288  0.59  9.69* 
  (2.70)  (3.77)  (2.56)  (3.11)  (2.77)  (4.30)  (3.24)  (3.64)  (2.97)  (2.43)  (3.25)  (4.59)      (0.85)  (0.07)       
4  -5.47  -1.60  -7.16  -12.45  -12.48  -8.88  -8.70  -6.43  -1.21  -0.16  13.29        -4.66  -1.07  264  0.67  11.93* 
  (3.48)  (2.72)  (3.28)  (2.95)  (4.18)  (2.82)  (3.12)  (2.98)  (2.56)  (3.25)  (4.75)        (0.91)  (0.07)       
5  -1.21  -5.59  -10.89  -10.77  -9.62  -8.56  -6.75  -2.33  -1.37  12.54          -4.45  -1.15  240  0.71  12.34* 
  (2.40)  (3.01)  (2.89)  (4.29)  (2.47)  (2.80)  (2.43)  (1.97)  (2.99)  (4.59)          (1.01)  (0.07)       
6  -4.83  -7.60  -7.50  -5.95  -10.10  -6.42  -2.97  -3.70  10.02            -4.35  -1.32  216  0.77  20.76* 
  (3.51)  (2.81)  (4.10)  (2.50)  (2.27)  (2.32)  (1.31)  (2.45)  (4.19)            (1.02)  (0.07)       
7  -8.37  -4.40  -2.27  -4.29  -8.30  -1.62  -3.20  8.02              -3.05  -1.45  192  0.79  26.35* 
  (3.84)  (3.60)  (2.42)  (2.69)  (2.41)  (1.61)  (2.12)  (3.56)              (1.07)  (0.08)       
8  -6.03  1.19  0.14  -0.56  -3.94  -1.16  9.15                -0.17  -1.58  168  0.81  34.52* 
  (3.20)  (3.06)  (2.78)  (2.52)  (2.54)  (2.3)  (2.95)                (1.30)  (0.14)       
9  -4.29  -0.92  0.52  3.25  -2.17  12.68                  1.51  -1.42  144  0.78  14.44* 
  (3.49)  (3.94)  (3.04)  (2.72)  (3.24)  (3.87)                  (2.27)  (0.16)       
10  -4.75  0.03  4.28  3.24  11.84                    2.93  -1.32  120  0.75  6.68* 
  (3.79)  (3.84)  (3.33)  (3.52)  (4.65)                    (2.86)  (0.17)       
11  -0.87  7.26  6.84  17.69                      7.73  -1.45  96  0.75  11.93* 
  (2.98)  (3.34)  (3.71)  (4.69)                      (3.15)  (0.15)       
12  4.06  7.72  19.95                        10.58  -1.42  72  0.74  10.92* 
  (2.59)  (4.00)  (4.83)                        (3.49)  (0.16)       
13  5.74  22.54                          14.14  -1.51  48  0.74  11.33* 
  (3.02)  (5.22)                          (3.91)  (0.15)       
14  20.37                            20.38  -1.62  24  0.71  9.61* 
  (4.45)                            (4.45)  (0.27)       







TABLE 8.1 (continued) 
PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS FOR REAL EXCHANGE RATES WITH TIME DUMMIES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h
, h ,t c,t+h c,t c,t c,t D q -q = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ          (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 





2  F 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
B. Without overlapping observations 
1  10.30  3.12  -0.80  -11.86  1.28  -6.33  -7.69  -3.50  -0.78  -2.44  -0.19  3.25  0.69  13.56  -0.10  -0.34  336  0.33  111.96* 
  (3.05)  (2.78)  (1.72)  (2.73)  (2.34)  (1.77)  (1.79)  (5.26)  (2.36)  (1.84)  (1.87)  (1.50)  (2.07)  (3.10)  (0.45)  (0.06)       
2  10.29    -11.83    -5.73    -8.86    -3.42    2.81    13.99    -0.392  -0.61  168  0.46  13.39* 
  (3.05)    (3.29)    (2.79)    (4.77)    (3.05)    (2.16)    (3.90)    (0.84)  (0.07)       
3  7.99      -8.69      -8.18      0.16          -2.18  -0.94  96  0.63  1.54 
  (2.64)      (3.04)      (3.15)      (2.38)          (0.48)  (0.07)       
4  -5.23        -12.62        -1.48            -6.45  -1.09  72  0.68  5.54* 
  (3.16)        (3.92)        (2.52)            (1.57)  (0.09)       
5  -3.52          -7.94                  -5.73  -0.93  48  0.57  4.41* 
  (2.25)          (2.89)                  (1.57)  (0.10)       
6  -9.02            0.29                -4.36  -0.92  48  0.72  2.78 
  (2.56)            (2.29)                (0.70)  (0.08)       
7  -12.48              13.14              0.33  -1.05  48  0.73  0.06 
  (2.80)              (4.93)              (2.06)  (0.17)       
8  -6.71                            -6.71  -1.51  24  0.70  7.80* 
  (3.88)                            (3.88)  (0.40)       
9  -5.94                            -5.94  -1.26  24  0.77  6.75* 
  (3.85)                            (3.85)  (0.22)       
10  -4.13                            -4.16  -1.38  24  0.81  8.17* 
  (3.80)                            (3.76)  (0.21)       
11  0.22                            0.22  -1.55  24  0.91  18.01* 
  (2.49)                            (2.49)  (0.12)       
12  4.05                            4.05  -1.42  24  0.92  11.55* 
  (1.88)                            (1.88)  (0.09)       
13  5.94                            5.94  -1.53  24  0.85  7.58* 
  (2.86)                            (2.86)  (0.16)       
14  20.37                            20.37  -1.62  24  0.71  9.61* 
  (4.44)                            (4.45)  (0.27)       
          Notes:   1. The F statistics of column 20 test the joint hypothesis of 
h η 0 =  and 
h 1 φ = −  for various values of h. 
      2. An asterisk (*) indicates significant at the 5 percent level. 
      3. Standard errors are robust, based on a cluster correction (Kleok, 1981). 
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TABLE 9.1 
THE BURGERNOMICS LITERATURE 
  Author  Key Results 
1.  Cumby (1996)  Deviations from Big Mac PPP tend to die out; half-life is about 1 year; the Big Mac is a 
useful exchange-rate predictor 
2.  Click (1996)  PPP holds in time-series dimension; departure is due to the productivity bias 
3.  Pakko and 
Pollard (1996) 
Deviations from absolute PPP are persistent and those from relative PPP are transitory; 
Big Macs are a useful but flawed PPP measure 
4.  Annaert and 
Ceuster (1997) 
Relative Big Mac PPP is a valuable international asset allocator  
5.  Ong (1997)  BMI surprisingly accurate in tracking exchange rates over the long term (revision of 
Ong, 1995) 
6.  Ong (1998a)  BMI good indicator of currency devaluations 
7.  Ong (1998b)  Significant relationship between Big Mac real wages and the productivity bias, market 
status and location 
8.  Ong and Mitchell 
(2000) 
Big Mac academic real wages and quality-of-life indices useful for relocation decisions 
9.  Ashenfelter and 
Jurajda (2001) 
McWages highly correlated with other wage measures 
10.  Lutz (2001)  Results similar to Cumby (1996) obtained using UBS price series and aggregate CPI 
data, but are not robust 
11.  Fujiki and 
Kitamura (2003) 
Big Mac PPP sensitive to different models, sample periods and countries 
12.  Pakko and 
Pollard (2003) 
BMI useful but imperfect PPP measure 
13.  Ong (2003)  Long-run PPP supported by BMI.  BMI works as well as other board price indices 
14.  Caetano et al. 
(2004) 
Income and trade openness explain failure of Big Mac PPP 
 
15.  Yang (2004)  Big Mac PPP overestimates currency values of low-income countries 
16.  Lan (2006)  BMI used to construct entire distribution of future exchange rates 
17.  Monson 
(undated) 
Adjustment toward parity is slower than that in Cumby (1996) and Ong (1997). The 
local price, rather than the nominal exchange rate, does most of the adjusting. 
18.  Chen et al. 
(2007) 
BMI supports PPP more than does CPI  
19.  Parsley and Wei 
(2007) 
Speed of adjustment for Big Mac PPP slower than that for tradable inputs, but faster 
than that for nontradable inputs 
20.  Fukumoto  
(2009) 
Big Mac prices suggest that regional price dispersion has diminished within regions, but 
global price dispersion has not decreased 
21.  Winkels (2009)  Absolute  PPP has predictive  value  for  the  performance  of  an  international  currency 
portfolio in the long run 
22.  Clementi et al. 
(2010) 
Inflation  has  increased  and  no  significant  reduction  in  price  dispersion  since  the 
introduction of the euro 
23.  Clements and 
Lan (2010) 
Real-time  exchange-rate  forecasts  derived  from  BMI;  these  beat  random  walk  over 






IMPLIED PPP EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                                   
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008
Argentina              1.51  1.58  1.57  1.29  1.27  1.03  0.98  1.03  1.00  0.98  1.00  1.51  1.50  1.55  2.26  2.42 3.08
Aruba                                  0.94  1.51  1.41  1.62  1.60 
Australia  1.09   0.82  1.04  1.05  1.09  1.16  1.08  1.07  1.06  1.06  1.03  1.04  1.09  1.03  1.18  1.21  1.11  1.12  1.06  1.05  1.01 0.97
Austria                  14.8  16.8  15.3  14.1  13.3                
Bahrain                                  0.34  0.31      
Belarus                                  916  904  1021    
Belgium  56.3  56.3  37.7  44.6  44.1  44.4  49.3  47.8  47.4  47.0  46.2  45.0  42.6                
Brazil  7.80           1735  33772  652  1.04  1.25  1.23  1.21  1.21  1.18  1.42  1.45  1.68  1.86  1.93  2.07  2.02 2.10
Britain  0.69  0.71  0.50  0.62  0.64  0.74  0.80  0.79  0.79  0.75  0.76  0.75  0.72  0.78  0.76  0.78  0.80  0.73  0.65  0.61  0.63  0.58 0.64
Bulgaria                                    1.10  1.03  0.98  0.97 
Canada  1.18   0.86  1.06  1.00  1.04  1.26  1.21  1.24  1.19  1.21  1.20  1.09  1.23  1.14  1.31  1.34  1.18  1.10  1.07  1.14  1.14 1.15
Chile                  412  410  403  496  488  518  502  496  562  517  483  490  503  459 434
China              2.88  3.73  3.91  3.88  4.07  4.01  3.87  4.07  3.94  3.90  4.22  3.65  3.59  3.43  3.39  3.23 3.50
Colombia                                  2289  2288  2241  2124  2097  2023 1961
Costa Rica                                  351  417  390  369  365  331 504
Croatia                                  5.98  5.50  5.14  4.87  4.84 
Czech Republic                  21.7  21.6  21.6  21.9  21.1   21.7  22.1  22.6  20.9  19.5  18.4  19.1  15.5 18.5
Denmark    13.4  9.52  12.3  11.6  11.9  12.4  11.3  11.2  11.5  10.9  10.6  9.30  10.2  9.86  9.74  9.94  10.2  9.57  9.07  8.95  8.14 7.84
Dominican Rep                                  20.1  22.1  20.7  19.6  19.4 
Egypt                                    2.95  3.45  2.94  3.07  2.80 3.64
Estonia                                  11.5  10.9  10.2  9.64  9.52  8.80 8.96
Euro Area                            1.04  1.02  1.01  1.07  1.00  0.94  0.95  0.95  0.90 0.94
Fiji                                      1.47  1.39  1.50 
France  10.3  10.9  7.24  8.76  8.05  8.00  8.27  8.11  8.04  7.97  7.42  7.23  6.84  7.20  7.37  7.28          
Georgia                                    1.35  1.26  1.19  1.34 
Germany            1.91  2.01  2.02  2.00  2.07  2.08  2.03  1.93  2.04  1.99  2.01          
Greece                  270                        
Guatemala                                  6.43  5.90  5.52  5.47  5.57 
Holland  2.72  2.81  2.03  2.53  2.39  2.33  2.44  2.39  2.37  2.35  2.31  2.25  2.13  2.24              
Honduras                                    9.58  12.4  11.7  11.6 
Hong Kong  4.75   3.18  3.76  3.91  3.96  4.06  3.95  4.00  4.10  4.20  4.09  3.98  4.20  4.06  4.21  4.50  4.24  4.14  3.92  3.87  3.52 3.73
 




TABLE A1 (continued) 
IMPLIED PPP EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                                   
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
Hungary            51  61  69  74  82  91  112  101  123  135  157  184  181  183  173  181  176  188
Iceland                                  160  162  151  143  148  138  131
Indonesia                    1681     3867  5967  5777  5787  6426  5941  5552  4771  4710  4663  5238
Ireland  0.74  0.74  0.51  0.64  0.59  0.62  0.66  0.65                            
Israel                    3.84  4.03  4.75  4.88  5.72  5.78   4.82          
Italy    2063  1381  1634  1773  1600  1872  1974  1978  1940  1907  1901  1758  1852  1793  1693            
Jamaica                                  48.2  41.7  39.0  53.9    
Japan  231   155  183  168  169  174  172  170  169  122  122  109  121  117  116  105  96.7  90  81.7  81  82  78
Jordan                                      0.89  0.85    
Kuwait                                  0.26  0.24  0.74      
Latvia                                        0.36  0.44  0.41  0.43
Lebanon                                    1587  1483  1405    
Lithuania                                    2.40  2.24  1.12  2.10  1.94  1.93
Macau                                  4.50  4.13  3.86  3.66  3.58   
Macedonia                                    35.1  32.8  31.0    
Malaysia                1.47  1.64  1.62  1.59  1.60  1.68  1.86  1.80  1.78  2.02  1.86  1.74  1.72  1.77  1.61  1.54
Mexico                3.11  3.52  4.70  6.31  6.16  6.99  8.19  8.33  8.62  8.80  8.49  8.28  9.15  9.36  8.50  8.96
Moldova                                      7.93  7.52  7.42   
Morocco                                  9.24  8.45  0.82  8.02  7.90   
New Zealand                    1.27  1.25  1.34  1.348  1.40  1.36  1.42  1.59  1.46  1.50  1.45  1.44  1.35  1.37
Nicaragua                                      11.9  11.3    
Norway                                  14.0  14.6  12.2  12.7  13.9  11.7  11.2
Oman                                  0.36  0.33        
Pakistan                                    36.5  37.9  42.5  41.9  41.1  39.2
Paraguay                                        2941  2903  3079 
Peru                                  3.41  2.92  3.10  2.94  3.07  2.79  2.66
Philippines                                23.2  26.1  24.0  23.8  26.1  27.4  24.9  24.4
Poland                  13478  1.47  1.61  1.78  2.07  2.26  2.19  2.32  2.37  2.33  2.17  2.12  2.10  2.02  1.96
Portugal                  191                          
Qatar                                  3.61  3.32  0.85  0.81    
Russia              26.5  342  1261  3491  4025  4545  4688  13.8  15.7  13.8  15.7  15.1  14.5  13.7  15.5  15.3  16.5




TABLE A1 (continued) 
IMPLIED PPP EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                               
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008
Saudi Arabia                                  3.62  3.32  0.83  2.94  2.90  2.64 2.80
Serbia & 
Montenegro                                        45.8   
Singapore  1.75    1.17  1.39  1.18  1.24  2.17    1.30  1.27  1.29  1.24  1.17  1.32  1.28  1.30  1.33  1.22  1.14  1.18  1.16  1.16 1.11
Slovakia                                  25.3  24.4  22.8  21.6  18.7  18.0 21.6
Slovenia                                  172.7  177.1  166.0  163.0  167.7 
South Africa                      2.97  3.22  3.13  3.54  3.59  3.82  3.90  5.15  4.28  4.56  4.50  4.55 4.73
South Korea        1188  955  933  1050  1009  1000  991  975  950  1016  1235  1195  1181  1245  1218  1103  817  807  850 896
Soviet Union          1.71  4.44                               
Spain  163    119  139  134  156  144  143  150  153  155  155  147  154  149  156           
Sri Lanka                                    50.0  48.3  57.2  61.3  61.6 58.8
Suriname                                  2410  2952       
Sweden  10.3    7.74  10.4  10.9  11.6  11.6  11.2  11.1  11.2  11.0  10.7  9.38  9.88  9.56  9.45  10.4  11.1  10.3  10.1  10.7  9.68 10.6
Switzerland                2.50  2.48  2.54  2.50  2.44  2.31  2.43  2.35  2.48  2.53  2.33  2.17  2.06  2.03  1.85 1.82
Taiwan                  27.0  28.0  27.5  28.1  26.6  28.8  27.9  27.6  28.1  25.8  25.9  24.5  24.2  22.0 21.0
Thailand                21.1  20.9  20.7  20.3  19.3  20.3  21.4  21.9  21.7  22.1  21.8  20.3  19.6  19.4  18.2 17.4
Turkey                                 1606425 1383763 1362069  1.31  1.36  1.39 1.44
Ukraine                                  3.53  2.58  2.5  2.37  2.74  2.71 3.08
UAE                                  3.61  3.32  0.84  2.94  2.90  2.93 2.80
Uruguay                                  11.3  11.0  10.3  14.4  13.7  18.2 17.1
Venezuela              77.6                    1004  1365  1517  1830  1839  2170
West Germany  2.66  2.56  1.72  2.13  1.96                                 
Yugoslavia      962  3465  7.27  14.2                      34.1  38.8       
                 Note:  The implied PPP exchange rate for country cin year t  is defined as 
*
t t c, P P , where Pc,t is the price of a Big Mac hamburger in country cduring  t  and 
*
t P  is the corresponding       










NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                                 
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
Argentina              0.99  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  3.13  2.88  2.94  2.89  3.06  3.09  3.02
Aruba                                  1.79  1.79  1.79  1.79  1.79   
Australia  1.64    1.36  1.24  1.32  1.27  1.31  1.39  1.42  1.35  1.27  1.29  1.51  1.59  1.68  1.98  1.86  1.61  1.43  1.30  1.33  1.17  1.03
Austria                  12.0  9.72  10.7  12.0  13.0                   
Bahrain                                  0.38  0.38         
Belarus                                  1745  2018  2161       
Belgium  42.0  39.1  34.8  39.5  34.7  34.5  33.6  32.5  35.2  28.4  31.2  35.3  38.0                   
Brazil  13.8            2153  27521  949  0.90  0.99  1.06  1.14  1.73  1.79  2.19  2.34  3.07  3.17  2.47  2.30  1.91  1.58
Britain  0.67  0.679  0.54  0.59  0.61  0.56  0.57  0.64  0.69  0.62  0.66  0.61  0.60  0.62  0.63  0.70  0.69  0.63  0.56  0.55  0.53  0.50  0.50
Bulgaria                                    1.78  1.62  1.60  1.54   
Canada  1.39    1.24  1.19  1.16  1.15  1.19  1.26  1.39  1.39  1.36  1.39  1.42  1.51  1.47  1.56  1.57  1.45  1.37  1.25  1.12  1.05  1.00
Chile                  414  395  408  417  455  484  514  601  655  716  643  593  530  527  494
China              5.44  5.68  8.70  8.54  8.35  8.33  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.28  8.26  8.26  8.03  7.60  6.83
Colombia                                  2261  2914  2765  2330  2504  1956  1799
Costa Rica                                  351  390  433  474  510  519  551
Croatia                                  8.29  6.87  6.16  5.96  5.72   
Czech Republic                  29.7  26.2  27.6  29.2  34.4    39.1  39.0  34.0  28.9  26.6  24.5  22.1  21.1  14.5
Denmark    7.19  6.36  7.33  6.39  6.42  6.32  6.06  6.69  5.43  5.85  6.52  7.02  6.91  8.04  8.46  8.38  6.78  6.22  6.06  5.82  5.46  4.70
Dominican Rep                                  17.2  23.0  45.5  28.3  32.6   
Egypt                                    5.92  6.18  5.80  5.77  5.69  5.31
Estonia                                  17.6  14.3  13.0  12.8  12.3  11.5  9.87
Euro Area                            0.93  1.08  1.14  1.12  0.91  0.83  0.81  0.78  0.73  0.63
Fiji                                      1.81  1.70  1.73   
France  6.65  6.30  5.63  6.37  5.63  5.65  5.55  5.34  5.83  4.80  5.13  5.76  6.17  6.10  7.07  7.44             
Georgia                                    2.21  1.92  1.82  1.80   
Germany            1.67  1.64  1.58  1.71  1.38  1.52  1.71  1.84  1.82  2.11  2.22             
Greece                                             
Guatemala                                  7.90  7.87  7.96  7.61  7.59   
Holland  2.28  2.13  1.86  2.13  1.88  1.88  1.84  1.77  1.91  1.55  1.70  1.92  2.07  2.05                 
Honduras                                    17.2  18.2  18.7  18.9   
Hong Kong  7.80    7.80  7.78  7.79  7.79  7.73  7.73  7.73  7.73  7.74  7.75  7.75  7.75  7.79  7.80  7.80  7.80  7.80  7.79  7.75  7.82  7.80




TABLE A2 (continued) 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                                 
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
Hungary            75  80  88  103  121  150  178  213  237  279  303  272  224  211  204  206  180  144
Iceland                                  96.3  75.8  72.9  65.6  72.0  61.7  78.6
Indonesia                    2231      8500  8725  7945  10855  9430  8740  9096  9542  9325  9015  9152
Ireland  0.74  0.70  0.62  0.71  0.63  0.62  0.61  0.65                             
Israel                    2.95  3.17  3.38  3.70  4.04  4.05    4.79           
Italy    1342  1229  1382  1230  1239  1233  1523  1641  1702  1551  1683  1818  1799  2088  2195             
Jamaica                                  47.4  56.7  60.2  61.1     
Japan  154    124  133  159  135  133  113  104  84  107  126  135  120  106  124  130  120  112  107  112  122  107
Jordan                                      0.71  0.71     
Kuwait                                  0.31  0.30  0.29       
Latvia                                      0.55  0.57  0.55  0.51  0.44
Lebanon                                    1512  1514  1509     
Lithuania                                    3.15  2.87  2.80  2.69  2.53  2.18
Macau                                  8.03  8.03  8.00  8.00  7.99   
Macedonia                                    55.8  51.7  49.9     
Malaysia                2.58  2.69  2.49  2.49  2.50  3.72  3.80  3.80  3.80  3.80  3.80  3.79  3.81  3.63  3.43  3.20
Mexico                3.10  3.36  6.37  7.37  7.90  8.54  9.54  9.41  9.29  9.28  10.5  11.5  10.9  11.3  10.8  10.2
Moldova                                      11.9  12.5  13.2   
Morocco                                  11.5  9.82  9.15  8.99  8.71   
New Zealand                    1.51  1.47  1.45  1.82  1.87  2.01  2.47  2.24  1.78  1.64  1.40  1.62  1.28  1.32
Nicaragua                                      15.8  16.4     
Norway                                  8.56  7.16  6.83  6.41  6.10  5.81  5.08
Oman                                  0.39  0.39         
Pakistan                                    57.8  57.9  59.7  60.1  60.4  70.9
Paraguay                                        6250  5505  5145 
Peru                                  3.43  3.46  3.50  3.26  3.26  3.17  2.84
Philippines                                50.3  51.0  52.5  56.1  54.3  52.6  45.9  44.5
Poland                  22433  2.34  2.64  3.10  3.46  3.98  4.30  4.03  4.04  3.89  3.86  3.31  3.10  2.75  2.03
Portugal                  174                           
Qatar                                  3.64  3.64  3.63  3.65     
Russia              99.0  686  1775  4985  4918  5739  5999  24.7  28.5  28.9  31.2  31.1  29.0  28.3  27.1  25.6  23.2




TABLE A2 (continued) 
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                               
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008
Saudi Arabia                                  3.75  3.75  3.76  3.75  3.75  3.75 3.75
Serbia & Montenegro                                        67.4   
Singapore  2.15    2.00  1.96  1.88  1.77  1.65    1.57  1.40  1.41  1.44  1.62  1.73  1.70  1.81  1.82  1.78  1.72  1.66  1.59  1.52 1.35
Slovakia                                  46.8  37.4  33.4  31.6  29.5  24.6 19.1
Slovenia                                  253  212  198  194  189 
South Africa                      4.26  4.43  5.04  6.22  6.72  8.13  10.9  7.56  6.67  6.65  6.60  6.97 7.56
South Korea        666  707  721  778  796  810  769  779  894  1474  1218  1108  1325  1304  1220  1176  1004  952  923 1018
Soviet Union          0.60  1.74                               
Spain  133    111  117  106  103  102  114  138  124  126  144  156  155  179  189           
Sri Lanka                                    97  99  100  103  111 108
Suriname                                  2179  2515       
Sweden  6.87    5.89  6.41  6.10  6.04  5.93  7.43  7.97  7.34  6.71  7.72  8.00  8.32  8.84  10.3  10.3  8.34  7.58  7.41  7.28  6.79 5.96
Switzerland                1.45  1.44  1.13  1.23  1.47  1.52  1.48  1.70  1.73  1.66  1.37  1.28  1.25  1.21  1.21 1.02
Taiwan                  26.4  25.7  27.2  27.6  33.0  33.2  30.6  32.9  34.8  34.8  33.5  31.1  32.1  32.8 30.4
Thailand                25.1  25.3  24.6  25.3  26.1  40.0  37.6  38.0  45.5  43.3  42.7  40.6  40.5  38.4  34.5 33.4






07  1.37  1.54  1.30 1.19
Ukraine                                  5.33  5.34  5.33  5.07  5.05  5.03 4.60
UAE                                  3.67  3.67  3.64  3.67  3.67  3.67 3.67
Uruguay                                  16.8  28.5  29.9  24.2  23.9  23.9 19.2
Venezuela              60.6                    857  1598  2973  2629  2630  2147
West Germany  2.02  1.89  1.66  1.89  1.68                                 
Yugoslavia      1400  9001  11.7  15.1                      67.8  59.2       









 TABLE A3 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                                 
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008 
Argentina              42.01  45.68  44.8  25.7  24  3.252  -2.372  2.84  -0.399  -1.587  -113.7  -64.38  -67.27  -62.37  -30.39  -24.47 2.007 
Aruba                                  -64.43  -16.82  -23.62  -9.957  -11.42   
Australia  -40.51    -51.09  -17.63  -23.32  -15.39  -12.18  -25.74  -28.75  -24.56  -18.14  -22.21  -37.76  -37.71  -48.74  -51.66  -43.42  -37.46  -24.49  -20.21  -23.79  -14.53 -6.375 
Austria                  20.85  54.78  35.46  15.77  2.449                   
Bahrain                                  -10.72  -19.19         
Belarus                                  -64.49  -80.3  -74.99       
Belgium  29.21  36.29  7.89  12.04  24.1  25.33  38.52  38.75  29.74  50.34  39.23  24.37  11.38                   
Brazil  -57.05            -21.58  20.47  -37.51  14.76  23.32  14.65  6.037  -35.42  -42.07  -43.51  -48.15  -60.35  -53.41  -24.71  -10.8  5.771 28.49 
Britain  2.578  3.899  -8.115  5.565  4.231  28.17  33.21  20.27  13.89  18.86  13.57  19.81  17.66  23.02  17.9  11.36  14.74  14.86  15.02  11.71  16.26  15.96 24.91 
Bulgaria                                    -48.16  -44.95  -48.71  -46.79   
Canada  -16.27    -36.86  -11.16  -15.3  -9.628  5.738  -4.006  -11.14  -15.2  -11.53  -15.53  -26.46  -20.47  -25.82  -17.39  -16.04  -20.54  -21.88  -15.14  1.373  8.033 13.6 
Chile                  -0.442  3.601  -1.347  17.32  7.059  6.789  -2.364  -19.19  -15.27  -32.64  -28.54  -19.02  -5.184  -13.83 -12.91 
China              -63.71  -42.11  -79.9  -78.91  -71.92  -73.15  -76.13  -70.92  -74.16  -75.35  -67.48  -81.83  -83.36  -87.94  -86.32  -85.7 -66.82 
Colombia                                  1.238  -24.19  -21.03  -9.237  -17.75  3.391 8.631 
Costa Rica                                  0.115  6.688  -10.54  -25.13  -33.58  -44.86 -8.879 
Croatia                                  -32.6  -22.28  -18.09  -20.21  -16.73   
Czech Republic                  -31.2  -19.53  -24.47  -28.76  -48.91    -59.06  -57.04  -40.83  -32.53  -30.86  -28.55  -14.86  -30.76 24.45 
Denmark    62.55  40.32  51.38  59.55  61.62  67.74  62.25  51.49  75.3  62.33  48.98  28.09  38.8  20.41  14.13  17.07  41.23  43.04  40.33  43.05  39.91 51.21 
Dominican Rep                                  15.48  -3.81  -78.71  -36.7  -52.14   
Egypt                                    -69.58  -58.23  -68.02  -63.28  -70.99 -37.72 
Estonia                                  -43.03  -27.28  -24.49  -28.12  -25.66  -26.79 -9.633 
Euro Area                            11.33  -5.285  -11.61  -4.674  9.531  12.31  15.69  19.39  20.58 40.61 
Fiji                                      -21.03  -20.21  -14.27   
France  43.75  54.56  25.13  31.89  35.7  34.78  39.82  41.84  32.18  50.76  36.84  22.75  10.25  16.58  4.163  -2.126             
Georgia                                    -49.52  -42.29  -42.53  -29.61   
Germany            13.49  22.55  24.45  15.67  40.5  31.19  16.9  4.961  11.27  -5.953  -10.04             
Greece                                             
Guatemala                                  -20.66  -28.74  -36.66  -33  -31.04   
Holland  17.59  27.7  8.711  17  23.85  21.6  28.34  30.05  21.56  41.58  30.63  15.95  2.806  8.988                 
Honduras                                    -58.57  -38.16  -47.13  -48.84   
Hong Kong  -49.6    -89.73  -72.65  -68.95  -67.77  -64.3  -67.21  -65.88  -63.54  -61.25  -63.89  -66.53  -61.32  -65.07  -61.6  -55.05  -60.87  -63.29  -68.66  -69.42  -79.85 -73.89 




TABLE A3 (continued) 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                               
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008
Hungary            -38.51  -27.18  -24.73  -33.77  -38.51  -50.33  -46.34  -74.45  -65.55  -72.55  -65.69  -38.9  -21.42  -14.05  -16.29  -13.13  -2.274 26.28
Iceland                                  50.92  75.95  72.87  77.92  72.1  80.16 51.4
Indonesia                    -28.3      -78.75  -37.99  -31.87  -62.89  -38.36  -38.6  -49.37  161.1  -68.31  -65.93 -55.8
Ireland  -0.338  5.488  -19.44  -9.824  -6.406  0.358  8.196  -0.035                           
Israel                    26.27  23.89  34.07  27.74  34.78  35.51    0.609         
Italy    43.01  11.64  16.73  36.55  25.57  41.76  25.92  18.69  13.07  20.65  12.17  -3.367  2.896  -15.24  -25.97           
Jamaica                                  1.659  -30.7  -43.34  -12.52   
Japan  40.65    22.19  32.01  5.614  22.4  26.59  41.71  49.14  69.39  13.15  -3.647  -21.05  0.82  9.986  -6.887  -21.15  -21.61  -21.88  -26.83  -32.84  -39.59 -30.87
Jordan                                      23  17.9   
Kuwait                                  -17.19  -22.38  92.73     
Latvia                                      -37.20  -46.61  -23.35  -22.41 -1.333
Lebanon                                    4.847  -2.091  -7.11   
Lithuania                                    -27.25  -24.93  -91.93  -24.91  -26.79 -12.04
Macau                                  -57.96  -66.42  -72.82  -78.19  -80.26 
Macedonia                                    -46.48  -45.49  -47.66   
Malaysia                -56.3  -49.54  -42.94  -44.65  -44.68  -79.51  -71.44  -74.68  -75.87  -62.99  -71.45  -77.95  -79.63  -71.59  -75.45 -73.1
Mexico                0.311  4.701  -30.44  -15.47  -24.93  -20  -15.27  -12.23  -7.462  -5.366  -21.57  -33.23  -17.06  -18.89  -23.9 -12.92
Moldova                                      -40.72  -50.86  -57.61 
Morocco                                  -22.17  -14.59  -241.2  -11.41  -9.72 
New Zealand                    -17.19  -16.21  -7.668  -30.05  -29.01  -39.46  -55.54  -34.5  -19.98  -9.015  3.532  -12.09  5.248 3.904
Nicaragua                                      -28.08  -37.17   
Norway                                  49.6  71.08  58.01  68.33  82.15  70.26 79.1
Oman                                  -7.603  -16.07       
Pakistan                                    -45.88  -42.29  -33.91  -35.99  -38.61 -59.22
Paraguay                                        -75.38  -63.98  -51.34
Peru                                  -0.478  -17.14  -12.08  -10.32  -6.184  -12.92 -6.508
Philippines                                -77.26  -66.97  -78.34  -85.77  -73.32  -65.15  -61.05 -60.19
Poland                  -50.95  -46.79  -49.44  -55.66  -51.36  -56.44  -67.41  -55.1  -53.36  -51.48  -57.61  -44.55  -39.1  -30.68 -3.469
Portugal                  9.481                         
Qatar                                  -0.704  -9.171  -145  -150.4   
Russia              -131.8  -69.58  -34.2  -35.61  -20.03  -23.32  -24.67  -58.31  -59.39  -74.07  -68.91  -72.06  -69.31  -72.64  -55.97  -51.81 -33.92




TABLE A3 (continued) 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES, 1986 TO 2008 
Country                                Year                                   
   1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 2008 
Saudi Arabia                                  -3.681  -12.15  -151.1  -24.29  -25.59  -35.12 -29.17 
Serbia & Montenegro                                        -38.6     
Singapore  -20.59    -53.48  -34.64  -46.42  -35.23  27.35    -19.21  -9.623  -8.711  -14.98  -32.38  -27.29  -28.78  -33.16  -31.72  -37.96  -41.24  -34.37  -31.42  -27.17 -19.9 
Slovakia                                  -61.5  -42.9  -38.16  -38.13  -45.53  -31.37 12 
Slovenia                                  -38.19  -17.97  -18.09  -17.84  -11.93   
South Africa                      -36.2  -31.8  -47.8  -56.39  -62.81  -75.56  -102.9  -38.43  -44.41  -37.65  -38.3  -42.75 -46.81 
South Korea        57.88  30.02  25.81  30  23.69  21.07  25.4  22.4  6.119  -37.25  1.351  7.577  -11.5  -4.632  -0.188  -6.408  -20.61  -16.59  -8.188 -12.73 
Soviet Union          104.4  93.78                                 
Spain  20.03    7.167  16.95  23.51  41.23  34.37  22.35  8.338  21.03  20.5  7.335  -6.294  -0.439  -18.07  -19.5             
Sri Lanka                                    -70.41  -72.11  -55.88  -51.91  -58.91 -60.34 
Suriname                                  10.06  16.02         
Sweden  40.62    27.32  48.36  58.13  64.88  67.48  40.9  33.01  42.32  49.58  33.05  15.86  17.15  7.848  -8.431  1.367  28.32  30.65  30.95  38  35.43 58 
Switzerland                54.47  54.29  81.12  70.93  50.59  41.62  49.5  32.4  36.03  42.14  52.88  52.45  50.1  51.85  42.32 57.94 
Taiwan                  2.086  8.633  1.251  1.792  -21.7  -14.19  -9.279  -17.71  -21.34  -29.81  -25.82  -23.88  -28.28  -39.97 -36.95 
Thailand                -17.82  -19.25  -17.31  -21.83  -30.2  -67.76  -56.37  -55.05  -74.25  -67.31  -67.36  -69.31  -72.64  -68.51  -64.05 -65.4 
Turkey                                  19.3  -14.55  -11.69  -4.683  -12.81  6.907 19.25 
Ukraine                                  -41.2  -72.63  -75.72  -76.07  -61.07  -61.75 -40.07 
UAE                                  -1.525  -9.992  -146.5  -22.23  -23.44  -22.43 -27.02 
Uruguay                                  -40.15  -95.23  -106.5  -51.96  -56.05  -27.35 -11.4 
Venezuela              24.71                    15.83  -15.74  -67.27  -36.23  -35.77  1.07  
West Germany  27.38  30.61  3.288  11.89  15.14                                   
Yugoslavia      -37.49  -95.45  -47.72  -6.121                      -68.62  -42.39         
              Notes:  1. The real exchange rate for country c in year  t  is defined as  ( ) =
*
ct ct ct t q log P S P , where Pct is the price of a Big Mac hamburger in country cduring  t , 
*
t P  is the corresponding 
price in the US and 
ct S  is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the domestic currency cost of $US1. A positive value of  c,t q  implies that the domestic currency is overvalued in 
real terms and vice versa.  






PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, CHANGES IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h
s, , h ,t c,t+h c,t s c,t s,c,t ) D -(s -s = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ                  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ s,τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
                                                                                      A. With overlapping observations 
1  69.84  0.86  -2.00  -9.89  17.82  -4.50  -10.14  -7.94  2.72  2.02  3.72  0.53  5.94  10.64  5.69  -0.31  336  0.07 
  (49.02)  (6.38)  (5.75)  (4.12)  (24.57)  (2.09)  (3.80)  (6.57)  (6.03)  (4.08)  (2.86)  (2.22)  (1.84)  (2.55)  (3.25)  (0.37)     
2  65.28  -5.80  -14.74  9.72  14.26  -12.09  -13.95  -1.33  7.58  8.37  6.06  6.66  16.45    6.65  -0.29  312  0.06 
  (49.23)  (9.06)  (8.00)  (20.01)  (25.17)  (2.68)  (6.38)  (9.02)  (7.95)  (4.59)  (3.93)  (3.16)  (3.07)    (4.57)  (0.51)     
3  58.78  -18.47  4.88  6.01  6.67  -15.99  -7.46  3.46  13.89  10.66  12.17  17.20      7.65  -0.29  288  0.05 
  (49.58)  (11.52)  (15.93)  (18.48)  (26.38)  (4.83)  (8.23)  (11.08)  (8.85)  (5.81)  (5.20)  (4.52)      (6.56)  (0.64)     
4  47.67  3.62  3.21  -0.43  1.90  -9.95  -3.89  7.89  14.46  15.52  21.56        9.23  -0.43  264  0.03 
  (49.93)  (15.02)  (15.82)  (18.79)  (26.82)  (5.53)  (8.98)  (11.01)  (9.45)  (6.36)  (6.08)        (8.80)  (0.68)     
5  67.69  0.45  -4.01  -4.11  8.16  -5.33  2.11  9.76  20.18  25.78          12.07  -0.45  240  0.05 
  (47.86)  (13.80)  (15.07)  (17.86)  (27.53)  (6.23)  (9.27)  (12.33)  (10.70)  (7.61)          (11.39)  (0.78)     
6  66.00  -3.96  -5.24  3.94  11.69  0.38  2.82  13.37  28.43            13.05  -0.64  216  0.05 
  (47.81)  (13.95)  (14.12)  (17.12)  (28.37)  (6.02)  (9.86)  (13.21)  (12.06)            (12.16)  (0.86)     
7  61.67  -2.48  5.72  11.35  15.97  1.74  6.31  19.77              15.01  -0.95  192  0.05 
  (48.63)  (12.78)  (12.54)  (15.99)  (29.77)  (6.73)  (11.96)  (16.71)              (12.61)  (1.11)     
8  58.88  5.82  11.98  18.52  17.53  7.49  15.93                19.45  -1.06  168  0.04 
  (48.69)  (12.81)  (12.58)  (15.33)  (30.83)  (7.06)  (13.4)                (13.23)  (1.28)     
9  63.98  8.32  16.37  19.64  24.37  18.35                  25.17  -0.94  144  0.03 
  (48.36)  (12.67)  (12.16)  (14.48)  (31.64)  (7.80)                  (14.50)  (1.43)     
10  67.60  12.80  17.13  24.82  35.51                    31.57  -0.83  120  0.03 
  (48.56)  (13.30)  (12.11)  (13.89)  (32.21)                    (17.30)  (1.53)     
11  80.74  26.35  32.67  41.02                      45.20  -1.49  96  0.05 
  (50.12)  (17.93)  (17.83)  (18.71)                      (23.23)  (1.26)     
12  88.60  41.65  50.93                        60.39  -2.03  72  0.07 
  (51.43)  (22.65)  (23.17)                        (29.96)  (1.11)     
13  102.82  65.55                          84.19  -2.81  48  0.11 
  (54.39)  (30.42)                          (40.16)  (1.25)     
14  135.62                            135.62  -4.94  24  0.15 
  (62.56)                            (62.56)  (2.25)     
(continued on next page) 




PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, CHANGES IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h
s, , h ,t c,t+h c,t s c,t s,c,t ) D -(s -s = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ          (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ s,τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
                                                                                                   B. Without overlapping observations 
1  69.84  0.86  -2.00  -9.89  17.82  -4.50  -10.14  -7.94  2.72  2.02  3.72  0.53  5.94  10.64  5.69  -0.31  336  0.07 
  (49.02)  (6.38)  (5.75)  (4.12)  (24.57)  (2.09)  (3.80)  (6.57)  (6.03)  (4.08)  (2.86)  (2.22)  (1.84)  (2.55)  (3.25)  (0.37)     
2  68.23    -10.69    12.52    -16.24    4.19    3.77    16.34    11.16  -0.58  168  0.07 
  (50.96)    (10.25)    (25.83)    (6.99)    (10.12)    (5.32)    (3.58)    (6.41)  (0.67)     
3  71.96      16.89      -17.72      -0.28          17.71  -1.55  96  0.07 
  (53.54)      (21.41)      (11.18)      (10.51)          (11.21)  (1.03)     
4  54.19        -1.95        6.96            19.73  -1.05  72  0.03 
  (54.93)        (28.88)        (15.30)            (14.41)  (1.22)     
5  95.48          -12.69                  41.39  -3.11  48  0.12 
  (58.57)          (9.68)                  (25.98)  (1.69)     
6  88.01            -14.31                36.85  -2.74  48  0.10 
  (56.44)            (14.99)                (22.80)  (1.42)     
7  83.34              -7.22              38.06  -3.02  48  0.01 
  (56.70)              (19.16)              (21.20)  (1.47)     
8  92.91                            92.91  -4.31  24  0.12 
  (62.24)                            (62.24)  (2.24)     
9  99.31                            99.31  -4.31  24  0.13 
  (60.23)                            (60.23)  (2.15)     
10  104.54                            104.54  -4.36  24  0.13 
  (59.56)                            (59.56)  (2.12)     
11  112.14                            112.15  -4.49  24  0.14 
  (60.56)                            (60.56)  (2.18)     
12  115.14                            115.14  -4.57  24  0.14 
  (61.07)                            (61.07)  (2.19)     
13  123.58                            123.58  -4.79  24  0.15 
  (61.37)                            (61.37)  (2.20)     
14  135.62                            135.62  -4.94  24  0.15 
  (62.56)                            (62.56)  (2.25)     






PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h
r, , h ,t c,t+h c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ                  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  r, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h 
( )
h










(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
                                                                                  A. With overlapping observations 
1  -59.54  2.26  1.20  -1.97  -16.54  -1.83  2.44  4.44  -3.50  -4.46  -3.92  2.72  -5.25  2.92  -5.79  -0.04  336  0.05 
  (48.22)  (6.40)  (5.68)  (3.25)  (25.56)  (0.91)  (3.93)  (4.49)  (5.17)  (3.56)  (3.50)  (2.26)  (1.14)  (1.60)  (3.09)  (0.37)     
2  -54.86  7.91  3.08  -15.78  -20.06  0.10  4.99  -2.41  -11.14  -10.60  -3.35  -4.12  -2.46    -8.36  -0.33  312  0.05 
  (48.52)  (8.86)  (7.54)  (20.49)  (25.51)  (1.88)  (4.49)  (6.95)  (6.74)  (4.95)  (4.29)  (3.16)  (2.02)    (4.43)  (0.49)     
3  -51.44  10.14  -9.45  -15.24  -18.95  4.28  -0.22  -9.98  -17.93  -9.96  -10.73  -2.67      -11.01  -0.59  288  0.05 
  (49.30)  (11.39)  (15.92)  (18.40)  (26.89)  (2.07)  (6.50)  (9.27)  (8.69)  (5.92)  (5.23)  (4.27)      (6.51)  (0.63)     
4  -53.14  -5.22  -10.38  -12.02  -14.38  1.06  -4.81  -14.32  -15.67  -15.68  -8.27        -13.89  -0.64  264  0.04 
  (49.06)  (14.7)  (15.33)  (18.95)  (26.56)  (3.49)  (7.08)  (10.06)  (8.91)  (6.04)  (5.52)        (8.82)  (0.66)     
5  -68.90  -6.04  -6.88  -6.66  -17.77  -3.23  -8.87  -12.09  -21.54  -13.23          -16.52  -0.70  240  0.05 
  (48.41)  (13.06)  (14.71)  (17.88)  (27.45)  (4.28)  (8.56)  (12.17)  (10.38)  (7.23)          (11.56)  (0.77)     
6  -70.83  -3.64  -2.25  -9.89  -21.80  -6.79  -5.78  -17.07  -18.41            -17.38  -0.68  216  0.05 
  (48.74)  (13.55)  (14.49)  (17.50)  (27.97)  (5.13)  (9.79)  (13.46)  (11.49)            (12.28)  (0.85)     
7  -70.04  -1.92  -7.99  -15.64  -24.27  -3.36  -9.51  -11.75              -18.06  -0.49  192  0.04 
  (49.05)  (14.49)  (13.59)  (16.42)  (29.76)  (6.79)  (12.33)  (17.36)              (12.77)  (1.12)     
8  -64.92  -4.63  -11.84  -19.08  -21.47  -8.65  -6.77                -19.62  -0.51  168  0.03 
  (50.11)  (13.93)  (13.47)  (15.96)  (30.39)  (7.44)  (13.72)                (13.47)  (1.26)     
9  -68.26  -9.24  -15.85  -16.39  -26.54  -5.67                  -23.66  -0.49  144  0.03 
  (50.38)  (15.12)  (13.77)  (14.81)  (31.49)  (8.50)                  (15.00)  (1.46)     
10  -72.35  -12.77  -12.85  -21.58  -23.67                    -28.64  -0.49  120  0.03 
  (50.83)  (15.88)  (13.56)  (14.25)  (32.11)                    (18.00)  (1.57)     
11  -81.61  -19.09  -25.83  -23.33                      -37.47  0.05  96  0.03 
  (51.3)  (18.93)  (17.95)  (18.19)                      (23.58)  (1.31)     
12  -84.55  -33.93  -30.98                        -49.82  0.61  72  0.03 
  (51.98)  (23.21)  (22.74)                        (29.96)  (1.19)     
13  -97.09  -43.01                          -70.05  1.31  48  0.05 
  (53.93)  (29.52)                          (39.26)  (1.30)     
14  -115.26                            -115.26  3.32  24  0.08 
  (61.02)                            (61.02)  (2.18)     




TABLE A5 (continued) 
PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
h h
r, , h ,t c,t+h c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ          (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  r, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ r,τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
                                                                                                    B. Without overlapping observations 
1  -59.54  2.26  1.20  -1.97  -16.54  -1.83  2.44  4.44  -3.50  -4.46  -3.92  2.72  -5.25  2.92  -5.79  -0.04  336  0.05 
  (48.22)  (6.40)  (5.68)  (3.25)  (25.56)  (0.91)  (3.93)  (4.49)  (5.17)  (3.56)  (3.50)  (2.26)  (1.14)  (1.60)  (3.09)  (0.37)     
2  -57.94    -1.14    -18.24    7.38    -7.60    -0.96    -2.35    -11.55  -0.03  168  0.05 
  (50.12)    (9.45)    (26.12)    (5.87)    (8.71)    (5.62)    (1.93)    (6.10)  (0.65)     
3  -63.97      -25.58      9.54      0.44          -19.89  0.61  96  0.04 
  (53.21)      (21.47)      (9.97)      (10.31)          (11.33)  (1.00)     
4  -59.41        -10.68        -8.45            -26.18  -0.05  72  0.03 
  (54.00)        (28.85)        (14.94)            (14.02)  (1.16)     
5  -99.00          4.75                  -47.13  2.17  48  0.09 
  (59.57)          (9.46)                  (26.96)  (1.76)     
6  -97.03            14.60                -41.21  1.82  48  0.09 
  (57.11)            (16.26)                (22.96)  (1.43)     
7  -95.81              20.35              -37.73  1.97  48  0.08 
  (56.97)              (21.16)              (20.56)  (1.46)     
8  -99.61                            -99.61  2.80  24  0.05 
  (63.84)                            (63.84)  (2.39)     
9  -105.24                            -105.24  3.05  24  0.07 
  (62.38)                            (62.38)  (2.29)     
10  -108.69                            -108.69  2.98  24  0.06 
  (62.02)                            (62.02)  (2.25)     
11  -111.93                            -111.93  2.94  24  0.06 
  (61.70)                            (61.70)  (2.23)     
12  -111.07                            -111.09  3.14  24  0.07 
  (61.29)                            (61.29)  (2.20)     
13  -117.64                            -117.64  3.27  24  0.08 
  (60.82)                            (60.82)  (2.17)     
14  -115.26                            -115.26  3.32  24  0.08 
  (61.02)                            (61.02)  (2.18)     





SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS UNDER FULL ADJUSTMENT WITH TIME DUMMIES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
H H




r, , H ,t c,t+H c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ        with 
H H H H
s r s r 0,  1 η +η = φ +φ = −   
   (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , H τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   H η =   Slope 
H  94,94+H  95,95+H  96,96+H  97,97+H  98,98+H  99,99+H  00,00+H  01,01+H  02,02+H  03,03+H  04,04+H  05,05+H  06,06+H  07,07+H  ( )
H
τ s,τ,τ+H 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
H




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  75.20  9.32  5.17  -5.37  15.49  -5.26  -13.37  -13.43  -2.32  -1.46  0.49  -1.50  6.29  11.37  5.76  -0.77  336 
  (14.15)  (14.54)  (14.36)  (14.08)  (14.00)  (13.94)  (14.06)  (14.28)  (14.23)  (14.08)  (14.06)  (13.99)  (13.92)  (13.92)  (3.73)  (0.25)   
2  70.22  1.21  -8.59  14.10  14.08  -11.22  -14.73  -3.62  5.59  7.42  5.28  6.67  18.05    8.03  -0.60  312 
  (16.05)  (16.53)  (16.30)  (15.96)  (15.86)  (15.78)  (15.94)  (16.21)  (16.14)  (15.96)  (15.94)  (15.84)  (15.76)    (4.44)  (0.29)   
3  62.35  -14.27  8.82  9.41  8.71  -13.65  -5.61  4.86  15.38  12.46  14.03  19.29      10.15  -0.38  288 
  (18.02)  (18.58)  (18.32)  (17.91)  (17.80)  (17.70)  (17.89)  (18.20)  (18.13)  (17.91)  (17.89)  (17.78)      (5.20)  (0.33)   
4  51.74  7.21  7.00  3.77  7.16  -4.93  1.52  13.65  20.15  20.96  26.96        14.11  -0.35  264 
  (20.17)  (20.84)  (20.52)  (20.05)  (19.91)  (19.80)  (20.01)  (20.39)  (20.30)  (20.05)  (20.01)        (6.09)  (0.38)   
5  68.92  1.26  -3.03  -2.77  10.44  -3.26  4.53  12.48  22.84  28.22          13.96  -0.39  240 
  (21.41)  (22.19)  (21.83)  (21.26)  (21.11)  (20.97)  (21.23)  (21.67)  (21.57)  (21.27)          (6.78)  (0.43)   
6  66.22  -4.10  -5.23  4.26  12.82  1.32  4.05  14.86  29.87            13.76  -0.59  216 
  (22.59)  (23.48)  (23.07)  (22.42)  (22.24)  (22.09)  (22.38)  (22.89)  (22.77)            (7.55)  (0.47)   
7  61.63  -2.78  5.52  11.38  16.58  2.21  6.99  20.64              15.27  -0.92  192 
  (24.08)  (25.24)  (24.70)  (23.86)  (23.62)  (23.42)  (23.80)  (24.47)              (8.54)  (0.56)   
8  59.40  6.97  12.86  18.86  16.46  6.74  14.66                19.42  -1.16  168 
  (25.72)  (27.10)  (26.46)  (25.45)  (25.17)  (24.93)  (25.39)                (9.73)  (0.63)   
9  65.88  12.02  19.32  21.06  21.82  16.71                  26.13  -1.20  144 
  (27.56)  (29.23)  (28.46)  (27.24)  (26.89)  (26.60)                  (11.29)  (0.72)   
10  70.13  16.91  20.58  26.91  34.07                    33.72  -1.07  120 
  (30.09)  (32.05)  (31.13)  (29.7)  (29.29)                    (13.62)  (0.81)   
11  81.44  27.37  33.57  41.65                      46.01  -1.54  96 
  (31.80)  (34.28)  (33.13)  (31.31)                      (16.31)  (0.94)   
12  87.04  39.59  49.08                        58.57  -1.96  72 
  (34.00)  (36.99)  (35.60)                        (20.51)  (1.07)   
13  92.43  52.32                          72.38  -2.39  48 
  (38.20)  (42.29)                          (28.46)  (1.33)   
14  94.84                            94.84  -3.69  24 
  (49.41)                            (49.41)  (2.31)   






TABLE A6 (continued) 
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS UNDER FULL ADJUSTMENT WITH TIME DUMMIES, 24 COUNTRIES, 1994-2008 
H H




r, , H ,t c,t+H c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ        with 
H H H H
s r s r 0,  1 η +η = φ +φ = −   
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , H τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   H η =   Slope 
H  94,94+H  95,95+H  96,96+H  97,97+H  98,98+H  99,99+H  00,00+H  01,01+H  02,02+H  03,03+H  04,04+H  05,05+H  06,06+H  07,07+H  ( )
H
τ s,τ,τ+H 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
B. Without overlapping observations 
1  75.20  9.32  5.17  -5.37  15.49  -5.26  -13.37  -13.43  -2.32  -1.46  0.49  -1.50  6.29  11.37  5.76  -0.77  336 
  (14.16)  (14.55)  (14.36)  (14.08)  (14.00)  (13.94)  (14.06)  (14.28)  (14.23)  (14.08)  (14.06)  (13.99)  (13.92)  (13.92)  (3.77)  (0.25)   
2  73.05    -4.40    11.12    -18.38    0.59    1.64    17.11    11.53  -0.95  168 
  (19.98)    (20.49)    (19.59)    (19.75)    (20.17)    (19.75)    (19.39)    (7.51)  (0.46)   
3  74.76      19.58      -16.09      1.32          19.89  -1.61  96 
  (26.73)      (26.26)      (26.15)      (26.27)          (13.17)  (0.85)   
4  62.00        8.12        17.83            29.32  -0.91  72 
  (30.80)        (29.80)        (31.28)            (17.68)  (0.92)   
5  92.78          -14.98                  38.90  -3.08  48 
  (35.43)          (32.10)                  (15.92)  (1.49)   
6  81.57            -18.82                31.37  -2.64  48 
  (34.66)            (33.52)                (24.11)  (1.34)   
7  83.23              -7.18              38.03  -3.02  48 
  (34.98)              (36.56)              (25.29)  (1.37)   
8  84.01                            84.01  -4.99  24 
  (49.70)                            (49.70)  (2.33)   
9  74.44                            74.44  -5.41  24 
  (46.53)                            (46.53)  (2.18)   
10  85.92                            85.92  -6.07  24 
  (45.67)                            (45.67)  (2.14)   
11  112.76                            112.76  -6.05  24 
  (48.49)                            (48.49)  (2.27)   
12  119.41                            119.41  -5.01  24 
  (49.69)                            (49.69)  (2.32)   
13  111.47                            111.47  -3.72  24 
  (49.46)                            (49.46)  (2.31)   
14  94.84                            94.84  -3.69  24 
  (49.41)                            (49.41)  (2.31)   





 TABLE A7 
MORE PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS, 20 COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008   
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
(i) Negative change in nominal exchange rate    (ii) Inflation differential 
h h h
c,t+h c,t s s ct s,ct - ) -(s s =η + d +u φ    
h h h h
c,t+h c,t r r ct r,ct =η + d +u r -r φ  
Horizon   Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ²    Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ² 
h  h
s η ×100 
h
s φ   observations        h
r η ×100 
h
r φ   observations     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  0.31 (0.66)  -0.15 (0.04)  280  0.04  6.54    -0.49  (0.43)  -0.13 (0.03)  280  0.07  6.05 
      -0.15 (0.04)              -0.13 (0.03)       
2  -0.47 (0.97)  -0.43 (0.06)  260  0.15  8.57    -1.24  (0.64)  -0.17 (0.04)  260  0.06  3.67 
      -0.43 (0.06)              -0.16 (0.04)       
3  -1.47 (1.19)  -0.72 (0.08)  240  0.26  29.53*   -1.58  (0.84)  -0.16 (0.06)  240  0.04  0.09 
      -0.71 (0.08)              -0.18 (0.06)       
4  -2.04 (1.41)  -0.96 (0.09)  220  0.34  51.84*   -2.04  (1.08)  -0.12 (0.07)  220  0.01  0.19 
      -0.95 (0.09)              -0.12 (0.07)       
5  -1.57 (1.60)  -1.13 (0.10)  200  0.39  65.20*   -1.86  (1.31)  -0.06 (0.08)  200  0.00  2.81 
      -1.13 (0.10)              -0.06 (0.08)       
6  -1.25 (1.76)  -1.30 (0.11)  180  0.46  62.37*   -2.12  (1.52)  -0.05 (0.09)  180  0.00  1.57 
      -1.30 (0.11)              -0.05 (0.09)       
7  -1.08 (1.83)  -1.33 (0.11)  160  0.49  52.64*   -1.33  (1.73)  -0.09 (0.10)  160  0.01  3.39 
      -1.34 (0.11)              -0.09 (0.10)       
8  0.78 (2.00)  -1.16 (0.12)  140  0.40  41.05*   -0.72  (2.00)  -0.28 (0.12)  140  0.04  0.00 
      -1.15 (0.12)              -0.29 (0.12)       
9  2.72 (2.30)  -1.00 (0.14)  120  0.31  28.27*   -1.09  (2.28)  -0.41 (0.14)  120  0.07  0.03 
      -0.95 (0.13)              -0.43 (0.13)       
10  3.38 (2.65)  -0.90 (0.15)  100  0.27  10.52*   0.21  (2.67)  -0.58 (0.15)  100  0.13  2.56 
      -0.83 (0.14)              -0.57 (0.14)       
11  3.12 (3.66)  -0.66 (0.20)  80  0.12  1.92    4.82  (3.59)  -0.92 (0.20)  80  0.22  4.03 
      -0.56 (0.16)              -0.77 (0.16)       
12  3.45 (4.59)  -0.58 (0.23)  60  0.10  1.62    7.18  (4.49)  -1.03 (0.22)  60  0.27  2.38 
      -0.47 (0.18)              -0.81 (0.18)       
13  6.57 (5.96)  -0.59 (0.27)  40  0.11  0.23    5.21  (5.99)  -0.97 (0.27)  40  0.25  1.91 
      -0.41 (0.22)              -0.82 (0.22)       
14  17.81 (9.47)  -1.21 (0.53)  20  0.22  0.81    1.60 (10.06)  -0.72 (0.56)  20  0.08  0.08 
      -0.66 (0.47)            -0.67 (0.46)       
                (continued on next page)  
 
  91
TABLE A7 (continued) 
MORE PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS, 20 COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008   
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
(i) Negative change in nominal exchange rate    (ii) Inflation differential 
h h h
c,t+h c,t s s ct s,ct - ) -(s s =η + d +u φ    
h h h h
c,t+h c,t r r ct r,ct =η + d +u r -r φ  
Horizon   Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ²    Intercept  Slope  No. of   R²  χ² 
h 
h
s η 100 ×  
h
s φ   observations        h
r η 100 ×  
h
r φ   observations     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
              B. Without overlapping observations 
1  0.31 (0.66)  -0.15 (0.04)  280  0.04  6.54    -0.49  (0.43)  -0.13 (0.03)  280  0.07  6.05 
      -0.15 (0.04)             -0.13 (0.03)       
2  0.42 (1.46)  -0.37 (0.10)  260  0.09  2.67    -1.01  (0.91)  -0.20 (0.06)  260  0.07  7.68 
      -0.37 (0.10)             -0.19 (0.06)       
3  -1.54 (1.92)  -0.73 (0.14)  240  0.27  13.10*    -0.13  (1.49)  -0.13 (0.11)  240  0.02  0.10 
      -0.74 (0.13)             -0.13 (0.10)       
4  -5.18 (3.01)  -0.86 (0.19)  220  0.25  11.29*    -1.08  (2.52)  -0.29 (0.16)  220  0.05  0.52 
      -0.80 (0.20)             -0.28 (0.16)       
5  -4.87 (3.56)  -0.92 (0.25)  200  0.27  16.39*    1.68  (3.40)  -0.12 (0.23)  200  0.01  0.02 
      -1.00 (0.24)             -0.09 (0.23)       
6  -3.56 (4.02)  -1.06 (0.24)  180  0.35  16.39*    -0.44  (3.59)  -0.09 (0.21)  180  0.01  0.61 
      -1.07 (0.23)             -0.09 (0.21)       
7  -0.40 (4.92)  -1.79 (0.27)  160  0.54  25.89*    -2.36  (3.96)  0.20 (0.21)  160  0.02  9.95* 
      -1.79 (0.26)             0.21 (0.21)       
8  -24.96 (7.36)  -0.55 (0.41)  140  0.09  4.21    18.64  (8.31)  -0.51 (0.46)  140  0.06  1.25 
      -1.31 (0.43)             0.06 (0.43)       
9  -14.16 (8.17)  -0.79 (0.46)  120  0.14  2.81    11.82  (8.64)  -0.45 (0.48)  120  0.05  0.00 
      -1.22 (0.40)             -0.09 (0.41)       
10  -7.82 (8.89)  -0.87 (0.50)  100  0.15  1.82    7.67  (9.05)  -0.53 (0.51)  100  0.06  0.21 
      -1.11 (0.41)             -0.29 (0.42)       
11  -2.24 (8.86)  -0.91 (0.50)  80  0.16  1.25    4.30  (9.68)  -0.62 (0.54)  80  0.07  0.000 
      -0.97 (0.40)             -0.49 (0.44)       
12  -0.18 (9.13)  -0.91 (0.51)  60  0.15  1.25    5.40  (9.92)  -0.66 (0.55)  60  0.07  0.000 
      -0.91 (0.42)             -0.49 (0.45)       
13  7.67 (8.78)  -1.15 (0.49)  40  0.23  0.81    -1.98  (9.88)  -0.54 (0.55)  40  0.05  0.08 
      -0.91 (0.41)             -0.60 (0.45)       
14  17.81 (9.47)  -1.21 (0.53)  20  0.22  0.81    1.60 (10.06)  -0.72 (0.56)  20  0.08  0.08 
      -0.66 (0.47)             -0.67 (0.46)       
  Notes: 1. The χ² statistics in columns 6 and 11 test the hypotheses of the independence between  c,t+h c,t - ) -(s s  and  ct d , and  c,t+h c,t r -r  and  ct d , respectively. Under the  null, χ² has 1                                    
              degree of freedom. 
         2. An asterisk (*) indicates significant at the 5 percent level.  
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                 TABLE A8 
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS UNDER FULL ADJUSTMENT,  
20 COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
H H H
c,t H c,t s s ct s,ct (s s ) d u + − − = η +φ +   and  
H H H
c,t H c,t r r ct r,ct r r d u + − = η +φ + , with 
H H
s r η +η 0 =  and 
H H
s r + 1 φ φ = −  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
                       
  With overlapping observations    Without overlapping observations 
Horizon   Intercept  Slope  No. of     Intercept  Slope  No. of  
H 
H
s η 100 ×  
H
s φ   observations   
H
s η 100 ×  
H
s φ   observations 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7) 
1  0.40 (0.45)  -0.51 (0.03)  280    0.40 (0.45)  -0.51 (0.03)  280 
      -0.51 (0.03)          -0.51 (0.03)   
2  0.39 (0.60)  -0.63 (0.04)  260    0.72 (0.88)  -0.59 (0.06)  140 
      -0.63 (0.04)          -0.59 (0.06)   
3  0.05 (0.73)  -0.78 (0.05)  240    -0.71 (1.21)  -0.80 (0.09)  80 
      -0.78 (0.05)          -0.80 (0.09)   
4  0.00 (0.89)  -0.92 (0.06)  220    -2.05 (1.97)  -0.78 (0.13)  60 
      -0.92 (0.06)          -0.76 (0.13)   
5  0.15 (1.04)  -1.04 (0.07)  200    -3.28 (2.44)  -0.90 (0.17)  40 
      -1.04 (0.07)          -0.96 (0.16)   
6  0.44 (1.17)  -1.13 (0.07)  180    -1.56 (2.67)  -0.98 (0.16)  40 
      -1.13 (0.07)          -0.99 (0.16)   
7  0.13 (1.27)  -1.12 (0.08)  160    0.98 (3.18)  -1.50 (0.17)  40 
      -1.12 (0.08)          -1.50 (0.17)   
8  0.75 (1.43)  -0.94 (0.09)  140    -21.80 (5.44)  -0.52 (0.30)  20 
      -0.93 (0.08)          -1.19 (0.30)   
9  1.90 (1.63)  -0.80 (0.10)  120    -12.99 (5.81)  -0.67 (0.33)  20 
      -0.71 (0.02)          -1.67 (0.29)   
10  1.59 (1.90)  -0.66 (0.11)  100    -7.75 (6.21)  -0.67 (0.35)  20 
      -0.63 (0.10)          -0.91 (0.29)   
11  -0.85 (2.59)  -0.37 (0.14)  80    -3.27 (6.44)  -0.64 (0.36)  20 
      -0.40 (0.11)          -0.74 (0.30)   
12  -1.87 (3.24)  -0.27 (0.16)  60    -2.79 (6.61)  -0.63 (0.37)  20 
      -0.33 (0.13)          -0.71 (0.31)   
13  0.68 (4.24)  -0.31 (0.20)  40    4.83 (6.51)  -0.80 (0.36)  20 
      -0.29 (0.16)          -0.65 (0.30)   
14  8.10 (6.93)  -0.74 (0.39)  20    8.10 (6.93)  -0.74 (0.39)  20 
      -0.50 (0.33)          -0.50 (0.33)    
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 TABLE A9 
PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, CHANGES IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES,  
20 COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
h h
s, , h ,t c,t+h c,t s c,t s,c,t ) D -(s -s = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ                  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope  R
2 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h 
( )
h




s φ  
No. 
of 
Obs.   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  5.55  -2.52  -4.50  -13.17  -2.17  -3.39  -9.28  0.22  7.69  5.00  4.81  1.71  5.47  9.42  0.35  -0.11  280  0.36 
  (4.15)  (2.52)  (2.04)  (3.14)  (1.43)  (1.89)  (1.63)  (1.53)  (2.30)  (1.20)  (1.12)  (1.22)  (1.62)  (2.30)  (0.59)  (0.07)     
2  2.99  -5.48  -16.35  -12.99  -7.12  -12.25  -8.96  6.28  11.98  9.43  6.14  6.67  14.95    -0.36  -0.29  260  0.49 
  (5.09)  (4.01)  (3.98)  (3.00)  (2.46)  (2.38)  (1.92)  (3.41)  (2.99)  (1.84)  (1.54)  (2.03)  (3.09)    (0.95)  (0.12)     
3  -1.18  -16.73  -15.41  -14.96  -17.25  -10.96  -1.83  9.54  16.09  10.70  10.97  15.69      -1.28  -0.45  240  0.59 
  (5.66)  (5.38)  (4.26)  (3.76)  (2.55)  (2.07)  (2.74)  (4.00)  (3.20)  (2.20)  (2.57)  (3.61)      (1.31)  (0.15)     
4  -14.08  -16.07  -17.29  -22.66  -16.62  -2.78  2.85  13.37  17.42  15.72  20.09        -1.82  -0.56  220  0.65 
  (6.34)  (5.99)  (5.27)  (4.18)  (2.43)  (1.99)  (3.07)  (4.42)  (3.15)  (2.94)  (3.78)        (1.74)  (0.2)     
5  -14.48  -18.18  -24.96  -20.51  -8.81  2.57  7.61  14.58  22.49  24.96          -1.47  -0.62  200  0.68 
  (6.65)  (6.70)  (5.85)  (3.65)  (3.27)  (2.31)  (3.34)  (4.59)  (3.81)  (4.05)          (2.14)  (0.24)     
6  -16.55  -24.88  -22.00  -11.34  -4.41  7.55  8.82  18.64  31.29            -1.43  -0.73  180  0.69 
  (7.08)  (7.05)  (5.53)  (3.57)  (3.61)  (2.58)  (3.12)  (4.85)  (4.75)            (2.54)  (0.25)     
7  -24.49  -22.41  -13.00  -5.52  0.37  9.48  13.95  27.55              -1.76  -0.77  160  0.69 
  (7.22)  (6.55)  (5.19)  (3.95)  (3.39)  (2.56)  (3.05)  (5.39)              (3.01)  (0.23)     
8  -23.17  -14.61  -7.97  -0.54  2.84  15.08  23.81                -0.65  -0.73  140  0.61 
  (7.01)  (6.69)  (5.51)  (4.11)  (2.89)  (2.65)  (4.24)                (3.71)  (0.24)     
9  -15.63  -10.60  -3.81  0.88  9.32  24.86                  0.84  -0.64  120  0.49 
  (7.64)  (7.34)  (5.67)  (4.57)  (3.08)  (3.84)                  (4.57)  (0.27)     
10  -10.71  -6.32  -2.47  5.97  19.49                    1.19  -0.58  100  0.38 
  (8.22)  (7.30)  (6.00)  (4.60)  (4.55)                    (5.28)  (0.27)     
11  -5.56  -4.43  2.91  15.43                      2.09  -0.57  80  0.21 
  (8.55)  (8.13)  (6.43)  (5.55)                      (6.81)  (0.29)     
12  -3.37  1.29  12.61                        3.51  -0.58  60  0.15 
  (8.60)  (7.69)  (6.45)                        (7.33)  (0.23)     
13  2.65  11.67                          7.16  -0.63  40  0.13 
  (8.29)  (7.58)                          (7.82)  (0.21)     
14  17.81                            17.81  -1.21  20  0.22 
  (7.26)                            (7.26)  (0.56)     
                                                                                                                                                                                                              (continued on next page)  
 
  94
TABLE A9 (continued) 
PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, CHANGES IN NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES,  
20 COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
h h
s, , h ,t c,t+h c,t s c,t s,c,t ) D -(s -s = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ          (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ s,τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
B. Without overlapping observations 
1  5.55  -2.52  -4.50  -13.17  -2.17  -3.39  -9.28  0.22  7.69  5.00  4.81  1.71  5.47  9.42  0.35  -0.11  280  0.36 
  (4.15)  (2.52)  (2.04)  (3.14)  (1.43)  (1.89)  (1.63)  (1.53)  (2.30)  (1.20)  (1.12)  (1.22)  (1.62)  (2.30)  (0.59)  (0.07)     
2  2.96    -16.38    -7.09    -8.94    12.00    6.16    14.95    0.52  -0.28  140  0.45 
  (4.93)    (4.11)    (2.60)    (2.04)    (3.24)    (1.57)    (3.09)    (1.16)  (0.15)     
3  0.22      -14.00      -2.97      10.04          -1.68  -0.60  80  0.45 
  (5.11)      (3.55)      (2.36)      (2.29)          (1.89)  (0.15)     
4  -12.17        -18.66        16.07            -4.92  -0.75  60  0.58 
  (5.73)        (2.97)        (3.37)            (2.46)  (0.26)     
5  -14.10          2.47                  -5.82  -0.66  40  0.36 
  (6.05)          (2.57)                  (3.57)  (0.35)     
6  -17.35            9.47                -3.94  -0.64  40  0.49 
  (6.15)            (3.68)                (3.66)  (0.32)     
7  -22.54              24.84              1.15  -0.97  40  0.71 
  (6.17)              (6.38)              (3.81)  (0.38)     
8  -24.96                            -24.96  -0.55  20  0.09 
  (6.67)                            (6.67)  (0.42)     
9  -14.16                            -14.16  -0.79  20  0.14 
  (6.50)                            (6.50)  (0.51)     
10  -7.82                            -7.82  -0.87  20  0.15 
  (6.74)                            (6.74)  (0.57)     
11  -2.24                            -2.24  -0.91  20  0.16 
  (6.79)                            (6.79)  (0.58)     
12  -0.18                            -0.18  -0.91  20  0.15 
  (7.00)                            (7.00)  (0.53)     
13  7.67                            7.67  -1.15  20  0.23 
  (6.62)                            (6.62)  (0.50)     
14  17.81                            17.81  -1.21  20  0.22 
  (7.26)                            (7.26)  (0.56)     





PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS, 20 COUNTRIES,  
(ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
h h
r, , h ,t c,t+h c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ                  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  r, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h 
( )
h










(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  3.23  2.34  2.57  -2.31  7.31  -2.64  1.60  2.94  -7.23  -5.58  -4.89  0.28  -6.32  1.68  -0.50  -0.15  280  0.39 
  (1.88)  (1.83)  (1.50)  (1.58)  (0.76)  (0.64)  (1.04)  (1.32)  (0.92)  (0.96)  (1.60)  (0.76)  (1.13)  (1.65)  (0.57)  (0.03)     
2  4.58  5.43  0.91  7.49  3.59  -0.22  5.43  -5.17  -13.08  -10.52  -4.72  -6.43  -4.52    -1.33  -0.29  260  0.39 
  (3.42)  (2.28)  (1.98)  (2.02)  (1.18)  (1.12)  (1.59)  (1.79)  (1.31)  (2.09)  (1.93)  (1.26)  (1.78)    (1.09)  (0.07)     
3  6.27  3.52  10.78  5.83  5.46  4.50  -1.46  -11.23  -17.98  -10.20  -11.35  -4.85      -1.73  -0.38  240  0.41 
  (4.12)  (2.91)  (2.65)  (2.37)  (1.64)  (1.72)  (1.64)  (2.09)  (2.30)  (2.22)  (1.61)  (2.04)      (1.54)  (0.09)     
4  3.50  13.25  9.17  8.98  9.84  -1.85  -6.79  -16.27  -17.62  -16.73  -9.73        -2.20  -0.43  220  0.42 
  (4.90)  (3.95)  (3.37)  (2.71)  (2.29)  (1.90)  (1.92)  (3.13)  (2.53)  (1.88)  (2.16)        (1.98)  (0.13)     
5  12.93  11.95  12.64  14.33  3.02  -6.89  -11.55  -16.34  -24.30  -15.16          -1.94  -0.49  200  0.43 
  (5.81)  (5.14)  (4.17)  (3.50)  (2.42)  (2.16)  (2.75)  (3.66)  (2.33)  (2.40)          (2.42)  (0.18)     
6  11.41  15.92  18.46  8.63  -2.65  -11.38  -11.41  -23.62  -22.98            -1.96  -0.56  180  0.39 
  (6.70)  (6.18)  (5.17)  (4.02)  (2.70)  (2.88)  (2.96)  (3.62)  (2.79)            (2.87)  (0.22)     
7  14.83  21.93  13.04  4.19  -7.63  -10.82  -18.21  -22.68              -0.67  -0.63  160  0.33 
  (7.40)  (7.17)  (5.76)  (4.48)  (3.90)  (3.00)  (2.95)  (4.21)              (3.37)  (0.27)     
8  20.74  17.29  9.29  0.56  -7.92  -17.34  -17.14                0.78  -0.73  140  0.32 
  (8.24)  (8.02)  (6.42)  (5.00)  (4.17)  (2.74)  (3.11)                (4.17)  (0.30)     
9  15.39  13.79  6.02  1.88  -15.10  -15.73                  1.04  -0.81  120  0.26 
  (8.90)  (8.86)  (6.87)  (5.30)  (4.03)  (2.84)                  (5.10)  (0.33)     
10  11.10  10.49  7.47  -3.98  -13.90                    2.24  -0.88  100  0.23 
  (9.36)  (9.03)  (6.99)  (5.39)  (4.23)                    (5.98)  (0.33)     
11  8.01  13.18  2.63  -1.31                      5.63  -1.00  80  0.26 
  (9.72)  (8.94)  (6.97)  (5.18)                      (7.42)  (0.32)     
12  9.08  7.46  4.87                        7.14  -1.03  60  0.27 
  (9.66)  (8.92)  (6.63)                        (8.14)  (0.30)     
13  2.48  8.77                          5.63  -1.00  40  0.25 
  (9.28)  (7.88)                          (8.36)  (0.25)     
14  1.60                            1.60  -0.72  20  0.08 
  (8.12)                            (8.12)  (0.53)     




TABLE A10 (continued) 
PREDICTIVE REGRESSIONS WITH TIME DUMMIES, INFLATION DIFFERENTIALS, 20 COUNTRIES,  
(ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
h h
r, , h ,t c,t+h c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ          (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  r, , h τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   h η =   Slope 
h  94,94+h  95,95+h  96,96+h  97,97+h  98,98+h  99,99+h  00,00+h  01,01+h  02,02+h  03,03+h  04,04+h  05,05+h  06,06+h  07,07+h  ( )
h
τ r,τ,τ+h 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
B. Without overlapping observations 
1  3.23  2.34  2.57  -2.31  7.31  -2.64  1.60  2.94  -7.23  -5.58  -4.89  0.28  -6.32  1.68  -0.50  -0.15  280  0.39 
  (1.89)  (1.83)  (1.50)  (1.58)  (0.77)  (0.64)  (1.04)  (1.32)  (0.92)  (0.96)  (1.60)  (0.76)  (1.13)  (1.65)  (0.57)  (0.03)     
2  4.04    0.26    4.17    5.87    -12.70    -4.50    -4.50    -1.05  -0.23  140  0.37 
  (3.14)    (2.05)    (1.42)    (1.62)    (1.37)    (1.96)    (1.71)    (1.19)  (0.08)     
3  5.68      5.43      -0.99      -9.92          0.05  -0.32  80  0.21 
  (3.95)      (2.40)      (1.88)      (2.39)          (1.92)  (0.13)     
4  2.36        11.05        -16.82            -1.14  -0.31  60  0.41 
  (4.18)        (3.31)        (3.29)            (2.99)  (0.24)     
5  12.22          -6.70                  2.76  -0.42  40  0.18 
  (5.52)          (2.42)                  (3.50)  (0.33)     
6  9.78            -10.09                -0.15  -0.40  40  0.15 
  (5.73)            (4.10)                (3.80)  (0.29)     
7  11.91              -18.63              -3.36  -0.33  40  0.25 
  (5.70)              (5.88)              (4.35)  (0.33)     
8  18.64                            18.64  -0.51  20  0.06 
  (6.70)                            (6.70)  (0.48)     
9  11.82                            11.82  -0.45  20  0.05 
  (7.09)                            (7.09)  (0.53)     
10  7.67                            7.67  -0.53  20  0.06 
  (7.60)                            (7.60)  (0.53)     
11  4.30                            4.30  -0.62  20  0.07 
  (7.72)                            (7.72)  (0.56)     
12  5.40                            5.40  -0.66  20  0.07 
  (7.92)                            (7.92)  (0.57)     
13  -1.98                            -1.98  -0.54  20  0.05 
  (8.21)                            (8.21)  (0.54)     
14  1.60                            1.60  -0.72  20  0.08 
  (8.12)                            (8.12)  (0.53)     





SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS UNDER FULL ADJUSTMENT WITH TIME DUMMIES, 
 20 COUNTRIES, (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
H H




r, , H ,t c,t+H c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ        with 
H H H H
s r s r 0,  1 η +η = φ +φ = −   
   (Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , H τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   H η =   Slope 
H  94,94+H  95,95+H  96,96+H  97,97+H  98,98+H  99,99+H  00,00+H  01,01+H  02,02+H  03,03+H  04,04+H  05,05+H  06,06+H  07,07+H  ( )
H
τ s,τ,τ+H 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
H




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
A. With overlapping observations 
1  10.63  5.52  1.49  -9.52  -6.66  -4.18  -12.60  -5.75  4.87  3.24  3.34  0.70  5.77  9.36  0.44  -0.58  280 
  (2.23)  (2.25)  (2.23)  (2.22)  (2.23)  (2.21)  (2.22)  (2.24)  (2.22)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (0.59)  (0.03)   
2  7.52  1.01  -11.21  -9.40  -8.92  -11.61  -9.99  3.49  11.28  9.43  6.35  7.17  16.32    0.88  -0.60  260 
  (2.74)  (2.79)  (2.76)  (2.73)  (2.75)  (2.72)  (2.73)  (2.77)  (2.73)  (2.72)  (2.72)  (2.72)  (2.71)    (0.76)  (0.04)   
3  2.44  -12.30  -11.54  -11.74  -16.25  -8.95  -0.51  10.13  17.55  12.45  12.81  17.64      0.98  -0.58  240 
  (3.08)  (3.15)  (3.10)  (3.06)  (3.09)  (3.05)  (3.07)  (3.12)  (3.06)  (3.05)  (3.05)  (3.05)      (0.89)  (0.05)   
4  -11.11  -13.04  -14.30  -19.72  -13.84  0.07  5.66  16.12  20.23  18.55  22.93        1.05  -0.57  220 
  (3.40)  (3.49)  (3.42)  (3.37)  (3.40)  (3.34)  (3.38)  (3.45)  (3.37)  (3.35)  (3.35)        (1.02)  (0.06)   
5  -12.85  -17.02  -23.48  -18.66  -5.66  5.13  10.58  17.97  25.38  27.68          0.91  -0.54  200 
  (3.71)  (3.83)  (3.74)  (3.67)  (3.72)  (3.64)  (3.68)  (3.78)  (3.67)  (3.65)          (1.17)  (0.08)   
6  -16.12  -25.63  -21.93  -10.34  -0.16  10.32  12.60  23.48  34.87            0.79  -0.54  180 
  (4.01)  (4.16)  (4.05)  (3.96)  (4.03)  (3.93)  (3.98)  (4.10)  (3.97)            (1.34)  (0.09)   
7  -25.03  -24.28  -13.95  -5.41  4.14  11.58  17.19  31.99              -0.47  -0.56  160 
  (4.17)  (4.36)  (4.22)  (4.11)  (4.19)  (4.06)  (4.13)  (4.28)              (1.48)  (0.10)   
8  -24.50  -17.17  -9.67  -1.27  5.49  16.19  25.97                -0.71  -0.53  140 
  (4.36)  (4.59)  (4.42)  (4.28)  (4.38)  (4.22)  (4.31)                (1.65)  (0.12)   
9  -17.38  -13.60  -5.95  -0.27  11.62  25.59                  0.00  -0.44  120 
  (4.78)  (5.09)  (4.86)  (4.68)  (4.81)  (4.60)                  (1.96)  (0.14)   
10  -12.84  -9.70  -4.99  4.45  21.42                    -0.33  -0.38  100 
  (5.25)  (5.62)  (5.35)  (5.13)  (5.28)                    (2.38)  (0.156)   
11  -8.86  -9.40  -0.91  12.93                      -1.56  -0.30  80 
  (5.77)  (6.23)  (5.89)  (5.62)                      (2.94)  (0.19)   
12  -7.72  -4.91  7.69                        -1.65  -0.28  60 
  (6.29)  (6.85)  (6.44)                        (3.77)  (0.21)   
13  -2.51  4.64                          1.06  -0.33  40 
  (6.98)  (7.72)                          (5.20)  (0.26)   
14  10.47                            10.47  -0.86  20 
  (8.94)                            (8.94)  (0.50)   




TABLE A11 (continued) 
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS UNDER FULL ADJUSTMENT WITH TIME DUMMIES, 
 20 COUNTRIES (ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, POLAND, RUSSIA OMITTED), 1994-2008 
H H




r, , H ,t c,t+H c,t r c,t r,c,t D r -r = + d +u τ τ τ+ τ ∑ α φ        with 
H H H H
s r s r 0,  1 η +η = φ +φ = −   
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
  Year dummies  s, , H τ τ+ α   ( 100) ×   H η =   Slope 
H  94,94+H  95,95+H  96,96+H  97,97+H  98,98+H  99,99+H  00,00+H  01,01+H  02,02+H  03,03+H  04,04+H  05,05+H  06,06+H  07,07+H  ( )
H
τ s,τ,τ+H 1 N α ∑  
(×100) 
h




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18) 
B. Without overlapping observations 
1  10.63  5.52  1.49  -9.52  -6.66  -4.18  -12.60  -5.76  4.87  3.24  3.34  0.70  5.77  9.36  0.44  -0.58  280 
  (2.23)  (2.25)  (2.23)  (2.22)  (2.23)  (2.21)  (2.22)  (2.24)  (2.22)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (2.21)  (0.59)  (0.03)   
2  7.45    -11.17    -10.14    -11.07    10.27    5.49    15.68    0.931  -0.66  140 
  (2.98)    (3.01)    (2.99)    (2.96)    (2.95)    (2.93)    (2.92)    (1.12)  (0.06)   
3  2.18      -12.26      -2.30      10.95          -0.36  -0.67  80 
  (3.31)      (3.22)      (3.25)      (3.18)          (1.62)  (0.11)   
4  -8.50        -14.05        20.51            -0.68  -0.71  60 
  (3.96)        (4.00)        (3.82)            (2.27)  (0.15)   
5  -12.13          5.15                  -3.49  -0.60  40 
  (4.85)          (4.33)                  (2.16)  (0.23)   
6  -14.82            12.49                -1.17  -0.62  40 
  (5.17)            (5.02)                (3.60)  (0.22)   
7  -23.44              28.77              2.66  -0.76  40 
  (5.50)              (5.91)              (4.03)  (0.23)   
8  -25.60                            -25.60  -0.55  20 
  (7.03)                            (7.03)  (0.39)   
9  -14.30                            -14.30  -0.80  20 
  (7.79)                            (7.79)  (0.44)   
10  -7.77                            -7.77  -0.74  20 
  (8.43)                            (8.43)  (0.47)   
11  -1.79                            -1.79  -1.02  20 
  (8.45)                            (8.45)  (0.47)   
12  0.96                            0.96  -1.03  20 
  (8.71)                            (8.71)  (0.49)   
13  7.91                            7.91  -1.17  20 
  (8.45)                            (8.45)  (0.47)   
14  10.47                            10.47  -0.86  20 
  (8.94)                            (8.94)  (0.50)    
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TABLE A12 
SUMMARY OF PRESENTATION OF RESULTS, 
HIGH-INFLATION COUNTRIES INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED 
(Number of table containing relevant results) 
High-inflation countries  Impact of currency 







1. Nominal exchange rate, 
with time effects  
   
•  Excluded  6.1  A7 
•  Included  A4  A9 
2. Prices, with time effects     
•  Excluded  6.1  A7 
•  Included  A5  A10 
3. Nominal rate and prices 
jointly under full 
adjustment, with time 
effects 
   
•  Excluded  6.2  A8 
•  Included  A6  A11 
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